On the New Loeb Republic



The new edition of Plato’s Republic in the Loeb Series, volumes 237 and 276 of their entire Greek Series, translated and edited by Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, is intended, under the General Editorship of Jeffrey Henderson, to replace the two volumes of the same numbers produced by Paul Shorey decades ago. Unfortunately that great edition will have been replaced by a version less than adequate.


The sheer quantity of the errors in the text and translation should have disqualified the manuscript from publication, at least in its present form. The nature and spectrum of those errors moreover suggests that the authors were unqualified to do the work. In addition to hundreds of basic translation errors that a third-year student might make, their work reveals specific ignorance of Greek idiom and insensitivity to Plato’s semantics and to his use of syntactical structures. The work even suggests a deficiency in the conceptual apparatus requisite to understanding what Socrates is saying, especially when the so-called Theory of Forms comes into the conversation.  And as to the pages on the left side, the fundamental errors made in presenting the text itself reveal methodological confusions and simple carelessness.

Before presenting a list of the offending passages in the order of volume and page, so as to illustrate and prove these alarming and disappointing claims, I will present representative instances of the kinds of errors that can be categorized and a few remarks, for remedial purposes, about the importance of getting these sorts of things right in the case of Plato.  




We may start with the presentation of the text itself. The Loeb authors have chosen on the whole to present the text of the 2003 OCT edition of the Republic by S.R.Slings (cf. v.1. p.4, n.1; 1.16, n.2; 1.26, n.4; 1.58 n.6; 1.74, n.8; 1.148, n.6; and 1.437, n.6 where Burnet's reading is listed but not Slings's, which instead is reported in the text without attribution). Certain idiosyncrasies of that OCT edition have therefore affected the presentation of the text here. First, despite the advances in the technology of digital printing, the line numbering of the Slings edition differs from that of Burnet by a line or two at any time. The authors of the Loeb might cite a passage in accordance with the Burnet numeration (e.g.,1.188, n.57 citing 376B11, and 1.201, n.69 citing 377D10) or in accordance with that of Slings (1.375, n.29 citing 428B5 and B8), without warning the Reader and probably unconscious of the discrepancy. Second, Slings’s “letter by letter” method of printing the text introduced certain disfigurements of presentation that have unfortunately been brought over into the Loeb, even though in most cases they did not need to be reproduced, since although the Loeb authors have almost everywhere printed Slings's square and pointed brackets they have very seldom included a corresponding note in their apparatus – even when the text they follow Slings in printing has no ms. authority and is just a delevit or a scripsit of Slings's (as for instance his relatively gratuitous emendations that they print without comment at 1.124, 1.136, 1.150, 1.170, 1.236, 1.256, 1.394). If one forgoes to present a critical note at the foot of the page there is little reason to insert the brackets above.  In other instances where the Loeb authors do include a note in the apparatus they might, or might not, import all or part of Slings's own apparatus, including his editorial remarks and his quirky way of displaying variants. Three examples will reveal the spectrum of problems brought on by this close reliance on Slings:


1)  At v.1, p.184, n.10, on 375B10:


Here is Burnet's text and his apparatus:


Πῶς οὖν, ἦν δ’ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, οὐκ ἄγριοι ἀλλήλοις τε ἔσονται καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις


b9  τε F Stobaeus :  om. ADM       b10 ἄλλοις  F :  ἀλλότριοις ADM Stobaeus



Here is Slings with his apparatus:


Πῶς οὖν, ἦν δ’ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, οὐκ ἄγριοι ἀλλήλοις ἔσονται καὶ τοῖς †ἀλλοτρίοις† πολίταις


b10 ἀλλήλοις AD :  ἀλλήλοις τε  F Stob.    b11 ἀλλοτρίοις AD :  ἄλλοις F Stob.(MA) :  ἀλλήλοις Stob.(S), fortasse πολίταις secludendum aut ⟨τoῖς⟩ legendum



And here is the Loeb with its apparatus


Πῶς οὖν, ἦν δ’ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, οὐκ ἄγριοι ἀλλήλοις ἔσονται καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις


ἄλλοις F Stob. :  ἀλλοτρίοις AD :  ἀλλήλοις Stob.  ⟨τoῖς⟩ πολίταις fortasse legendum Slings


So much ink for so little: ἄλλοις (adverbial) is the reading, with Ast, Stallbaum, Jowett-Campbell, Adam, Shorey, and Chambry – and now the Loeb editors. But the student looking across will wonder why Stobaeus contradicts himself and why Slings wants us to insert τοῖς into the text between τοῖς and πολίταις.




2) Here is Burnet’s text and apparatus at 411E4, identical to all previous editions:


Ἐπὶ δὴ δύ’ ὄντε τούτω, ὡς ἔοικε, δύο τέχνα θεὸν ἔγωγ’ ἄν τινα φαίην δεδωκέναι ἀνθρώποις


 e4  ἐπὶ δὴ scr. recc. :  ἐπειδὴ AFDM



Here is Slings with his apparatus:

Ἐπ[ε]ὶ δὴ δύ’ ὄντε τούτω, ὡς ἔοικε, δύο τέχνα θεὸν ἔγωγ’ ἄν τινα φαίην δεδωκέναι ἀνθρώποις


e4 ἐπὶ δὴ Laur.80.19pc: ἐπειδὴ ADF    δύ’ ὄντε AD: δυοῖν τε F



And here is the Loeb with its apparatus – i.e., none.


Ἐπ[ε]ὶ δὴ δύ’ ὄντε τούτω, ὡς ἔοικε, δύο τέχνα θεὸν ἔγωγ’ ἄν τινα φαίην δεδωκέναι ἀνθρώποις




The Loeb provides no critical note to go with this rara avis, Ἐπ[ε]ὶ, and the student will look to the foot of the page and become doubly confused. Then he will be trebly confused when he reads the translation on the right: “Since it seems then that there are these two types, I myself would say that god has given men two faculties,” which reads ἐπειδή and does so at the expense of treating ὄντε as a finite verb. I cannot say what happened here, but in case the authors of the Loeb have printed one thing and translated another, this will not be the only time. Cf. 395A3, where Slings and they have printed [τὰ] but the article is translated; 407B8 where Slings posits a lacuna (disfiguring the text with <***>) but the translation has no gap; 412D5 where they follow Slings and others in deleting ὅταν μάλιστα but then appear to translate it; 433B7, where Slings posits a lacuna in order to avoid the meaning that the translator nevertheless gives to the sentence; 472D4, where Slings deletes ἄν but the translation says “would you think” (there are several more instances in the second volume); 473E5, where Slings reads dative ἄλλῃ from the Monacensis, and the Loeb prints the nominative ἄλλη but translates Slings’s dative. The student will be left high and dry by these careless discrepancies.



3) The Ugliness at 1.92 (349B7):


Burnet's text and apparatus:


οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας, ἔφη.


b7  τῆς ⟨πράξεως τῆς⟩ δικαίας  Adam vetante etiam Stobaeo



Slings with his:


οὐδὲ ⟨ταύ⟩της [δικαίας], ἔφη.


b7 ταύτης scripsi: τῆς ADF Stob.     δικαίας ADF Stob.: secl. Wilamowitz: δικαίας πράξεως Stallbaum


And here is the Loeb with its apparatus:


οὐδὲ ⟨ταύ⟩της [δικαίας], ἔφη.


b7 ⟨ταύ⟩της Slings: τῆς ADF Stob.     δικαίας ADF Stob.: secl. Wilamowitz: δικαίας πράξεως Stallbaum


The Loeb authors have introduced Slings's peculiar way of citing the text into their apparatus which even Slings did not do. It is something of a relief to turn to Shorey's old text and see οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας with no critical note, translated, with swift elegance, “Not that either.”


        Besides these problems that come from the reliance on Slings there is evidence of a general failure to distinguish between textual evidence and editorial opinion, of which I will give only one example here. At 613E2 Au. prints εἶτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται (without dashes before and after as supplied by Burnet) and appends this critical note (n.6):


                εἶτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται Jowett-Campbell, Burnet; secl. Ast, Slings


The note is peculiar for listing four editors’ opinions without even citing the mss. What he has printed is in fact the unanimous testimony of the mss. and he has chosen to read it, so no critical note is needed. He might well add a note to the translation about editors’ doubts but these doubts are not textual evidence. Slings and Burnet both record in their apparatus that Ast deleted the words so that we have the early editor Ast deleting with one modern editor accepting his deletion and the other refusing it. But then how does Jowett-Campbell come into the picture? Why not mention Adam’s deletion, or Chambry’s in the Budé? And what did Shorey do? If we look at Shorey’s Loeb, which this text is meant to replace in the Series, Shorey tells us that Ast deleted it and was followed by Hermann and Stallbaum but that Jowett-Campbell and Burnet read it. This, then, is where Au. got the reference to Jowett-Campbell! Compare Au.’s use of Shorey’s outdated report of Adam’s opinion about 556D7, noted above ad 2.254, which Shorey got from his text of 1900 and not his famous commentary as any unsuspecting reader would assume, where in fact he reversed himself! Shorey had mentioned J-C only because that was a major edition at the time of his writing (indeed he had published a fairly detailed review article of the edition when it came out: AJP16(1895)223-436). This continual confusing of editorial opinion with historical evidence is the error of an amateur.


It is instructive to recall what Shorey had said over a hundred years ago, in the edition that the present edition will replace: “The text criticism of Plato to-day is a game that is played for its own sake, and not for any important results for the text itself or the interpretation.” Then he lets a few heads fall: “Nothing whatever results from the hundred and six pages of 'Textkritik' in the Appendix to Professor Wilamowitz's Platon;” Adam, he notes, repeatedly changed his mind about the readings; Jowett and Campbell devoted, he counts, “a hundred pages of costly print to what are for the most part unessential and uncertain variations.” In closing he quotes a passage from his even older 1895 review of that edition that I think can be counted prescient of the work of Slings and its effect on the Loeb that ironically will be replacing his own: “There is something disheartening in the exiguity of all this toil. … The game must be played strictly according to the rules, but when it is played out we feel that it was hardly worth the midnight oil.”

Of the Notes listed below the ones pertaining to the presentation of the text are marked as such by a small “t” in parentheses at the end of the Note.




The methods and content of Plato's thought, though not the ultimate purpose of his entire project, are new. He has not only built a raft in the ocean but in a sense has created the ocean at the same time as the raft. Among the means at his disposal were the semantics and syntax of his language, and the reader of Plato soon learns how heavily he relies upon both semantical and syntactical devices, in large matters and small, to pull this off.  Among semantic strategies are his uses of synonyms, antonyms, metonymy, figurae etymologicae and strategies of verbal anticipation and restatement, to involve his reader in the thought he is expressing. One is very often surprised by an unexpected word but then very soon is rewarded for noticing it, by an explanation that he would not have recognized as such without having felt the surprise. The course of the thought often culminates in the coining of a new term supported not by the previous knowledge and experience of Greek but upon what has just now been reached in argument for the first time (an example close to hand is the coining of “philodoxer” at the end of Book Five). Hereunder I collect passages in the Loeb translation that seem to me inadequately to bring across such semantic support in Plato's expression; the younger student might even profit from this part of the collection as a guide to recognize the claims I have just made about reading Plato.

For instance, at 375A2-3 Plato uses an hapax: οἴει … διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς. The sound play needs a more playful translation than “a well bred dog … and a young man of good family” to make the analogy seem less far-fetched than it is, or at least a note (Shorey: “well-bred hound … well-bred lad” / Quandt: “the noble hound and the son of a noble”).

At 478D5/D8, the logic of the argument relies upon φανείη and τὸ … φανέν meaning the same thing but they are translated “could be shown” (subjective) and “it would apparently” (objective). In both cases it is objective and means “plainly is.” The sense is that if something came into view ... then the faculty applying to it would be neither knowledge nor ignorance, whereupon the thing (faculty) correlatively comes into view as a thing between knowledge and ignorance. Socrates’s reliance on this sense and use of φαίνεσθαι is then emphatically acknowledged and corroborated by πέφανται in both question (D11) and answer (D12).

At 538D4, the fact that Socrates is making an analogy to the father indicates that the etymon of πάτρια should be brought across. Not “traditional” but “teachings of their fathers” (Shorey), vel sim.

At 603E8, “get under control” for μετριάσει fails to produce the etymon Socrates is interested in, upon which the argument depends (μέτρον). “moderate” (Shorey) is closer.

These examples are taken from the Notes below, where they will be designated as failures in the appreciation of Plato’s semantics with the mark, “(sm).”




In addition to his “astigmatic” use of language, with words shifting their meaning as the thought discovers new ground, Plato relies heavily upon word order, syntactical structures, discourse markers, and a variety of transitional structures to keep the reader abreast of the thought-events. His problem, and therefore our problem, is that he has chosen to represent conversation naturally. Careful distinctions might suddenly be made at any moment but the character of the language always remains casual and naturalistic and indeed positively eschews technical coinages and slavish parallelism. When  the suggestions, as for instance by emphasis, that are conveyed by the Greek syntax do not come across in the translation, the Reader finds himself outside the discussion and consequently the movement of the argument seems to him arbitrary or forced or both.

Again a few examples selected from the Notes below. At 364A1-4, ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς καλὸν μὲν ἡ σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον, ἀκολασία δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ εὐπετὲς κτήσασθαι, δόξῃ δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰσχρόν is translated, “They harp on about moderation and justice as fine things but hard and laborious while licentiousness and injustice are pleasant, easily acquired and regarded as shameful only by common repute.” The virtual shift out of indirect discourse loses the balance within the thought, which is presented with supercilious hypocrisy; and the management of μέν answered first by μέντοι but then also by δέ does not come across in the tr.  Better, “They aver that self-control and justice are without question fine (though mind you harsh and toilsome), whereas their opposites are pleasant and ready to hand, with opinion only and convention calling them vile.” The speaker (Adeimantus, telling us what he hears literature telling him) concedes the importance of virtue (the two main ones of the cardinal four slapped together with τε καί, verging on an expression like “temperance 'n' justice”) but then burdens them with a clause in μέντοι instead of, and stronger than, δέ: But then δέ does come (we had thought that the contrast between the good and the struggle it costs was done), and we realize there is an alternative: the uncomplicated truth that the opposite of virtue is attractive in itself whereas the attitude we just conceded is merely a conventional obfuscation.  

At 416C6-7: καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην οὐσίαν τοιαύτην παρεσκευάσθαι ἥτις ... is a καί … καί construction. τοιαύτην points forward (incorporating both οἰκήσεις and οὐσίαν) and is correlative with ἥτις. Socrates is generalizing (with ἄλλην) from the mention of beds to the principle involved, articulated in the relative clause. The logic does not come across in the translation “we must provide accommodation for them and all other material needs of this kind which will neither prevent them … nor induce them... .” Better: “their shelters and all other possessions or property to be provided them must meet the criteria that they not impede their progress toward becoming the best guards they can, and not arouse... ” (Quandt).

At 500A4-5: ἢ οἴει τινὰ χαλεπαίνειν τῷ μὴ χαλεπῷ ἢ φθονεῖν τῷ μὴ φθονερῷ ἄφθονόν τε καὶ πρᾷον ὄντα is not “Or do you think that anyone who is generous and mild-tempered will be annoyed at someone who is not difficult or will resent someone who is ungrudging?” but, according to the word order,  “Or do you fancy anybody is offended by an inoffensive person or envious of an unenvious one, as long as he himself is without envy and harshness?” The former puts the burden onto the generous person to perform rather than saying it is only the lack of generosity that might cause trouble.

In the collection of Notes below deficiencies of this kind are marked with “(sy).”




It is a hard saying that the Authors of this edition might have missed distinctions that are present in the language of Plato, but when the semantics and the syntax of a passage are clear I see no other way to explain how its sense did not make its way across to the translation, an outcome which is gravely detrimental to the reader. The deficiencies I have in mind occur most densely in passages where the Theory of Forms has become the vehicle of the argument (as for instance at the end of Book Five and the end of Book Six) but not only there. By the end of my reading, for instance, I came to realize that the translators treat a construction like “I am looking for that which has ...” (restrictive relative clause) as equivalent to “I am am looking for something which has” (where “something” is an expletive serving to provide an antecedent for the relative). I do not think these constructions have the same meaning, but in current English they may have come to, and if so the reader needs to know this. Cf.  note to 1.557-9, infra.

Errors that seemed to stem from conceptual confusion are marked in the list below with “(c).”




Problems of idiom encountered herewith were of two kinds, Greek and English. As to idioms of the Greek that had to be translated non-literally, we all know there is no systematic way to teach or to learn them. They are either known or not, and all of us are learning more of them all the time. By reviewing herewith the cases of Greek idiom that (I believe) the Authors have missed, the younger student might profit to learn some more. As to the English used to translate the Greek, the Authors have adopted fixed idioms for translating certain Greek expressions that often give the wrong sense or at least the wrong impression. I will present five such “idioms of translation” here, and will leave the hundreds of cases of missed Greek idioms to speak for themselves in the Notes below, where I mark them with an “(i).”

1)  “you see” is very often used for γάρ and even καὶ γάρ (1.303, 613D, 620A), which can be distracting (as at 1.85 top); also 500A5-6 (“I press the question because I think you will agree” is the sense), 550D10, 562A8 (γάρ is programmatic here, as also at 613D1), 598A5, 607B3 (a continuation of the apologia). At 606C5 “you see” (without comma: is it a typo?) becomes the governing construction! At 611A6 it introduces a purely logical inference from which the formula “you see” can only distract. At 620A1 it introduces an alien voice into Er’s narrative, which is being quoted.

2) “Then again” for αὖ is often adequate but almost as often not really correct (426D1, 435B, 435C, 477A, 510B, 524A, 581D6, 585D2 [echoing 585B4]). Au. translates it “moreover” at 580C3, where “again” would have been correct!

3) As for Au.’s habit of translating enclitic που with “I think,” this is almost always wrong (at 572C1 it is alright), since που means “we all presumably think” – that is, it presents an idea as presumable by the speaker, whereas “I think” often has the sound of asserting a (falsifiable) belief (problems at 337A, 362E, 379A, 485D, 486A, 491D, 520D, 527A, 564E6, 596A6, 596B1, 598B6, 599D1 [much too subjective here], 605C8, 611A5). Conversely, “surely” is just right, at 604B9.

4) οὐκοῦν is not inferential nearly as often as the translator takes it to be, seemingly by habit (380E, 507C [bis], 510D, 562A10, 573A4, 573D7, 574B9, 576B6, 576C10, 581B12, 582D15, 583D3, 584C9, 585D1, 588A7, 589A6, 590C8, 596B6, 598D, 601D4, 604A10, 604D5, 604E1, 609A5) – so also οὖν (cf. e.g. 536D6, 580C6, 584D1).

5) Finally, Au. seems to underrate the ubiquitous tendency of the μέν clause to be concessive (539A9-B1ff and 591A7 are two examples among many).




That a mediocre version of this very important work in Greek Literature has been published in this Series will tarnish its reputation, but that such a version should be allowed to replace so great a translation as Shorey’s is an incalculable loss – in my view at least who have learned so much from Shorey. Of the fifteen hundred errors I have assembled hereunder, Shorey committed less than ten, but a quantitative comparison pales when one compares the general quality of the new translation with that of the one it will replace, one of the finest translations of anything Greek into English. To illustrate the relative inferiority of the new translation, even when it is defensibly “correct,” I have included in the collection of errors below hundreds of passages where the ungainly new translation is vague, awkward, or slovenly instead of what had been elegant, graceful, and clear.

The problem may just be a creature of current fashion. James Loeb’s original goal was to present a reader of limited Greek with a good English version. As he put it,


    To make the beauty and learning, the philosophy and wit of the great writers of ancient Greece and Rome once more accessible by means of translations that are in themselves real pieces of literature, a thing to be read for the pure joy of it, and not dull transcripts of ideas that suggest in every line the existence of a finer original from which the average reader is shut out, and to place side by side with these translations the best critical texts of the original works, is the task I have set myself. 


It is conceivable in the present day that the patently less elegant and less fine translation presented herewith was deemed to fulfill Loeb’s wishes that the Reader should not regret missing something more fine in the original, and conceivable that the informality it exhibits was thought to make the text more “accessible,” as we now say. But by the same token the translation has turned out to be something less than what Loeb had called “a real piece of literature.”

Au. seems in fact to have respected Shorey’s translation enough to use it as a pony but then in his attempts to improve upon it has often lost the sense it made (cf. ad 334C5, 494C1-2, 539C1-2, 546D3-5, 564E6, 571D3-4, 586A6). Sic transit gloria.  

I have marked the Notes that exhibit such ungainliness in the English with “(u)” but give here a few mild but representative examples by way of introduction, quoting the two translations in tandem for comparison.


1) 409A


Δικαστὴς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, ψυχῇ ψυχῆς ἄρχει, ᾗ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ ἐκ νέας ἐν πονηραῖς ψυχαῖς τεθράφθαι τε καὶ ὡμιληκέναι καὶ πάντα ἀδικήματα αὐτὴν ἠδικηκυῖαν διεξεληλυθέναι, ὥστε ὀξέως ἀφ’ αὑτῆς τεκμαίρεσθαι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικήματα οἷον κατὰ σῶμα νόσους.


Now the judge, my friend, governs the soul with a soul, which cannot be brought up from childhood and have dealings with base souls, and experience every kind of wrongdoing when it has gone wrong itself, so that it can make shrewd inferences from its own experience as to the wrongdoing of others in the same way as it experiences physical illnesses.


But a judge, mark you, my friend, rules soul with soul and it is not allowable for a soul to have been bred from youth up among evil souls and to have grown familiar with them, and itself to have run the gauntlet of every kind of wrong-doing and injustice so as quickly to infer from itself the misdeeds of others as it might diseases in the body.



2) 479A

τούτων δὴ ὑποκειμένων λεγέτω μοι, φήσω, καὶ ἀποκρινέσθω ὁ χρηστὸς ὃς αὐτὸ μὲν καλὸν καὶ ἰδέαν τινὰ αὐτοῦ κάλλους μηδεμίαν ἡγεῖται ἀεὶ μὲν κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ καλὰ νομίζει...


With these assumptions I will say: let the worthy man speak and answer my question – the man who thinks there is nothing actually beautiful and no Form of beauty itself that is consistent in the same respects, but thinks there are many kinds of beauty …

This much premised, let him tell me, I will say, let him answer me, that good fellow who does not think there is a beautiful in itself nor any idea of beauty in itself always remaining the same and unchanged, but who does believe in many beautiful things …



3) 504D8-E3

ἢ οὐ γελοῖον ἐπὶ μὲν ἄλλοις σμικροῦ ἀξίοις πᾶν ποιεῖν συντεινομένους ὅπως ὅτι ἀκριβέστατα καὶ καθαρώτατα ἕξει, τῶν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας ἀξιοῦν εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας;


Or isn’t it ridiculous to spend all our energies on things of little worth to make them the most precise and pure but not consider the most important things which are worth the greatest effort to determine with precision?


Or would it not be absurd to strain every nerve to attain to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision for the greatest matters?


4) 591C5ff

Ἔπειτά γ’, εἶπον, τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν καὶ τροφὴν οὐχ ὅπως τῇ θηριώδει καὶ ἀλόγῳ ἡδονῇ ἐπιτρέψας ἐνταῦθα τετραμμένος ζήσει, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν βλέπων, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πρεσβεύων, ὅπως ἰσχυρὸς ἢ ὑγιὴς ἢ καλὸς ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ σωφρονήσειν μέλλῃ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ...


Then, I said, with regard to his physical condition and his regime, he’ll not only not give himself over to any irrational animal-like pleasure and live with his attention turned in that direction, but he won’t regard his health either, or even pay it special attention as to how he can be strong, healthy, and handsome, unless he’s going to gain temperance from these qualities ...


And then I said, he not only will not abandon the habit and nurture of his body to the brutish and irrational pleasure and live with his face set in that direction, but he will not even make health his chief aim, nor give the first place to the ways of becoming strong or healthy or beautiful unless these things are likely to bring with them soberness of spirit ...



5) 612D3-9

Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, κεκριμέναι εἰσί, πάλιν ἀπαιτῶ ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης, ὥσπερ ἔχει δόξης καὶ παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἡμᾶς ὁμολογεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖσθαι οὕτω, ἵνα καὶ τὰ νικητήρια κομίσηται, ἀπὸ τοῦ δοκεῖν κτωμένη ἃ δίδωσι τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτήν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ διδοῦσα ἐφάνη καὶ οὐκ ἐξαπατῶσα τοὺς τῷ ὄντι λαμβάνοντας αὐτήν.


Then, since they have been judged, I said, on behalf of justice, I demand by way of return the reputation that it actually has among both gods and men, and we should agree that that is how it is seen, in order that the prizes can be awarded which it acquires from its reputation and which it gives to those who have it since it has been shown that it bestows the good things which come from the real justice and does not mislead those who in actual fact adopt it.


Well, then, now that they have been compared and judged, I demand back from you in behalf of justice the repute that she in fact enjoys from gods and men, and I ask that we admit that she is thus esteemed in order that she may gather in the prizes which she wins from the seeming and bestows on her possessors, since she has been proved to bestow the blessings that come from the reality and not to deceive those who truly seek and win her.




This list includes the problems I noticed in one read-through and is not presented as exhaustive. Throughout I keep to the lineation of Burnet’s OCT. I have left out commenting on the exegetical notes at the foot of the page and on the introductory essays, as being of secondary importance. In addition to the sorts of problems illustrated by examples above and categorized by letters at the ends of the Notes, I have included typos, marked as “(typo),” and unclassified errors which as such receive no categorical marking. For the sake of classifying the errors where possible, a single passage with a duplex error will receive two notes. References to“Quandt” are references to my own translation and commentary on Plato’s Republic, available online at www.onplatosrepublic.com.


1.5    (327B6): αὐτός: ipse, the man himself – as opposed to the slave.

1.5    (note 5):  “to work alone” needs something. (typo)

1.7    (328B3): δοκεῖ: that it “seems right” means we “must do” (not “if that’s what you decide:” there is no “you” involved).

1.9    (329A7): “we feel irritated.” The translation shifts to the first person but Cephalus surely did not and would not.

1.11    (329B2): Regarding “moan on” and “harp on,” the “on's” only diminish the difference between ὀδύρονται and ὑμνοῦσιν. Shorey: “complain about … and recite a doleful litany.” (u)

1.11    (329B6): “I have long encountered” as a translation of Cephalus's ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα fails to bring across that he is bragging about having such better associations and introduces his “acquaintance” with no less a personage than Sophocles. Shorey: “ere now met with.” (u)

1.11    (329C5): “and still do now no less” is unnecessarily awkward. Shorey uses a chiasm: “thought it a good answer then and now I think so still more.” (u)

1.11    (329D7): “I was full of admiration for what he said,” says Socrates to the reader. Au. notes (n.15) that an extravagantly favorable reaction followed by critical interrogation is “typical of Plato's Socrates” noting Prot.328D and Symp.198A – but this is to confuse narration with drama. Those are dramatic dialogues and this one is narrated: it is to us that Socrates expresses his feeling of admiration, not to Cephalus. (c)

1.13    (329E2): “don't agree” should be “don't accept” (ἀποδέχεσθαι).

1.13    (330B1): ποῖα: qualitative (not quantitative) feigning surprise.

1.13    (330B6): ἀγαπῶ: will be pleased, idiomatically future.

1.13f    (330D-331B): The self-satisfied smoothness of Cephalus's expression does not come across. (u)

1.16    (331B1): Au. notes D F and Stob. but really it is Slings versus Burnet – for he does not report many of the more controversial emendations at all. (t)

1.17    (331A8): πολύστροφον is not “the complex mind of mortals” (abstract, vague and “unpoetical”) but “foundering” or “wavering,” retaining the sense with an accurate metaphor. Shorey: “the changeful mind of mortals.” (u)

1.18    (331D8): ἔφη, ἐγώ  AD :   ἐγὼ, ἔφη F – if one will report a total of ten variants in all the thirty Stephanus pages of Book One, why report this one? (t)

1.19    (331D9): ἅμα: matching action with speech.

1.19    (331D8-9): τῶν γε γε is causal (bis): it is as his heir that he is to take over the λόγος.

1.33    (334D7): “bad” is too weak for πονηρός. “knavish” would be better. Polemarchus implies that an evil implication drawn from a definition of good disproves the definition. Shorey: “the argument can't be right,” and then in a footnote: “that is an ‘immoral conclusion.” (u)

1.41    (336B2): “eagerly trying” interprets but does not bring across the imperfect, ὥρμα. “lurching” is better. (u)

1.41    (336B2): “take hold of the argument” should be “interrupt to oppose the argument” (ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι).

1.43    (336B8): “got hold of you all this time” is at first sight ambiguous (is it temporal or does “all” go with “you?”), and so the directness of Thrasymachus's remark is lost. Saliently, πάλαι is placed with φλυαρία.  Shorey gets it by upping “nonsense” to “balderdash:”  “What balderdash is this that you have been talking?” (u)

1.43    (336D7): “at the very moment” for ἥνικα, but the verb is imperfect.

1.43    (336E4): “not deliberate error on our part” is too roundabout for ἄκοντες. “didn't mean to” or even “accidental” is better. (u)

1.43    (336E5): χρυσίον as “piece” of gold is ugly nor is it the meaning. This expression is used to set up the plural used (πολλῶν χρυσίων [E8], translated “masses of gold”) as part of the argument a fortiori below, but “many pieces of gold,” which is what that awkward singular actually set up, is not the same as “masses of gold.” Shorey in the first instance uses “gold” and then gets the a fortiori aspect with the expression “much fine gold.” (u)

1.45    (337A5) προύλεγον is translated “told before” but then προείποις is translated “warned.” (sm)

1.45    (337C1): “what would your answer be” should be “what would you say to him.”

1.47    (337C2): “This instance is just like the previous one to be sure.” is not snide and abrupt enough. “As though this were that!” is better. Shorey: “Humph! how very like the two cases are!” (u)

1.47    (337C7): ἄλλο τι = ἄλλο τι ἤ. (i)

1.47    (337C9-10): “decided to do that” for οὕτω δόξειεν should be “if I came to that judgment.”

1.47    (337D1): δείξω is not “demonstrate that there is” but “put on display.”

1.47    (337D2) παθεῖν here and then twice in Socrates's reply, but translated differently. (sm)

1.47    (337D3): “incur” (παθεῖν) should be “undergo.”

1.49    (337E7): οὐ φαῦλον should be “redoubtable” not “of no mean reputation.”

1.49    (338A1): “has” should be “and to have” (ἔχειν infinitive).

1.49    (338A7): “be keen” (for φιλονικεῖν) should be “contend.”

1.49    (338B8-9): εὖ λέγειν translated “good answer;” then εὖ ἐρεῖν “argue the case well.” (sm)

1.51    (338D1): “him” should be “he.” (u)

1.51    (338D3): βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ: comic idiom and onomatopoetic.  Not “You are appalling.”

1.51    (338D3): μάλιστα: not “most likely to” but “(just to) attack it.”

1.53    (339A5): ἔμαθον ὃ λέγεις· εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς … πειράσομαι μαθεῖν is I grasp what you are saying; whether it is true I will next try to grasp” (rather than “but I will try to find out whether you are right or not”). (sy)

1.53    (339B2): In οὔπω δῆλον οὐδ’ εἰ μεγάλη the force of δέ is, “How big is as yet unclear.” (sy)

1.55    (339D4): σύ is emphatic (again below at 340A). Not “What do you mean” but “What do you think you are saying?”

1.57    (340B7): “what the stronger (sc. man) believes” (singular: this is important to Thrasymachus).(i)

1.59    (340E2): καὶ σύ is not “you too” but “just as you in fact did.” (i)

1.61    (341B4): ποτέρως is not “clarify in loose or strict terms whether … ,” but “clarify whether you mean it loosely or strictly.”

1.63    (341E6): τοιούτῳ means πονηρόν not “self-sufficient.”

1.67    (342D3): ἄλλο τι οὖν: not “in other words” but “wouldn't you say?” (i)

1.69    (343A2): ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος is not Thrasymachus's “reasoning on justice” but his “definition of justice,” referring to Thrasymachus's stunning “interest of the stronger” remark.  Shorey: “his formula of justice.” (u)

1.69    (343A7): “turning a blind eye” is not correct for περιορᾷ, which means that the nurse does not avoid but  fails to do her job. (u)

1.69    (343A5): τί δέ: not “what do you mean?” but “what's this?” (i)

1.69    (343A7-9): The echoic rhyme snivel / drivel misleadingly associates very different ideas (cf. “moan on” / “harp on,” ad 1.11, supra). (u)

1.70    In n.51, “minimize” means “understate.” (u)

1.71    (343E6): Tr. “do a service unjustly” is wrong. ὑπηρετεῖν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον is to help them in an unjust way. Shorey: “serve them unjustly.” (u)

1.72    (344A3): The text of AD is read by Slings and Burnet. The note records the variant of F which is just wrong.  Why report it in a “working” apparatus such of the sort the authors have announced they will provide (I.Introduction, xxiv)? (t)

1.73    (344A3): Au. prints a paragraph break (with Slings) but this is the climax of the list. (sy)

1.73    (344B6):  “instead being” needs to be “instead of being.” (typo)

1.73    (344B6-7): ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν ὀνόματων not “shamed and named,” but “instead of being called by shameful names they are called 'happy and blessed'.”

1.73    (344C1): ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπό is not “also by everyone else who hears,” but “even by persons who know of him merely by hearsay.” (sy)

1.73    (344C5): “both A and B and C”  for καὶ A καὶ B καὶ C becomes nonsense the moment the third item is added, instead of triumphant as Thrasymachus with his anaphora of καί and homoioteleuton means it to be.  Shorey contrives to bring this across by introducing “thing” as expletive noun so that he can put all three into attributive position and achieve a crescendo by lengthening the third:  “a stronger, freer and more masterful thing.” Tr. imitates Shorey but fails, with “is both stronger, freer and more masterful.” (u)

1.75    (344D1): ἐν νῷ εἶχεν ἀπιέναι means not “made as if to leave” but “wanted to leave,” as ἐν νῷ εἶχες indicates below, correctly translated “intend.”

1.75    (344E1-3): Compare, for this important challenge by Socrates, “Or do you think it's a minor matter you're attempting to define, and not the conduct of a life by which each of us will live our course most profitably, if we follow it through?” with Shorey's “Do you think it is a small matter that you are attempting to determine, and not the entire conduct of a life that for each of us would make living the most worthwhile?” (u)

1.77    (345A7): ἔστι … κερδαλεώτερον means not “there is something” but “that it really is” more preferable (cf. 345A3 for corroboration of this).

1.77    (345C4): Relocation in the translation of καθ’ὅσον ποιμήν ἐστιν to the beginning of the sentence emphasizes it too much and too little: it represents the proviso, which is the essential predication. (sy)

1.77    (345D3-5): “since I presume that it has sufficiently provided what concerns itself as regards its own arrangements for making it the best, as long as it in no way falls short of the shepherding art” for ἐπεὶ τά γε αὑτῆς, ὥστ’ εἶναι βελτίστη, ἱκανῶς δήπου ἐκπεπόρισται, ἕως γ’ ἂν μηδὲν  ἐνδέῃ τοῦ ποιμενικὴ εἶναι (345D3-5) is unnecessarily convoluted (Au. duly apologizes in a note). Shorey:  “since its own affairs, its own best estate, are surely sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of being the shepherd's art.” (u)

1.79    (345D4): ἐκπεπόρισται is passive (contrary to n.58).

1.83    (347A2-3): οὐδέποτε αὑτῷ τὸ βέλτιστον … ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ translated “his own best advantage … the interests of the ruled.” (sm)

1.93    (349B1): οὐδέν: “Skip it” (avoiding confrontation, choosing battles). (i)

1.93    (349B11): The second ἀλλά is sympathetic: drop “but.” Thereupon, μηδέ is illative: “although the just man doesn't deem it right to have more than a just man and therefore does not wish to, he does over the unjust.” (sy)

1.93    (349C6) ἀξιοῦν is parallel with the use at 349C1 but this does not come across. (sm)

1.95    (349C10): ἔστι ταῦτα: not “that is so” but “that's it” – i.e. that is what I think. (i)

1.96    (349E11-12): ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει, “tightening and loosening,” is translated “adjustment.” (sm)

1.97    (350A10): τοῦτό γε is “This much perhaps must be so” (not “Well perhaps this must be so”). (sy)

1.99    (350D4): ἐπειδὴ δέ, after μέν is “but once,” not “so.” (sy)

1.101    (350D9): οὐδὲ ἃ νῦν λέγεις ἀρέσκει is not “I'm not even happy with what you're now saying” (“happy” being the language of the personnel manager: cf. IDIOM n. ad 2.177 [533E7], infra) but “I can't accept what you are now saying, either.” It is true that the metaphor of “happiness” might seem justified by the fact that in the doxographic tradition ἀρέσκοντα came into Latin as placita, but here we are dealing not with an exchange of preferred or favorite opinions, but a dialectical fight. (u)

1.103    (351B4-5): ἡ ἀρίστη … καὶ τελεώτατα ἄδικος = “the city that is best, i.e., most absolutely unjust,” not “the best city that is most absolutely unjust.”

1.103    (351C7): Tr. for εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν is “And well done you.” British? (u)

1.107    (352C7): ἡμιμόχθηροι is satirical and derogatory, not just “half-corrupted,” but “half-bad” or “kinda-bad.” Below, τελέως – “perfect injustice” – is of the same coin. (i)

1.108    According to the n.73, concern about how one should live is “almost formulaic in Plato.” Perhaps this means that Plato the author uses this theme to effect a transition to a higher level of seriousness, but the theme itself already does this and so it is unclear what Plato has to do with it. (c)

1.111    (353B3): ἐπί indicates “examples” not “points.” (i)

1.113    (353D5): “caring” for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι  should be “taking care” or at least “caring for” (again at E4). (u)

1.113    (353D6): ἀποδοῖμεν not “entrust,” but “assign” or “attribute.”

1.115        That a second mention of the festival of Bendis gives a sense of closure to the discussion of Book One is true, but that the sense of closure it gives is a “false” sense (n.75) is only true because the dialogue unexpectedly (even to Socrates) continues after all.  Au.’s notion that it is a false sense shows that (1) he is positing that Book One was once a separate treatise, the so-called Thrasymachus), and (2) that when Plato added more to it he forgot or ignored to remove his original signal that the Thrasymachus was coming to an end. The sense of closure is only false if these two assumptions of his are true but Au. has only suggested that the first assumption might be true. (c)

1.117    The innovative punctuation :  : is probably unnecessary – again at 1.125; and 139 (: followed by , and : introducing examples “: such as”). (u)

1.117    (354C1): σχολῇ: “hardly likely” is too weak. “It would be nonsense to...” (i)

1.119    (357A3): Socrates calling Glaucon ἀνδρειότατος at the beginning of Book Two is not the same as his brother calling him φιλόνικος in Book Eight (548D): (1) the words do not mean the same thing in themselves; (2) the “immediate” behavior of Glaucon that Socrates's statement about him is here meant to embody is not contentious nor even competitive, but candid and challenging; (3) by the time we get to Book Eight we will have no hint of competitiveness in Glaucon (though the reader cannot know this since he is just now beginning Book Two), so that Adeimantus's remark there is unjustified by Glaucon's behavior up to that point in the dialogue (commentators can “explain” his characterization only by referring to an external passage from Xenophon); and (4) within the actual dramatic curve of the dialogue it is Adeimantus that by the time of Book Eight proves to be the contentious one, so that the best interpretation of that passage will be that the pot is calling the kettle black. (c)

1.121    (357C2): φρονεῖν does not refer to “soundness of mind” but “awareness,” correctly translated below with “intelligence” (367D1).

1.123    (358B1): “still think the same” should be “still agree with me” (cf. D6).

1.125    (358E3): “yet THAT being wronged...” (ἀδικεῖσθαι): oratio obliqua continues.

1.125    (359A3): “begin” should be “began” (ἄρξασθαι). Also “have made” for “make” below (συνθέσθαι, B3).

1.127    (359B7-C1):  “explore the … idea” should be “carry out in thought:” Glaucon is proposing a “thought-experiment.”

1.127    (359D6): On the verb καταβῆναι: That Gyges's climbing down into the fissure caused by the earthquake is an archetypal κατάβασις (n.11) is too much of a stretch without some argument. Surely κατέβην at the beginning of the dialogue would deserve such an interpretation more than this passage. Gyges “descent” does not fulfill the archetypal form, and his climbing back is a climbing “out” not “up” (ἐκβῆναι, 359E1). (c)

1.131    (360B6ff): “while at the same time … even” is wrong. We have καὶ … καί in a long list, thus: “since he could take … and he could go in and … .”

1.131    (360E2): Whether κρίσις means “judge” or “distinguish” (an old question), διαστησώμεθα does not mean “let us distinguish.”

1.135    (361D4): βαβαῖ does not mean “Fantastic!” but expresses consternation: “Yikes, I am in trouble!” (cf. Phdrs.236E4).  There is no “irony” for Glaucon to fail to see. (i)

1.135    (361E4): δεδήσεται means “tied up” not “imprisoned.”

1.137    (362C6): οὕτω is not “thus they say,” but goes with παρασκεύασθαι.

1.141    (363C4): The subject of ἀγαγόντες (κ.τ.λ.) is Musaeus and his son, not the gods.

1.141    (363D7): ἔτι τε ζῶντες means “and while still alive” not “in fact when still alive.”

1.143    (364A1-4): ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς καλὸν μὲν ἡ σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον, ἀκολασία δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ εὐπετὲς κτήσασθαι, δόξῃ δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰσχρόν is translated, “They harp on about moderation and justice as fine things but hard and laborious while licentiousness and injustice are pleasant, easily acquired and regarded as shameful only by common repute.” The virtual shift out of indirect discourse loses the balance within the thought, which is presented with supercilious hypocrisy; and the management of μέν answered first by μέντοι but then also by δέ does not come across in this tr.  Better, “They aver that self-control and justice are without question fine (though mind you harsh and toilsome), whereas their opposites are pleasant and ready to hand, with opinion only and convention calling them vile.” The speaker (Adeimantus, telling us what he hears literature telling him) concedes the importance of virtue (the two main ones slapped together with τε καί, verging on an expression like “temperance 'n' justice”) but then burdens them with a clause in μέντοι instead of, and stronger than, δέ: But then δέ does come (we had thought that the contrast between the good and the struggle it costs was done), and we realize there is an alternative: the uncomplicated truth that the opposite of virtue is attractive in itself whereas the attitude we just conceded is merely a conventional obfuscation. (sy)

1.143    (363E3): ἄλλα δ’ οὐκ ἔχουσιν means they have nothing else to mention although they very well should. “They don't have any others” is too vague and uncertain of sense. (u)

1.145    (365A2): In ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, δή does not mean “actually” but points up the etymological connection with τελευτήσασιν, which Au. translates “after death” (or does he mean for “initiations” to stand in contrast with dying?). (sm)

1.147    (365A4ff): ταῦτα πάντα … τοιαῦτα και τοσαῦτα λεγόμενα ἀρετῆς πέρι καὶ κακίας, ὡς ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αυτὰ ἔχουσι τιμῆς, τί οιόμεθα ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν... is translated, “How do we imagine the souls of young men will react on hearing all this and a lot of other such talk like it about virtue and vice and the esteem in which they are held by men and gods?” Better:  “Given this sample of things that are said about virtue and vice and the kind of respect men have for them and the gods have, too, consider what sense the soul of a young man might make of it all … .” Adeimantus front-loads the challenge for a reason: he formulates all he has said dismissively and only then asks what a talented young man would think. The translation again (as at 1.143) does not bring across the inwardly conflicted soul of Adeimantus, who is the person making these remarks. (sy)

1.147    (365A8): ἐπιπτόμενοι is not “darting around:” the metaphor is that of the bee finding the flower with the honey.

1.147    (365C1): The paragraph break (neither in Slings nor Burnet) is inappropriate. The “conversation within the soul” that Adeimantus is depicting is simply continuing to higher and higher levels. (sy)

1.149    (365D7): That it is impossible to “use force” against the gods is not quite right.  Shorey: “to compel the gods” is correct. (u)

1.149    (365E1): εἰ δὲ εἴσι is not “even if they exist” but “if on the other hand (δέ) they do exist” (the argument is an eliminatio). (sy)

1.149    (365E2): οὐκ ἄλλοθεν … ἴσμεν ἢ ἀκηκόαμεν ἢ ἔκ τε … :  ἄλλοθεν goes with the second . Having seen and having heard is a conventional doublet for personal knowledge and hearsay.

1.149    (365E4): “persuaded and diverted” for παράγεσθαι ἀναπειθόμενοι would better be “driven off course by being dissuaded of their better sense of things,” continuing the notion of βιάσασθαι (365D7). (sy)

1.149    (366A3-4): ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες quotes the poem quoted at 364E and should therefore have been translated with an echo of the same English. (sm)

1.151    (366B4): εὐσχημοσύνη  is not “elegance.” This is a back-reference to 365C3-4, πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλῳ περὶ ἐμαυτὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς... . (sm)

1.151    (366C6-7): “his” godlike nature is wrong for εἴ τις θείᾳ φύσει. The “if” really goes with θείᾳ φύσει. “He” has it only by hypothesis.

1.151    (366D3-4): “the first of such people having reached a position of power is the first to commit injustice” is perhaps British English – “first to reach” would perhaps be more idiomatic to my ear; but Shorey's “no sooner do they … than they... “ captures the idea better. (u)

1.153    (366E5): αὐτὸ ἑκάτερον is placed first, immediately pointing to virtue and vice considered in themselves. Tr. postpones the focus and an ambiguous pronoun as well as anacoluthon ensues: “But what each of these does through its own power when it is within the soul of the man who possesses it (are the it's pointing to the “what” or to the “each”?) … nobody has ever adequately explained by his argument that injustice is the greatest evil … while justice is the greatest good.”   Better, “As for what each of them is in itself and in contrast with the other is able to do given its own nature by virtue of being present in the soul of the person who possesses it, regardless whether gods or men notice, nobody has adequately attempted an account, proving that the one is the greatest of the evils by which a soul can be afflicted, whereas justice is the greatest of goods” (Quandt) or “But what each of them is in itself, by its own inherent force, when it is within the soul of the possessor and escapes the eyes of both gods and men, no one has ever adequately set forth – the proof that the one is the greatest of all evils that the soul contains within itself while justice is the greatest good” (Shorey). (sy)

1.153    Anacoluthon at “by his argument that” (dropped comma). (u)

1.153    (367A4): “be associated with” for σύνοικος replaces a powerful metaphor with a vague assertion. Shorey: “dwell in communion with.” (u)

1.155    (367D8): “unless you insisted” misses the emphatic σύ.  Add “considering who you are.” The optative is, moreover, polite, whereas “insisted” makes it contrafactual.

1.155    (367E): The word order “do not demonstrate to us simply by argument” is infelicitous. The construction with μόνον is: “Show us by argument not only … but also … .” The expression at 367B was better. (u)

1.157    (368A7): οὕτω δυνάμενοι is not “when you are able to” but “given the way you can.” (u)

1.157    (368A7): δοκεῖτε does not mean “of course,” esp. not just before τεκμαίρομαι.

1.157    (368B2): πίστουν is not “I would disbelieve you” but “I would lose my trust in your character.”

1.159    (368C5): μὴ ἀνεῖναι τὸν λόγον means “not to give up the argument” and has nothing to do with releasing Socrates (per n.40).

1.159    (368D1ff): “Since … we are not good at making an inquiry of such a kind, I think we should employ the kind of investigation suitable for people who are not very keen-sighted, if someone had ordered them to read small letters from a distance...” misconstrues the demonstrative (τοιαύτην [D2] points forward to οἵαν) and tangles itself up. Shorey: “Since we are not clever persons, we should employ the method of search that we would use if we, with not very keen vision, were bidden to... .” (u)

1.159    (368D8): For ἀλλὰ τί τοιοῦτον the tr. is “But what relevance here do you here perceive in our search for 'the just'?” Why the scare quotes? More exact would be, “But what analogy to this do you detect in the inquiry about justice?” (Shorey). (u)

1.159    (368E8): καταμαθεῖν is “apprehend,” not “understand.”

1.161    (369BC): What is needed is things, not people, as χρεία τῆς τροφῆς at 369D1 shows. In ἄλλος ἄλλου ἐπ’ ἄλλου, the last ἄλλου must be neuter, παραλαμβάνω taking a complex predicate.

1.162    (369D6): πόση, read in the text and reported in the apparatus, against all mss., is a guess in passing made by R.Chapman, but according to him approved by Housman, also in passing (CR 50 [1936] 167). Slings dug up this forgotten bit of worthless ingenuity, and read and reported it in his OCT, so that now it has been preserved the Loeb. (t)

1.163    (369C9): ἴθι δὴ τῷ λόγῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶμεν πόλιν, says Socrates.  “Let's make a theoretical state,” says the tr., but to “make a state by theorizing” (τῷ λόγῳ) is the real meaning and this is different from making a state that is theoretical.  (c)

1.165    (370A3): πράγματα ἔχειν means to be bothered by associations with the others. The note reveals that Au. gets the connotations of this (which is negative) and of τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν (which is positive) backwards. (i)

1.173    (372A6): ἄλλο τι again idiomatic = not “will they make anything other than” (literally) but just “won't they... .” (i)

1.175    (372C2): Glaucon interrupted (ὑπολαμβάνειν) with a retort: Plato takes care to indicate change of interlocutor. (c)

1.175    (372D8): For τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι, “avoiding suffering and hardship” misses the tone. Glaucon means “if their lives are not to be a complete struggle.” Glaucon τρυφᾷ. (i)

1.177    (372D7): κλῖναι is translated “couches” but then “beds” just below at 373A2, where Socrates is there quoting Glaucon. (sm)

1.177    (373A4): ἕκαστα τούτων παντοδαπά goes with the entire list, not just the last item.

1.177    (373B8-9): τῶν τε ἄλλων καί is an ἄλλως τε καί construction: “particularly for the women.” (i)

1.179    (373E6): ἐξ ὧν = ἐκ τούτων ἐξ ὧν. It is not that “out of war the greatest evil happens” (he has just decided not to judge whether what war brings about is good or bad) but that war comes out of the greatest of evils a city can suffer – namely, becoming “enflamed.” (i)

1.179    (373E9): σμικρῷ is “by a small amount” not a small army, since a whole army is not larger than a small army.

1.179    (374A3): ἱκανοί = “quite good enough” (Glaucon is expressing irresponsible “optimism”). (i)

1.180        The idea that Socrates's long argument about the need for warriors is meant to foreshadow or justify what comes later (n.52) shows only disregard for the conversation. The speech is long because at this moment Socrates (not Plato) is shaming Glaucon for bringing on the need for an army out of his luxuriant attitude and then insouciantly hoping they might get away without providing for one (τί δέ; οὐκ αὐτοὶ ἱκανοί; 374A3). The argument is a satirical argumentum a fortiori and Glaucon's acceptance of it ('The weapons would be very special indeed if an unskilled person could just pick them up and fight effectively') shows contrition. (c)

1.181    (374C4): γεωργῶν τις is not “one of our farmers” but “somebody who farms” (γεωργῶν a participle). The verbal expression calls for ἅμα.

1.183    (374E10): ἠράμεθα is “aroused” or “stirred up” not “having been taken on” (which would have been imperfect).

1.183    (375A2-3): In οἴει...διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς. The sound play needs a more playful translation than “a well bred dog … and a young man of good family” to make the analogy seem less far-fetched than it is, or at least a note (Shorey: “well-bred hound … well-bred lad” / Quandt: “the noble hound and the son of a noble”). (sm)

1.184        In his text-critical note (n.10) Au. reports Slings's emendation but in addition quotes his editorial remark (“fortasse legendum”). The obiter dicta of previous editors (and Slings was unusually generous with these) should not become part of the reportage in subsequent apparatus critici. (t)

1.185    (375A5-7): ξύν τε … πρὸς αἴσθησιν καὶ ἐλαφρὸν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθανόμενον διωκάθειν καὶ ἰσχυρὸν αὖ ἐὰν δέῃ ἑλόντα διαμάχεσθαι. The list is a swift κλῖμαξ with each item implying and dovetailing into the other (this is affirmed by αὖ). The tr. has “keen sighted and nimble at pursuing their prey when they have spotted it, and again strong when they need to fight it out when they have captured their quarry.” Shorey: “keen of perception, quick in pursuit of what it has apprehended, and strong too if it has to fight it out with its captive” with a note on the present tense of αἰσθανόμενον that in effect recognizes the κλῖμαξ: “There is no pause between perception and pursuit.” Quandt: “to have sharp senses, and as they sight their prey to be quick at pursuing it, and then once they have caught it to be strong at battling it into submission.” (u)

1.187    (375D5): “We're a long way short of the image we proposed,” but “short of an image” does not mean much; ἀπελείφθημεν means we have abandoned it (“lost sight of,” Shorey). (u)

1.191    (376D4): “Now it was his brother's turn to join in” is an editorializing elaboration of the actual words of the narrator, Socrates: καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφὸς πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔφη.  It is an interruption, and the tr. has distracted us from asking why Adeimantus interrupts at this point – though of course the long speech had faulted exactly his own education in poetry.

1.191    (376D5): προσδοκῶ προὔργου means “I believe the close study (of poetry) will help toward the goal” – not “looking at it.”  The gravamen here is εἰς τοῦτο.  He casts his vote for a longer instead of a shorter study of poetry.

1.191    (376D10): λόγῳ makes an implicit contrast with ἔργῳ. Cf.369C. (i)

1.195    (377B11): ἐπιστατέον means we must watch over the story-makers – not that we must “put (the children) into the care of them.”

1.195    (377C1): The variant again seems too minor to mention, except for the fact that in this case there is disagreement between the OCT's. (t)

1.195    (377C3-4): πλάττειν τὰ ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν: The tr. is, “and (persuade them to) form their souls with them much more than their bodies by handling them.” Tr. had already placed the stories in the previous phrase (“persuade their nurses … to tell their children the approved stories”), but even so μύθοις could and should have been translated again in order to drive home the comparison (moreover, the doubling of “them” for the myths and then for the children is ungainly). πολὺ μᾶλλον is not just “much more” (Socrates is not saying they should read to them for longer periods than they should massage them) – it asks the nurses to entertain the metaphor so as to persuade them that forming the soul is much more important than forming the body (for the sentence is a virtual instruction to the nurses).  Shorey does bring home the parallel by translating μῦθοι twice and also by using the same preposition (“by”) rather than varying it (“by” in the tr. is varied by “with”). Shorey:  “and so shape their souls by these stories far rather than their bodies by their hands” (though “far rather” is an obsolete expression). (u)

1.197    (377E1): εἰκάζῃ τῷ λόγῳ κακῶς means to do a bad job of imitating or depicting them, not “making a bad comparison.”

1.197    (377E2-3): “an artist who paints nothing like those whose likenesses he wishes to paint” for μηδὲν ἐοικότα γράφων is an awkward compression. Shorey: “whose portraits bear no resemblance to his models.” (u)

1.197    (377E7): ὁ εἰπών (sc. μῦθος not ἄνθρωπος!) i.e., μῦθος ἐκβλητέος.

1.199    (378C6): εἴ πως μέλλομεν not “if we can somehow ...” but “if we entertain the goal of somehow... .”

1.199    (378D): All three plurals are derogatory, which is not brought across in the translation. (i)

1.199    (378D1): “preferably” is not in the Greek.

1.199    (378D1-2): καὶ πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις … λογοποιεῖν means “and when the children get older it becomes THEIR job to lord it over the poets.”

1.201    (378D7-8): ὅτι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μή not “what has a deeper meaning and what hasn't,” but “what is mere under-meaning and what isn't” which is the opposite. That is, they do not know what to take literally and what not.

1.201    (378D7-8): “unable to distinguish what has a deeper meaning and what hasn't” is not quite right in English. Shorey: “what is and what is not allegory.” (u)

1.201    (378E1): “fixed” would be better than “ingrained” for ἀμετάστατα. (i)

1.201    (379A2): ἐν οἷς becomes τύποι, the controlling boundaries or outlines within which, not (singular) “model.” (u)

1.201    (379A10): δεῖ γάρ is answering ἀποδοτέον, not που! (i)

1.201    (379B1): ὅ γε θεός:  γε is causal. “since he is god he is good,” not “a god is of course good.” (i)

1.201    (379B2): τί μήν is “of course,” not “what do you mean?” (i)

1.201    (379B3): ἀλλὰ μήν … γε introducing the minor premise, as often: “And yet it is also true that... .”

1.203    (379B9): “Therefore whatever can do nothing bad cannot be responsible for anything bad?” translates ὃ δέ γε μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ, οὐδ’ ἄν τινος εἴη κακοῦ αἴτιον. In the course of the argument, above, the tr. has used “can” to designate the apodosis or inference, but in this case “can” slips into the protasis (indicative ποιεῖ) and the logic fails. (u)

1.203    (379C5-7): “No one else is to be held responsible for the good things, but for the bad things we must look for any other cause but the god” is needlessly awkward. Shorey: “for the good we must assume no other cause than God, but the cause of evil we must look for in other things and not God.” (u)

1.203    (379C6): ἄλλ’ ἄττα is “something else,” not “anything else.” (i)

1.203    (379D1): “blunder” for ἁμαρτία is wrong in the context of truth. ἀνοήτως ἁμαρτάνοντος is not “foolish mistake” but “mindless error.”

1.205    (379E3ff): “Pendant” or proleptic accusative τὴν δὲ … σύγχυσιν is better presented with “As to” than with “There is.” (i)

1.207    (380A8): Not “search out the reason we are pretty much looking for now” (?), taking σχεδόν with ζητοῦμεν, but “invent somehow that the explanation we are now interpreting be true,” taking  σχεδόν with (τοῦτον) ὃν. Shorey: “devise some interpretation such as what we now require.”

1.207    (380BC): The mounting climax, achieved by an unrelenting concatenation of μήτε's, does not come across. The climax indicates that the treatment of the first τύπος περὶ θεολογίας is complete. (sy)

1.207    (380C6): τοίνυν here = not “I can tell you” but “Hence” (given your agreement to the last point). (i)

1.207    (380C8-9): The sense of μὴ πάντων αἴτιον … ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν is not “god is not responsible for everything, but for all good things,” but “god is not the cause of all things but only of good things.”

1.207    (380C10): “happy with that” for ἀπόχρη: again the silly language that confuses rational conviction with personal mood. Cf. ad 1.101, supra. (u)

1.207    (380D1): “second point” should be “second model” or “outline” or “criterion” (sc. τύπος).

1.207    (380D2): ἄλλοτ’ ἐν ἄλλαις is spelled out in an appositive consisting of two logically complementary cases (τὸτε μέν and τὸτε δέ), namely, himself actually changing (αὐτὸν γιγνόμενον) and his producing different appearances of himself. This does not come across. (sy)

1.207    (380D5-6): πάντων ἥκιστα: πάντων is neuter not masculine. “Least of all things would he do that … .”

1.209    (380D7): νῦν γε οὕτως means not “I can say I can't tell you at the moment” (?) but “right off the bat.” (i)

1.209    (380E3): “in the best situation” should be “in the best state” (ἕξις): cf. 381B, below.

1.209    (381B4): ἀλλὰ μήν … γε again introducing the minor premise: “there again” is unnecessarily vague. (i)

1.209    (381B6): ἴσχοι is “take on,” not “have.”

1.211    (381B8): The first alternative having been dealt with (ταύτῃ μέν, 381B6), ἀλλ’ ἆρα now turns to the second alternative: μέν is answered by ἀλλά instead of by δέ. “if he does change,” in the answer, is almost strong enough for εἴπερ but the fact that this is the only alternative should be made cleaarer (e.g., “if he does change, that is”). This structure does not come across. (sy)

1.211    (381C10): ἅπασα ἀνάγκη is not “absolutely right” but “absolutely necessary,” referring to the logical necessity of the eliminatio, which indicates that the argument is complete. (sy)

1.211    (381D3-4): “gods of all kinds” is incorrect. παντοῖοι is predicate of τελέθοντες.

1.211    (381D7): ὡς ἱέρειαν ἀγείρουσαν describes her changed appearance, not a “pretext.”

1.213    (381E1): μηδ’ αὖ is translated “there again,” which does not bring across the μηδέ, by which Socrates had indicated it is another lie, leading to ἄρα which expresses indignation about the lie (which also does not come across). (sy)

1.213    (381E2): ἀναπειθόμενοι: The prefix adds the idea of being persuaded against their better instincts. (i)

1.213    (381E8-10): οἷοι μὴ μεταβάλλειν with μέν/δέ is not “are the gods themselves those who never change, but make themselves appear to us in every guise,” but “then is it the case that while it is the nature of gods never to change in themselves (αὐτοὶ μέν), they make us think they do.” (sy)

1.215    (382B4): δέξαιντο: not “admit to” but “accept;” and ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ (B5) is not “in such a case” but “in such an important part of himself.”

1.217    (382E10): κατὰ σημείων πομπὰς ὕπαρ οὐδ’ ὄναρ: NOT “a parade of signs in sleeping or waking,” but “signs sent to us while we are dreaming or while we are awake,” as below τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπήν, where tr. is correct: “the sending of the dream.”

1.217    (383A9): οὐδὲ Αἰσχύλου is not “nor even,” but just “nor.”

1.217    (383A9): αὑτῆς: just “her,” not “her own.” The reflexive is used merely to remind us it is she who speaks the following lines.

1.219    (383C1): χαλεπανοῦμεν is not “shall be enraged” but “shall chastise:” it is our policy, not our mood, that is the issue.

1.221    (386A1): τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα refers to the τύποι περὶ θεολογίας in general, thereby announcing the CLOSE of the section with edifying elaboration, but n.2 finds it referring narrowly to 378AD. (sy)

1.221    (386B8-9): περὶ τούτων τῶν μύθων τοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσιν λέγειν is not “those who undertake to talk about those tales” but “those who try to tell these stories.”

1.223    (386B10): τὰ ἐν Αἵδου is not “Hades,” but “what happens in Hades” (Shorey: “life in Hades”).

1.223    (386C4): πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα points (as usual) backwards (toward the indiscriminate dispraise of life in Hades) –  “everything such as” does not bring this across. (sy)

1.223    (386C5): θητεύεμεν ἄλλῳ means not to be “a peasant beside another poor man” but to be “a wage earner working for a man who merely rents the farmland” – TWO steps down from lord. Tr. makes a different set of mistakes the next time the line is quoted (516D5: “a slave tending a field for another person, a man of no renown” – 2.115).

1.223    (386C7): πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι … ἀνάσσειν: “rule over all these dead.”

1.223    (386D1): “appear” for φανείη is too vague. The meaning is not that the dwellings appear to be terrifying, but that terrifying dwellings come into view (perhaps the translator wanted a comma after “appear” and it is a TYPO). (u)

1.222    (386D4): The strange and busy emendation of the Homeric text by Slings (τι against the τις of the Plato mss. as well as most Homer mss.) should probably have been left behind in his OCT. (t)

1.223    (386D5): “there is no understanding in it (ἔνι).

1.227    (387C5): γένωνται ἡμῖν: Not “softer than we think they should.” The dative is “ethical,” used throughout the policy-making conversation to designate the interest and goals of the policy makers (371A8, 376C7; and, later, 423A6,427C6, 545D5, 607A6). (i)

1.227    (387D8): ὑπέρ γ’ ἐκείνου is not “would not mourn for that man” but (because of γε) “it would not be for the sake of that man that he would mourn,” setting up the alternative that he would neither mourn for himself. (sy)

1.229    (387E3): ἥκιστα … δεινόν is not “the least he has to fear is …,” but “for him the fear is minimal.” (sy)

1.229    (388A1-3): Compare the translation of this passage on the policy of allocating unseemly lamentation “to men of bad character in order that those whom we say we are bringing up to guard our country may scorn to do similar things to these men” with the translation of Shorey:  “to inferior men in order that those whom we say we are breeding for the guardianship of the land may disdain to act like these.” (u)

1.230    (388B8): μή τοι should be μήτοι (as at C2) – or both should be separated. (typo)

1.231    (388C3): ἀνομοίως = “inconsistent,” “unlike” – not derogatory: cf.377E. (i)

1.231    (388D4): ἄνθρωπον ὄντα is untranslated, and means “mere man that he is.”

1.233    (388D5): εἰ καί here = “even if” (not just “if”).

1.233    (388E3): “until such time as” should be “not until such time as.” (typo)

1.233    (388E9-389A1): “Nor must we accept it when someone portrays men who deserve respect being overcome by laughter, and even less so if they are gods” is an unfortunate expression since “they” has no antecedent other than “men.” Compare the swift clarity of Shorey: “if anyone represents men of worth as overpowered … much less if gods.” (u)

1.233    (389A5): μακάρεσσι should be translated. (typo?)

1.235    (389C2): “on the same level or greater” mixes measures. (u)

1.235    (389C4-5): Compare “or a sailor not telling the helmsman what the real situation is about the way in which he himself or one of his fellow crewmen is managing concerning the ship and the crew” with Shorey: “or for a man to deceive the pilot about the ship and the sailors as to the real condition of himself or a fellow-sailor, and how they fare.” (u)

1.238    (390B7): The text, brought over from Slings, is [ὡς], μόνος ἐγρηγορὼς ⟨ὅσ⟩α. The Loeb note tells us that ὡς was deleted by Wilamowitz, against all mss., but says nothing about the ὅσ that Wilamowitz added to in order to compensate for it. (t)

1.239    (390A5): εἰ δέ τινα ἄλλην ἡδονήν: not “if it provides any other pleasure,” but “that it might be pleasurable besides would not be a surprise.” ἄλλην is adverbial and was set up by γε in the line above, which was missed in the translation. (i)

1.245:    (391E6): Place comma thus: “such things, even.” (typo)

1.247    (392A11): τάξαι is translated “prescribe” but προστάξαι below, though interrelated, is translated “command” and the interrelation is lost. (sm)

1.247    (392B8): ὡμολογηκέναι: It is important, for representing the contours of the dialectical drama, to recognize when this verb means “concede” (as here) rather than “agree” (as translated). (i)

1.249    (392D3): “really” for τυγχάνει should here be “in fact.” (u)

1.253    (393E1-2): For ἐκείνοις μὲν … τὴν δὲ θυγατέρα the translation does not bring across how the former is his warrant for asking for the latter – one of the characteristic powers of μέν / δέ. (sy)

1.257    (394E3-6): Tr. again misses the contour of μέν / δέ. (sy)

1.259    (395C7): μηδὲν τῶν αἰσχρῶν means “none of the shameful things” not “(anything) which is classed as shameful.” The notion of classifying introduces doubt or mere convention. (u)

1.259    (395C7-D1): “in order that they may gain no enjoyment of the reality from their imitation of it” (ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύσωσιν, 395C7-D1) does not quite make sense. Shorey: “lest from the imitation they imbibe the reality of it.” (u)

1.261    (395E6): In οὐδὲ τοῦτο, οὐδέ answers the οὐδέ just above (δέ is copulative), and so the answer means, “Not that, either,” but the tr. takes δέ as emphatic (“Certainly not that”). Then the next question continues the pattern with οὐδέ γε ἄνδρας κακούς, which means “Nor men that are bad ...” rather than “And no bad men either” which rhetorically does not come to the same thing.  (sm)

1.265    (397B1): φωναῖς τε καὶ σχήμασιν is “in voice and gesture” not “in words and gestures.”

1.273    (399A5): “make an exception” should be “keep.” The double negative in the tr. loses the proper emphasis and contour of this beautiful passage (399AC); Shorey: “but leave us that mode that ... .” Moreover, for the second mode Socrates wants to keep, which is brought on by αὖ, we get “Again leave out that other mode ...” (i.e., leave it out of the ones you will reject – i.e., keep it, again interposing a double negative); and the translation of αὖ as “again” (a formulaic translation upon which the translator too readily relies) is redundant after the anarthrous ἄλλην that came before it (there is no “that other” in the Greek). (u)

1.275    (399C1): “ending up contented” for τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἀγαπᾶν  is incorrect nonsense. The phrase means “accepting the outcome.” (u)

1.275    (399D1): θρέψομεν  has to do with support and policymakers: “spawn” would be better than the consumerist term, “patronize.” (u)

1.277    (399E7): σωφρονοῦντές γε ἡμεῖς is not “So at least we are showing restraint.” The effect of the pendant participial construction with (causal) γε is, “That's because we are acting in moderation.” Glaucon is apologizing for his feverish τρυφᾶν at 372, which brought on the problems that are now being solved.

1.279    (400C5): σμικροῦ λόγου refers to the foreseeable length of the disquisition needed, in order to dismiss according to the criterion announced at 376D – not a “small task” to decide.

1.279    (400D2): “resembles and matches” for ἕπεται ὁμοιούμενον needlessly loses the element of irreversibility required by the logic of the argument. Better: “follows suit by assimilating itself to … .” (c)

1.283    (401D4): After Socrates's climactic τῷ καλῷ ἄγουσα (401D2), which the tr. nicely gets (“with the beauty of reason”), Glaucon responds “κάλλιστα” but the translation (“far the best”) misses the connection. (sm)

1.283    (401D6): “education” is too strong for τροφή, as is confirmed below at 402A2 (πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν). (i)

1.285    (402A5-6): For ἐν μουσικῇ … ἡ τροφή the tr. says “education lies in the arts.” What the Greek means is that what had been said above has illustrated what nurture in music can enable a young person to do. (u)

1.285    (402B7): τέχνης τε και μελέτης is translated “practical skill.” Shorey: “art and discipline.” (u)

1.301    (406D6): The (speaking) worker spells out his οὕτω with a participial antithesis. The “if” in “if he turns” inappropriately softens his rhetoric. (u)

1.301    (406E2): τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττων does not mean “minding his own business” in the sense of keeping to himself, but returning to his προκειμένη ἐργασία (as it is put above at D7). (i)

1.303    (407A9): οἶμαι δέ γε … καὶ πρότερον: δέ γε more than anything else in the sentence indicates the meaning, that it is a retort to Phocylides, and in particular to his ἤδη. (i)

1.303    (407A9): καὶ πρότερον is not “I think it was said earlier” (it wasn't) but “He should do it (i.e., pursue virtue) before as well.” Hence περὶ τοῦτο αὐτό has sense. δέ γε indicates “retort.”

1.303    (407B3): The subject of οὐδὲν ἐμποδίζει is νοσοτροφία; its object is the παρακέλευμα. With πάντων (sc. ἐμπόδιόν ἐστι) he then goes on to prove it (καὶ γάρ with empirical list).

1.303    (407B8-C4): XYZ ὑποπτεύουσα (sc. ἡ περιττὴ ἐπιμέλεια) καὶ αἰτιωμένη ἐκ φιλοσοφίας is not “causing XYZ and leading to the accusation that … (etc.).” It means “always imagining that XYZ are happening and blaming philosophy for it” – so that wherever “virtue” (sarcastic) is practiced in this way, there (πάντῃ answering ὅπῃ) the ἐπιμέλεια is obstructive.

1.305    The large paragraph in the center of the page is beyond repair.

1.305    (407E3): πολιτικὸν λέγεις Ἀσκληπιόν is a joke. Not “Asclepius was a politician as you see it,” but “You've made the doctor into a politician!” (i)

1.306    (408A6): ὅτι δ’ (first words) should not be indented. There is no paragraph break here. (typo)

1.307    (408B2): “to themselves” for αὐτοῖς (not αὑτοῖς), should be “to those who live it.” (u)

1.307    (408B7): ἀπειθοῦντες is not “disregarding” but “unpersuaded,” “persisting to view things differently from the way we do.”

1.309    (408D4): καὶ μάλα ἀγαθούς, in response to 408C6, ἀγαθούς referring to the δικασταί, only.(i)

1.309    (408E3): “or become ill” (translating γενέσθαι) should be “or have become ill,” as in the next clause γενομένην, which is translated properly. Also “have had” is needed for the perfects τέτραφθαι and ὡμιληκέναι (at 409A2-3).

1.309    (409A1): δέ contrasts with μέν at D10 above and should be translated “but” – not “now.” (sy)

1.309    (409A): Again the tr. is beyond repair. Compare Shorey. (u)

1.309    (409A5): οἷον κατὰ σῶμα νόσους goes with ὀξέως τεκμαίρεσθαι: “make swift judgments about ἀδικήματα as soul can do about diseases of body,” not “as it experiences physical illnesses.”

1.311    (409B6): “who has not perceived” (οὐκ, B6, goes with ᾐσθημένον not οἰκείαν). One does not perceive a negative.

1.311    (409B6-7): The two perfect participial phrases (ᾐσθημένον / μεμεληκότα) create a contrast that does not come across in the translation. μελέτη stands in contrast with raw empirical exposure, and ushers in perception instead (διαισθάνεσθαι trumps ᾐσθημένον). (sm)

1.315    (410C6): τὸ μέγιστον is “in largest part,” not “especially.”

1.319    (411D1): It is the φιλομαθές τι that is the subject, not the man.

1.319    (411D5): For οὐδὲ διακαθαιρομένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων αὐτοῦ, “nor are his senses ever thoroughly cleansed.” (= ?)  Shorey: “nor are its perceptions purified and quickened.” The subject of the sentence is not the man but the putative learning-loving element within him (εἴ τι καὶ ἐνῆν ... φιλομαθές): all those participles are neuter. The learning-loving element is starved of what sustains it and therefore (the οὐδέ is illative) remains submerged in the sensory aspect of what it is eager to know. (u)

1.319    (411E4): ἐπὶ δή is printed (more accurately, ἐπ[ε]ὶ δή is printed, in the manner of Slings) but the translation is “since there are” as if the translator read ἐπειδή, with the mss. – but that would require a finite verb, not the participle ὄντε.

1.319    (411E5): θεόν … τινα is “some god,” not just “god.”

1.323    (412C10): φυλακικωτάτους needs to be translated as the coinage that it is – at least “most guardly” – in order to represent the consequence of the argument. Not just “defending” (i)

1.323    (412D2): κήδοιτο δέ τις: not “the one who would most take care would be the one who loves it,” but “a person would take most care of that which he loves.”

1.323    (412D4): καὶ μήν … γε introducing the minor premise (A is B; B is C) – not “and added to this.” (i)

1.323    (412D5): “when he thought” begins an anacoluthon unless we supply “would love it” before. It appears that the translator has decided to translate the ὅταν μάλιστα he indicates he deleted (with Hermann, Burnet and Slings – where incidentally he should have written, in the critical note, secluserunt rather than seclusit). For the discrepancy between his Greek text and his translation cf. 1.391: ἐπ[ε]ὶ δή, which he seems to translate with “since,” and cf. §1 on TEXT, supra. (u)

1.323    (412D5): The text brackets ὅταν μάλιστα and the note below reads: ὅταν μάλιστα seclusit Hermann, Burnet, Slings. Besides its unneeded commas and incorrect third singular seclusit, the report is misleading since the mss. at 412D5 do not all read the words that the three editors are said to have excluded. Stob. has ὅτι μάλιστα and while AD have the καὶ before it F does not. Add to this that the deleted words do appear in the facing translation. (t)

1.323    (412D10-E3): οἳ ἂν … μάλιστα φαίνωνται … ὃ μὲν ἂν τῇ πόλει ἡγήσωνται συμφέρειν πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ ποιεῖν, ὃ δ’ ἂν μή, μηδενὶ τρόπῳ πρᾶξαι ἂν ἐθέλειν is translated: “who ... appear to do with the utmost enthusiasm throughout their lives whatever they think will benefit the state, while on the other hand having no wish at all to do what they do not consider beneficial.” “Appear” is wrong: it means “are revealed,” “are seen,” “are discovered” (as we watch them), and with μάλιστα means “stand out.” The early location of “do” in the translation steals the thunder from the coming μέν / δέ construction (for ποιεῖν goes only with the μέν clause) and πρᾶξαι ἂν ἐθέλειν is rendered anticlimactic, although πρᾶξαι ἂν ἐθέλειν is a strengthened version of the construction we had expected, which was merely μηδενὶ ἂν πράττειν. (u)

1.325    (413A1): δόξα (understood with ) should be translated not “doctrine” but “belief,” as just above. (sm)

1.327    (413C1): τοὺς μὴν γοητευθέντας ὡς ἐγῷμαι κἂν σὺ φαίης is not “I myself think and I think you too would say,” but “As to those I have referred to (this is the role of τούς) as having been beguiled, I fancy that you, too, would say this (for in the previous two cases he had told us merely what he himself would say: μήν warns this sort of asseveration is coming) about any persons who change their outlook either because lured by pleasure or the terrorized by fear.” And Glaucon's reply is not (per tr.) “It seems that 'to beguile' means everything that misleads” (strangely identifying the verbal subject with the verb itself), but “Yes I would (this is γάρ), for it seems that whatever confuses a person beguiles him,” explaining that the passive (γοητευθέντας) is predicable of the verb's object because the active (γοητεύειν) can be predicated of the verb's subject. (u)

1.327    (413C6): τοῦ παρ’αὑτοῖς δόγματος: not the “best guardians among themselves of the principle,” but the “best guardians of the principle that has been entrusted to them to preserve.”

1.327    (413C8): “those we put in charge” is not in the Greek, and “in setting” should be “by setting:” the dative goes with τηρητέον and tells how we will watch and test them.

1.327    (413D5): ταὐτὰ ταῦτα is “these same behaviors” not “qualities:” the behaviors (C8-9) are being watched as evidence for the qualities (i.e., τίνες ἄριστοι).

1.327    (413D10): δείματ’ ἄττα is not “anything frightening” but “some (specifically chosen) frightening things,” τὶς often added to connote details of contrivance or carefulness being passed over with understatement. (i)

1.329    (414B5): “are calling” should be “were calling” (ἐκαλοῦμεν).

1.331    (414E4): βουλεύεσθαι is dependent upon δεῖ, which was not translated. αὐτούς means it has devolved upon themselves to do the work for the mother.

1.333    (415C6): “is on duty” for (φυλάξῃ, aorist) should be “is its guardian” (Shorey). (u)

1.335    (415E1): μάλιστ’ ἂν κατέχοιεν: μάλιστα not going with “those inside”(τοὺς ἔνδον) but with κατέχοιεν (from what location they can best control as well as defend). (i)

1.335    (415E4): εὐνάς is not “sleeping quarters:” the sparest possible expression is needed.  

1.335    (415E6): The antecedent of τοιαύτας is the beds, not “measures.” Socrates is referring back and Glaucon does not understand.

1.335    (415E6-7): On χειμῶνός τε καὶ θέρους ἱκανάς:  These words about the simple beds of the guardians plainly allude to the words that incited Glaucon to interrupt at 372C and must be translated so as to bring across this allusion. (sm)

1.335    (416A1): αὖ is not just “then,” but self-consciously asks a second question to get to the bottom of what Socrates is saying. (sm)

1.335    (416A6): ἀντί not “more like B” but “instead of A.” (i)

1.335    (416A7): ὁμοιωθῆναι is an inceptive aorist: not just “resemble” but “come to resemble.”

1.337    (416B8): οὐκ ἄξιον διισχυρίζεσθαι is translated, “That doesn't deserve a strong assertion” (is this perhaps British?). It means, “you cannot rely on the education being sufficient in itself,” while φαίη ἄν τις νοῦν ἔχων below means “rather than being rash, a mindful person would declare,” not “anyone with any sense.” (u)

1.337    (416C6-7): καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην οὐσίαν τοιαύτην παρεσκευάσθαι ἥτις ... is a καί … καί construction. τοιαύτην points forward (incorporating both οἰκήσεις and οὐσίαν) and is correlative with ἥτις. Socrates is generalizing (with ἄλλην) from the mention of beds to the principle involved, articulated in the relative clause. The logic does not come across in the translation “we must provide accommodation for them and all other material needs of this kind which will neither prevent them … nor induce them... .” Better: “their shelters and all other possessions or property to be provided them must meet the criteria that they not impede their progress toward becoming the best guards they can, and not arouse ... .” (sy)

1.337    (416E4-417A1): Compare the present tr., “We shall tell them they have divine gold and silver from the gods for ever in their souls, and that they have no need of human gold and silver in addition. Also that they must not combine the possession of that gold with the possession of mortal gold and contaminate the divine, because many unholy things have been done in relation to the currency of the masses but what they have is pure” with Shorey's: “Gold and silver, we will tell them, they have of the divine quality from the gods always in their souls, and they have no need of the metal of men nor does holiness suffer them to mingle and contaminate that heavenly possession with the acquisition of mortal gold since many impious deeds have been done about the coin of the multitude, while that which dwells within them is unsullied.” (u)

1.339    (417A2): “in the state” is said twice in the translation: the first should be kept and the second deleted. (typo)

1.339    (417B3-4): πολὺ πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον δεδιότες τοὺς ἔνδον ἤ τοὺς ἔξωθεν: Not just “fearing those within far more than the enemies from the outside,” but “fearing those within instead of – and even more than – those without, who are the enemy.” (i)

1.341    (419A2): μὴ πάνυ τι is sarcastic:  “you're not making them particularly happy” – not “you are not making them at all happy.” (i)

1.341    (419A7): ξενοδοκοῦντες is entertaining guests from abroad. (i)

1.341    (419A8): At καὶ δὴ καί the translation (“And ... they have amassed gold ...”) loses the construction which resumes the participles after (A5). (sy)

1.341    (419A9): ὅσα νομίζεται τοῖς μέλλουσιν: Not what is “highly valued by those who are destined to be happy” (I am not sure what this means), but “all that is customary for those who are expecting to be happy” (Shorey), or “all one customarily expects to find in the lives of those who have really arrived” (Quandt). For the expression and the sentiment cf. Glaucon's remark at 372D6-8. In both cases the objectors are hiding behind custom as a sanction for their own desires.

1.345    (420D5): To end the quotation at 420D5 (with Slings) leaves ἡμεῖς to mean Socrates and the others, excluding Adeimantus – impossible. Keep quote until 421A8 (with Burnet): thereby, ἐκεῖνο (B1) has something to refer to (it does not mean “the opposite”). Socrates is responding, but indirectly, to Adeimantus. His exasperated rhetoric (e.g., 420E7) shows impatience with the imaginary interlocutor.

1.345    (420E7): Not “so that the whole state is happy” but “in order that the whole state be happy:” ἵνα for purpose not result; δή (E7) shows climactic exasperation. (i)

1.345    (421A1-2): Not “nor will anyone else who makes up the state have a specific function,” but “nor will anyone else retain his respective function out of which (functions) the state is constituted.”

1.351    (422B10-C1): τὸν πρότερον ἀεὶ προσφερόμενον κ.τ.λ. : not “the one who persists in attacking” but “retreating from the one who at any moment is attacking, but attacking the other (who isn't):” ἀεί in its “distributive” sense.

1.351    (422D2): τἀληθῆ εἴπωσιν Not quite “send a delegation and tell them the truth, that …” but “inform them, with a delegation, of what is after all nothing but the truth.”  For the idiom Shorey supplies parallels ad loc. (i)

1.353    (423A8-B1): οὕτω γὰρ μεγάλην πόλιν μίαν οὐ ῥάδίως … εὑρήσεις is not “you will not easily find a single state so great which is a unity” but (notice the word order, and translate μίαν only once) “a state great in this way you will not easily find, even one.” Then δοκούσας stands in contrast with οὕτω, not μεγάλην. (i)

1.355    (423B6): ἥλικῃ οὔσῃ not “when it is” but “for a city of that (determined: cf. ὅρος) size, marking off the amount of space it (as such) needs (and forgoing to grasp for more).”

1.355    (423B9-10) The ὅρος – μέχρι οὗ ἂν ἐθέλῃ αὐξομένη εἶναι μία μέχρι τούτου αὔξειν – is not “if the state wants to be a single entity it should expand this far and no farther,” but “up to the point where the state tends despite its increase (αὐξομένη, absent in the translation) to remain unified, up to that point (to allow it) to grow.” It is the ἐθέλειν of natural tendency. (u)

1.355    (423C1, C5): Adeimantus's repeated use of καί … γε, noticed by Socrates at C6, marks a strong shift in his tone toward sputtering indignation. (i)

1.355    (423C4): ἀλλά τις ἱκανὴ καὶ μία: Not “something adequate and unified.” τὶς is not nominal but adjectival and effects an understated transition from the wrongheaded way to a better way brought about by contrivance and care (cf. on 1.327 supra). The sense, is “instead of large or small it will be seen qualitatively, to be adequate and unified.” (i)

1.355    (423C4): δοκοῦσα is not “to all appearances” (which means 'as far as you can tell by looking') but “seeming” (i.e., 'conveying a false impression'). (u)

1.355    (423C5): “I'm sure that we will probably have no trouble in getting them to do this” confuses the modalities of certainty. What Adeimantus means by καὶ φαῦλόν γ’ ἴσως αὐτοῖς προστάξομεν is “Yes, a mere bagatelle,” dubious that they will be able (not that they will be willing). For his καί γε cf. idiom n. ad 1.355. (u)

1.355    (423C6): τούτου ἔτι φαυλότερον τόδε: not “even easier than this (the following)” but “this (the following) is even easier than that.”

1.357    (424B1): ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, adverbial ἄλλος meaning “among animals as well,” not “in other animals.” (i)

1.359    (424D5): ὡς ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει is not “as in some part of a game” (ἐν μέρει with genitive is idiomatic), but “because it is supposed to be only a form of play” (Shorey), or “viewed as if it were merely a playful diversion” (Quandt). (u)

1.359    (424C7-D7ff): Misses again the mounting shift of tone. Adeimantus's οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται is a retort (n.b., γάρ) to Socrates's κακὸν οὐδὲν ἐργάζεται. (i)

1.359    (424D5): ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει is not “as some part of a game.” It is the common idiom with μέρος in the dative, like εἴδει. (i)

1.359    (424D5): ὡς ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει is not “as in some part of a game” (=?), but “because it is supposed to be only a form of play” (Shorey), or “viewed as if it were merely a playful diversion” (Quandt). (u)

1.360    (425A4): κείνοις should be ’κείνοις. This diacritical error (in designating the elision of an initial vowel) has occurred several times in the presentation of the Greek text and might be due to an uncontrolled intervention of a default “smart quotes” preference in word processing software. (typo)

1.361    (425B1): “an example” is wrong for the plural τὰ τοίαδε.

1.363    (425B7): νομοθετεῖν δέ should be “But to legislate … .” The antithetical structure does not come across. (sy)

1.363    (425B7-8): Socrates says that to legislate about minor aspects of behavior is silly:  οὔτε γάρ που γίγνεται οὔτ’ ἂν μένειεν λόγῳ τε καὶ γράμμασιν νομοθετηθέντα (425B7-8). The translation is “For anything laid down by law … does not happen ... nor would it last.” I do not think the translator means to say what this sentence means. (c)

1.363    (425B8): νομοθετηθέντα is predicate of αὐτά, not subject. The translation adds “anything” to the Greek and ends up asserting that all legislation is useless, which is not the sense at all. (sy)

1.365    (425D7): ἄξιον: “right” is wrong. ῥάδίως, below, tells why it is not “worth our time.” They will easily find them on their own, being καλοὶ κἀγαθοί.

1.365    (425E6): ἐπιλήψεσθαι is “latch onto,” not just “get;” ἐκβῆναι “abandon” rather than “escape;” πονηρᾶς διαίτης is “corrupt diet” rather than “life of poor quality.” (i)

1.365    (426A3): καὶ ἀεὶ ἐλπίζοντες, coming first in the Greek, means “foolishly optimistic as they are” they always fall for the latest nostrum. The translation turns this precondition of the protasis into an apodosis. (sy)

1.365    (426A6): τόδε αὐτῶν οὐ χαριέν; οὐ does not negate χαριέν (“Isn't one of their unattractive characteristics … ,” Tr.), but is there to ask for yes. The question continues the ironic manner of 426A1. (i)

1.367    (426A6 / B4): On οὐ χαριέν / οὐκ ἔχει χάριν: Here the tr. gets the etymon but the expression (“not attractive” / “has not attraction”) is too awkward to achieve the needed force. Shorey: “not altogether charming” / “there is no charm in … .” (sm)

1.367    (426A7): “most hostile thing” is wrong. ἔχθιστον is masc. (modifying τὸν ἀληθῆ λέγοντα, as Socrates discovered in 399). Tr. gets this right below (τῷ εὖ λέγοντι).

1.367    (426B9): ἐργάζεσθαι, redone with δρᾶν below, is not “achieve the same” but “do the same.” (sy)

1.369    (426E3): αὖ missed (again: cf. D1 above). It marks Adeimantus's resolute “negativism:” Socrates had just given him another chance to relent. (i)

1.369    (426E4): Now χαριέστατοι is brought across as “nicest.” (sm)

1.369    (427A5): πλέον οὐδέν: not “useless and nothing more.” The idiom means “contributing nothing.” (i)

1.373    (427E7): Socrates infers that if the state they have constructed is wholly good (τελέως ἀγαθή) then we should be able to find all four of the cardinal virtues in it. The argument is based on the fact, which remains implicit, that in Greek ἀρετή is the noun of which ἀγαθός is the adjective,  along with the “background list” of the four cardinal virtues. Translator hereupon (n.28) accuses Socrates of begging the question that justice is good, but all Socrates is assuming is that justice is one of the virtues. Translator asserts this is the first explicit mention of the background list of virtues, but in fact this list had governed the order of the treatment of poetry in Book Three (Tr. noticed the operation of σωφροσύνη [1.236, n.27] there, but not that of ἀνδρέια beforehand), to the extent that when they were about to move on to ask how the justice of man should be depicted it would beg the question since they do not yet know what justice is (392AB). (c)

1.379    (429B2): προπολεμεῖ is not “lead the fighting” but “fight on the city's behalf.”

1.379    (429B4): οὐδ’ ἂν εἷς: οὐδέν in tmesis is sometimes unemphatic, as here: the tmesis gives ἄν the early placement it gravitates toward. (i)

1.379    (429C2-3): ἢ οὐ τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς; is “and that's what you call 'courage,' no?” The translator countenances the contrary too strongly: “On the other hand isn't this perhaps what you call courage?” (i)

1.379    (429C5): σωτειρία is translated “guarantee of safety” though it means “ability to conserve.” Adeimantus asks, “Conserve what?” but tr. has him say “What sort of guarantee?” requiring Socrates to reply “(a guarantee) that upholds belief” but what Socrates means is the strength (or ability) to maintain one's conviction. (c)

1.381    (430A5): διὰ τὸ ἐσχηκέναι is not “because they had, but “because they had secured.” (i)

1.383    (430B4): τίθεμαι is not otiose (“regard”) but dialectical. Translate “and posit” (for the sake of our discussion). This is why he asks for Adeimantus's agreement.

1.383    (430B8): οὔτε πάνυ νόμιμον is not “is quite outside the law” but (with Shorey) “has little or nothing to do with the law.” (i)

1.382    (430B8): Au. significantly rejects the reading of Slings (above, he had also dropped Slings's comma at 366D and had adopted Burnet's paragraph break against Slings on 1.172). (t)

1.383    (430D4-5): For πῶς οὖν ἂν τὴν δικαιοσύνην εὕροιμεν, ἵνα μήκετι πραγματευώμεθα περὶ σωφροσύνης the tr., “How could we discover justice so that we would no longer have to busy ourselves with temperance,” does not quite bring across the intemperance or impatience indicated by the slight illogic of the purpose construction (“I ask because,” not “discover in order that”) and of μήκετι (for they have not yet begun) and the verb πραγματευώμεθα. Compare Shorey: “If there were only some way to discover justice so that we need not further concern ourselves about soberness” is close, with its introduction of a wish – but even so, “concern ourselves” does not bring across the impatience. Quandt: “How do you think we might be able to find justice so as to avoid the bother of dealing with temperance?” (u)

1.383    (430D6): “would I have wanted” is wrong for ἂν βουλοίμην: the optative is ideal, not contrafactual.

1.385    (430E1) On εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ:  “It would be wrong” should be “If I am to avoid acting unjustly” in overreaching the proper order of the investigation by skipping over temperance straight to justice. It is a joke. (sm)

1.385    (430E8-9): Not “echoes of the phrase.” αὐτῆς is σωρφοσύνη: “other expressions give us a trace of her.” Shorey, seeing the hunting allusion in ἴχνη, translates, “and other expressions that as it were point us on the same trail.”

1.385 (430E9): ἴχνη: “echo:”  The audial metaphor is wrong: he not meditating or dreaming, but hunting. Hence βούλεσθαι λέγειν below (431A). (i)

1.385    (431A1): In “I could suppose also be less” something has fallen out. (typo)

1.389    (432A3): διὰ πασῶν: Not through the “whole population.” The reference is to the notes of the entire octave (though Au. does place a note below about a “musical metaphor” being present in the passage). (i)

1.393    (432E8): “For someone keen that was a long introduction” is wooden compared with Shorey's “That is a tedious prologue for an eager listener” or Quandt's “Somebody wants to know what you are talking about, and he’s finding your prelude a bit tedious.” (u)

1.393    (433B7ff): “of the qualities we've looked at in our state – temperance, courage, prudence – the one remaining is the one that gives ...” This formulation is unmeaning for the very reason that Slings posited for the first time in history a lacuna at 433B7 (which the translator has accepted into his text on the page across, as follows: ** ὧν⟩). The sense is, “the one left out of the list we studied – which list includes T,C, and P – is just this, the thing that ... .” (u)

1.397    (433E12-434A1): “to possess and work with one's own person and property” for ἡ τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕξις τε καὶ πρᾶξις is unmeaning and translates out the fine play of rhyme and chiasm. The sense is that managing one's own inner disposition (ἕξις going with ἑαυτοῦ only) and keeping to one's appointed task (πρᾶξις going with τοῦ οἰκείου only) is justice. (u)

1.397    (434A8): οὐ πάνυ does not mean, “No, not at all,” but “Not particularly.” (i)

1.397    (434B1): ἐπαιρόμενος is not “goes on to better himself” but “because titillated” (a negative notion as often with this verb in Plato – cf. 416D, 608B) by the prospect of wealth, etc. (i)

1.399    (434C7): πάλιν here means “conversely” (the tr.'s “again let's put it like this” is only vague). They have just arrived at an account of ἀδικία – that πολυπραγμοσύνη (A) = κακουργία (B), and κακουργία (B) = ἀδικία, so that A = C. Now he works the converse (loosely speaking) and shows that οἰκειοπραγία (~A) the contrary of πολυπραγμοσύνη, is δικαιοσύνη (~C) the contrary of ἀδικία. (i)

1.399    (434C8-9): ἑκάστου τούτων τὸ αὑτοῦ πράττοντος ἐν τῇ πόλει does not mean “and each has his own function” but “each of these doing (in fact) his own job.”

1.401    (435A6): ταύτῃ ᾗ means qua, not “in view of the fact that.” (c)

1.401    (435B1-2): κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος means not “the actual concept of justice” but “justice in itself.” It is hard, for me at least, to understand what an “actual concept” is or would be. (c)

1.401    (435B4ff): ἀλλὰ μέντοι πόλις γε ἔδοξεν εἶναι δικαία ὅτι ἐν αὐτῇ τριττὰ γένη φύσεων ἐνόντα τὸ αὑτῶν ἕκαστον ἔπραττεν, σώφρων δὲ αὖ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σοφὴ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων γενῶν ἄλλ’ ἄττα πάθη τε καὶ ἕξεις. Compare for accuracy and brevity the present tr., “But on the other hand we decided a state is just because three natural kinds of people in it were doing their own business individually; and there again it is temperate, courageous and wise because of some other properties and conditions of these same kinds of people,” with Shorey: “But now the city was thought to be just because three natural kinds existing in it performed each its own function, and again it was sober, brave and wise because of certain other affections and habits of these three kinds.” (u)

1.401    (435C3): “That has to be entirely so” should be “That entirely has to be so” (πᾶσα with ἀνάγκη). (u)

1.403    (435C9): εὖ γε ἴσθι is imperative.

1.403    (435E2): εἴδη is not “concepts,” which is too subjective, but self-identical, distinct qualities. (c)

1.403    (435E3): ἄλλοθεν means “from anywhere else” not “any other way.”

1.403    (435E4): “passion” for θυμοειδές is too general.  The Au. will also use “passion” for the very different psychic function of ἐπιθυμία, from which indeed the present passage will be endeavoring to distinguish the θυμοειδές. Cf. ad 1.545 infra. (u)

1.403    (435E3-5): Compare “For it would be ridiculous to think that passion did not occur in our states from individuals who are indeed the origin of it,” with Shorey's “It would be absurd to suppose that the element of high spirit was not derived in states from the private citizens who are reputed to have this quality ... .” (u)

1.405    (436B2-3): ἀξίως λόγου, having no article, means not “in keeping with our argument,” but  “passing muster with reason” (“properly,” Shorey).

1.405    (436B8): ταὐτὸν is a noun not an adjective, and it (not “faculty”) is the (completely general) subject: Socrates is articulating a Law of Contradiction in general as Au. acknowledges in n.47. (i)

1.405    (436B10-C1): οὐ ταὐτὸν ἦν ἀλλὰ πλείω is “it was not the same thing but several,” which is all the Greek says or implies. The tr. unaccountably adds “parts” (cf. 1.407, “part” added to μέν / δέ). (c)

1.407    (436E8-9): οὐδὲ μᾶλλον: “nor any the more” will persuade us (not “moreover”).

1.409    (437A5): ἀμφισβητήσεις is derogatory: not just attitudinal “differences of opinion” but contentious “quarrels.” (i)

1.409    (437A8): ἀπὸ τούτου means “from this (hypothesis):” cf. ὑποθέμενοι ὡς τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος, above.

1.411    (437D8-11): Compare “Then in so far as it is thirst, would it be for something more than that for which we say there is a desire in the soul? For example thirst is a thirst for a hot or cold drink, isn't it, or for a lot or a little, or in short for a particular kind of drink?” expecting a yes answer, with Shorey's “I mean is thirst thirst for a hot drink or cold or much or little or in a word for a draught of any particular quality?” – correctly expecting a 'no.' (u)

1.421    (440B4ff): The tr. is “But when passion has made common cause with your desires to act against reason, when reason forbids – I think you would say that you deny such a thing ever having arisen inside yourself.” 'When' at the beginning sets up anacoluthon: κοινωνήσαντα is not circumstantial but indirect discourse, presupposing αἰσθανόμενος or some continuation of the previous participial construction, as is confirmed by αἰσθέσθαι (which the tr. leaves out). Compare Shorey: “But its making common cause against the reason when reason whispers low 'Thou must not' – that I think is a kind of thing you would not affirm ever to have perceived in yourself … .” (u)

1.425    (441A5): The “if” (ἄν γε) in “if it is shown” should be italicized at least. (u)

1.445    (449B6): Not “let it go” but only “... let go … .” They are speaking inaudibly and this is all Socrates hears, so that he asks “let what go?”

1.447    (450A2): “an analyzed” a few lines from the bottom should be “analyzed.” (typo)

1.449    (450B2): “just now” should be “then” (τότε).

1.451    (450C7): εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα γένοιτο is not “turn out to be so” but “come into existence.”

1.451    (451A7): Au. prints καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων [καὶ] νομίμων πέρι without a supporting critical note. According to both Burnet and Slings the mss. unanimously read καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων νομίμων πέρι, with the exception of a scribitur of καὶ after δικαίων in Ven.184 (which Slings does not report). Slings however has printed καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν [καὶ] δικαίων ⟨καὶ⟩ νομίμων πέρι, citing in his apparatus that Wilamowitz conjectured  δικαίων ⟨καὶ⟩ νομίμων as an emendation of the καὶ δικαίων νομίμων found in all the mss. There is no justification therefore, nor any reason, for Au. to print δικαίων [καὶ] νομίμων since the καὶ he thereby indicates a wish to delete was never there. (t)

1.451    (451A7): “principles” for νόμιμα is too strong. It is only convention and usage that Socrates is reluctant to upset needlessly (cf. B7, “law,” below).

1.457    (452A8): “pursued in the way described” does not bring across the λόγος / ἔργον polarity that underlies εἰ πράξεται ᾗ λέγεται. (i)

1.457    (452A10-B2): ὁρᾷς is the governing verb, with accusative-participial construction. The Greek stresses the spectacle.

1.457    (452C5): μὴ τὰ αὑτῶν πράττειν:  To translate “Don't give us their usual stuff” translates out the joke, which was noticed by Shorey “the business of the wit (who is talking) is to raise a laugh.” (i)

1.459    (452D1): ἐξῆν (imperfect) means not that “they made fun of this” but that “they could have made fun of this” but did not – stressing the analogy rather than some fact.

1.459    (452E4): ἀνομολογητέον is not just “agree” but “reach an agreement.” (i)

1.459    (453A1): δυνατὴ φύσις ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη is not whether females “actually have the natural attributes” but “whether human nature has the ability that the female version of it can ...”

1.459    (453A4-5): “Wouldn't it be best to start in this way, and so be likely also to make the best ending?” should simply be “Wouldn't such a fine beginning likely lead to an equally fine result?” Compare Shorey: “Would not this be that best beginning which would naturally and proverbially lead to the best end?” enabling him to append a note on the proverb. (u)

1.461    (453B7): ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως οὐ πάμπολυ διαφέρει contentiously challenges assent (with blustering πάμπολυ). It is not “So are there not aspects where a woman is not completely different from a man?” but “How could a woman not be utterly different from a man in some ways?” Next,  οὐκοῦν ἄλλο καὶ ἔργον (B10) continues pushing: not “So is it appropriate …” but “And likewise mustn't it be appropriate … .” Then πλεῖστον and κεχωρισμένην (C5), strengthening πάμπολυ and διαφέρει, seek to bar recourse to the rejected alternative: not just “being naturally very different from each other” but “having natures utterly divorced and separated from each other.” (i)

1.464    (454B4): In this rare instance Au. departs from both Slings and Burnet to accept a conjecture by Baiter reported by Slings. The sense of the passage is so clear that the readings of the mss. actually do not matter. (t)

1.465    (454B1-2): “There is a risk that we fasten” suggests a general principle, but ἅπτεσθαι represents an imperfect of citation, and the imperfect indicates he is speaking specifically: “We might have moved into the realm of contentiousness unwittingly.” (i)

1.467    (454E1): οὐδὲν μᾶλλον is the skeptical trope, shorthand for “the argument is worthless since it proves the proposition no more than it proves its contrary.” (i)

1.467    (454E1): ἀποδεδεῖχθαι is “proven” not “discovered.”

1.469    (455C1): “back.” should be “back?” (typo)

1.469    (455C1):  “Are there any others.. (ἆρα)?” not “So are there any others … ?” No inference is being drawn.

1.469    (455C3): ἄλλα φήσει here means not “disagree” but “have other factors to adduce.”

1.469    (455C6-D1): “Or do we have to string it out by mentioning weaving and looking after the baking and the cooking where the female sex has a reputation, though if outclassed, they are the most absurd of all.” Confusion is caused by the punctuation and by the doubled gerund (does 'looking' go with 'weaving' or 'mentioning'?) and how “absurd” (for καταγελάστατον) fails to bring across the antithesis with 'reputation' (for δοκεῖ τι). The Greek is μακρολογῶμεν τήν τε ὑφαντικὴν λέγοντες καὶ τὴν τῶν ποπάνων τε καὶ ἑψησμάτων θεράπειαν (“baking and cooking” is done with a satirical periphrasis and strikingly specific derogatory plurals in order to characterize the macrologia) ἐν οἷς δή τι δοκεῖ τὸ γυναικεῖον γένος εἶναι, οὗ καὶ καταγελάστατόν ἐστι πάντων ἡττώμενον. Compare Shorey's very fine: “Must we make a long story of it by alleging weaving and the watching of pancakes and the boiling pot, whereon the sex plumes itself and wherein its defeat will expose it to the most laughter?” (u)

1.469    (455D4): “superior to men” should be “superior to a lot of men” (vel sim.):  πολλῶν needs to be translated.

1.477    (457C1): φυλακίδας is a good example of a coinage called for by an innovation of thought for which there was no word. Therefore, not “female guardians” (which then required φύλακες to be translated “male guardians” as it will never need to be translated again) but “guardettes.” (sm)

1.477    (457C1): ἀλλά πῃ does not and cannot mean “but only where.” The sense is, positing (τιθέντας, 457B9) that “the argument somehow comes out to be consistent.”

1.477    (457C7): “is a natural consequence” is an over-translation of πεται. Socrates simply suggests, without justification, that “the next thing is this.”

1.479    (457D4-5): “as to what is possible and what is beneficial” should be “as to its possibility no less than its benefit.”

1.479    (457D8-9): ἀλλ’ οἶμαι περὶ τοῦ εἰ δυνατὸν ἢ μὴ πλείστην ἂν ἀμφισβήτησιν γενέσθαι is not “But as to its being possible, I'm not sure it won't lead to a great deal of disagreement,” but rather, “But I think the question of its being possible or not will generate a huge controversy.” He has no doubt.

1.479f    (458A): The tr. fails to clinch the analogy, but Plato's Greek does by its reuse of language, e.g., διατάττειν, ἤδη, γίγνεσθαι. (sm)

1.481    (458B3): ᾗ δυνατά: “in what way” (sc. ὁδῷ) possible, not “in what respect.” (i)

1.481    (458B6/B8): συνδιασκοπεῖσθαι and σκόπει in reply should be translated with the same verb in English.  English does not follow the rule of the older IE languages as Greek does (dropping the prefix in repetition of the verb). This may be a problem to class under IDIOM rather than SEMANTICS. (sm)

1.483    (459A3/A6): γενναίων is translated “fine” but then “true-bred.” The variation again misses clinching the analogy. (sm)

1.487    (459E5-6): “make sacrifices” should be “legislate sacrifices” (θυσίαι with νομοθετητέαι).

1.497    (462B8): ἰδίωσις designates individualization, not privacy. (i)

1.497    (462C4): For τοιάδε, not “whenever such” but “whenever the following sorts of.” Replace comma-plus-“but” with a colon. (i)

1.501    (463D3): here is not just “or” but “or else.” (i)

1.505    (464C2): “and all consume it in common,” for κοινῇ πάντες ἀναλίσκειν fails to bring across the point of the verb, which is that they exhaust the supply and use it up. Shorey's “and squirrel none of it away” gets the sense. (u)

1.505    (464C2-3): εἰ μέλλοιεν ὄντως φύλακες εἶναι is at the end, but tr. puts it early and adds “our” which together deflect the emphasis. Not “if they really are to be our guardians they should … ,” but “they must do all these rigorous things – if that is they are going to be real guardians.” (sy)

1.505    (464CD): The translation loses the construction at the end of the long sentence (with “Shouldn't they all ...”). The sense is, “our policies prevent ... but instill that … .” (sy)

1.505    (464D2-3): ἰδίων ὄντων presents not the excuse for the behavior (“on the grounds that”), but the cause (of ἰδίας).

1.513    (466C6-7): τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν κοινωνίαν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν is not “women sharing with men” (?) but “the men sharing their wives.”

1.515    (467A3): οἷον idiomatically adverbial: “those such as the sons of potters” should be “how, for instance, the sons of potters ... .” (i)

1.515    (467B5): πρῶτον μέν means “provide, above all” not “first prepare them:” the δέ clause then describes exceptions, not a second step. (i)

1.517    (467C10-D1): τῶν στρατειῶν are battles, not “aspects of war” and τάς at D3 also means battles, not “situations.” (u)

1.531    (471B3-5): “but will pursue their dispute to the point where those responsible are compelled to be punished by those who are not, but who are nevertheless suffering.” Compare Shorey: “but will carry the conflict only to the point of compelling the guilty to do justice by the pressure of the suffering of the innocent.” (u)

1.533    (472A2): I am gratified that Au. has here preserved, in a critical note at least, the reading of all mss. (στρατευομένῳ ADM), despite the fact that with almost all other editors he reads something else (στραγγευομένῳ ex em. F). I defend the well-attested reading of the mss. in my own commentary on the Republic (ad loc.). (t)

1.537    (472D4): “Would you think he is any less” is incorrect.  οἴει [ἂν] … εἶναι, deleting ἂν (with Slings, alone) would be, “Do you think he is any less.” Keeping ἂν would be “Do you think he would be any less.”  

1.537    (473A3): In ἀλλὰ σὺ πότερον, σύ is as usual emphatic. “But as for you (leaving the others aside), do you agree or not,” not “Well, do you agree?” (i)

1.539    (473B1): ἃ σὺ ἐπιτάττεις: Not “the conditions you have laid down,” but “as you commanded.” is quasi-adverbial, as often.  He is referring to the proof of possibility upon which Glaucon had rather importunately insisted. (i)

1.539    (473B5ff): τί ποτε νῦν κακῶς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττεται δι’ ὃ οὐχ οὕτως οἰκοῦνται καὶ τίνος ἂν σμικρότατον μεταβαλόντος ἔλθοι is not “find whatever is badly done in our states and” (there is no and) “which is the cause of their not being run in the way mentioned, and whether any slight change can be made for a state to match up,” but “find what error in policy causes current states not to meet with our ideal, by a slight adjustment of which a (current) state might do so.” καί is virtually epexegetical: the two τί 's are asking after one and the same thing, first as the cause of the problem and second as the key to solving it. See also IDIOM n. ad 473B9, infra.

1.539    (473B9): σμικρότατον τὴν δύναμιν should not mean “smallest in their effect” (this is the opposite of what he is looking for!) but “slightest in terms of its feasibility,” the sense that is continued below by δυνατοῦ δέ (C4). (i)

1.540    (473E5): ἄλλη probably should be ἄλλῃ (the scr. in the Monac., read by Burnet), since this is how the Greek is translated and this is how the Greek is printed in Slings, unless it is another example of Au. printing one text and translating another. There is no critical note. (typo?)

1.541    (473D3-5): “(unless) the many natures of those pursuing exclusively the one or the other are necessarily excluded” is awkward, and “necessarily” is incorrect. Compare Shorey: “(unless) the motley horde of the natures who are present pursue either apart from the other are compulsorily excluded.” On “natures” cf. IDIOMS n. ad loc., infra. (u)

1.541    (473D4): For φύσεις “natures” is too general. φύσις has its “naturalistic” connotation of  “specimen” or “creature” (LSJ s.v., V: cf. 588C3, Phdrs.229E2). Shorey: “motley horde of natures.” (i)

1.541    (473D6): ταῖς πόλεσι:  The plural is empirical (cf. 345E2, 338D7). Not “in the state” but “in existing states.” (i)

1.541    (473E1): The sense, at οὐδὲ αὕτη, is “not for empirical states nor, for the human race, nor is there a chance for this state we have made up … .” (sy)

1.541    (473E1-2): εἰς τὸ δυνατόν also refers to feasibility (see ad 1.539 [473B9], supra): not “grow to the full potential” but come into existence “within the limits of possibility” (Shorey). (i)

1.541    (473E4): ὡς πολύ is “how greatly” not “that much.”

1.541    (473E6-7): ῥῆμά τε καὶ λόγον is not plural (“words and arguments,” tr.). Glaucon is trying as hard as he can to use the singular.  The connotation is of an “utterance” or of a word that “passes the fence of the teeth.” (i)

1.541    (474A1): νῦν οὕτως does not mean “at that” (like καὶ ταῦτα) but “like us who are present.” (i)

1.543    (474B5-6): διορίσασθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοὺς φιλοσόφους τίνας λέγοντας τολμῶμεν … is not “with regard to philosophers themselves” but “to present to them (αὐτούς) a clarification as to who or what we are calling philosophers (τοὺς φιλόσοφους) that enables us to dare … .” It is a proleptic “lilies of the field” construction.

1.543    (474C1-2): “for some … but for others” should be “for the others” (i.e., the rest). (u)

1.543    (474C1-3): The clear contrast of the μέν / δέ is muffled by the variation in translation of what Plato does with the same etymon in the active (ἡγεμονεύειν: “rule”) and the middle (ἡγουμένῳ: “leader”). (sm)

1.543    (474C4): ὥρα ἂν εἴη not just “a good moment.” At least say “high time” (Shorey). (i)

1.545    (475B4): ἐπιθυμητικόν is here translated “passionate” (cf. ad 1.403, supra). (u)

1.547    (475C4): “a gourmet rather than a fastidious eater” (for the opposed terms φιλόσιτον / κακόσιτον) hardly brings across the opposition. Shorey: “not a lover of food but a poor eater.” (u)

1.549    (475E4): τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας φιλοθεάμονας:  The climactic metaphor with ἀλήθεια is blunted. Not “those who love to observe the truth” but (at least) “those who love the spectacle of truth.” (sm)

1.549    (475E-476B): The theory of forms is being introduced. This requires very clear thinking to translate, and the best rule is to say as little as Socrates does. Instead, the translator tends to spell things out, and perhaps to interpret rather than translate, with abstract but vague language that is sometimes inaccurate and fraught with implications that are avoided by Socrates's language. For example: ἐπειδή ἐστιν ἐναντίον καλὸν αἰσχρῷ δύω αὐτὼ εἶναι becomes “Since beautiful is the opposite of ugly we have two distinct concepts here.” Also, below, πάντα τὰ εἴδη (A5) becomes “all other concepts” when the phrase simply generalizes the foregoing examples of distinct qualities and means “and any qualities that are distinct.” Then in the translation the εἴδη become “entities” (“each of them is an entity”) where the Greek says αὐτὸ ἓν ἕκαστον εἶναι. Thereupon “physical forms” translates σώματα (an unfortunate use of the term). (c)

1.549    (476A7): πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον is not “each appears to have many manifestations,” which is another abstruse phrase hard to understand (since manifestations would be appearances of something, so we would have appearances of appearances). εἶναι must be supplied, and the sense is that though in truth the distinct qualities are one, by virtue of their community with the world of appearances we see around us “they appear to be many.” (c)

1.551    In this theoretical passage the failures to let the parallels guide the translation would require an essay to document adequately. Without the parallels we have Socrates spouting off, which is all that many readers expect in the first place. (sm)

1.551    (476C8): ὀνειρώττειν τὸν τοιοῦτον is not “dreaming is something of this sort,” but “a person in this condition is dreaming” (τὸν τοιοῦτον masc.).

1.551    (476C9-D1): “Someone … who thinks something is actual beauty and that he can distinguish both the actual and those things that partake of it” translates ὁ … ἡγούμενος τέ τι αὐτὸ καλόν καὶ δυνάμενος καθορᾶν καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα. Perhaps “who thinks something is actual beauty” is not what Au. wanted to say; even so, αὐτὸ καλόν is the object of ἡγούμενος and τι is adverbial and carries the same meaning that εἶναι would have (cf. νομίζειν c. acc. above and ἡγεῖσθαι c.acc. at 479A2, quoted at 1.563, infra). The subject and predicate have therefore been reversed in the translation. And as for the second part, καθορᾶν does not mean to distinguish one thing from another (which might be the meaning of the translator's “distinguish the actual and the things that partake”), but means “to distinguish” in the sense of viewing in focus, or to “make it out,” so that the phrase means to be able to catch sight both of the character in itself and of the many in which it is shared (μετέχοντα, drawn out of and implied by κοινωνία above) which everyone else catches sight of, rather than thinking they are the same – i.e., thinking that the examples are all that is beautiful. Finally, the adjective “actual” here used does not translate, but interprets, αὐτό. The parallelisms in Plato's expression (i.e., between 476B4-C7 and C9-D3) help to guide the sense in this passage, which is just outside the semantic reach of language. (c)

1.551    (476D9): ἀμφισβητῇ, subjunctive, continuing the protasis: “were to argue” rather than “argues.”

1.553    (476E5): πυνθανώμεθα is not “Do you want me to find out from him?” The verb denotes a speech act in which one deferentially makes a request for information as from someone knowledgeable. Socrates's deferential proposal is part of the πείθειν ἠρέμα. (i)

1.553    (477A3): “can be entirely known” not just “known” (παντελῶς γνωστόν).

1.553    (477A10): ἐπὶ τῷ μεταξὺ τούτῳ μεταξύ τι καὶ ζητητέον is not “Then something in between must be sought that is this middle ground between knowledge and absence of knowledge,” but “Applying to (this is what ἐπί means in this context) this in-between thing we should likewise look for something in between … .” Moreover, the addition of “ground” is distracting or misleading. (sy)

1.555    (477B7): τέτακται is not “formed for.” The adjacent use of ἐπί indicates that the sense is “is assigned by nature to.” (i)

1.555    (477B11): μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε: A self-interruption that breaks the syntax. Not “Yet if so” but “Nay, first we must make a distinction, as follows...”

1.555    (477C1-2): “by which we and anything else are enabled to do what we and they can do” introduces a silly pairing that Plato avoided: αἷς δὴ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἃ δυνάμεθα καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν δύνηται. He means not to pair “us” with “everything else” but to generalize and thereby to define δύναμις. Shorey is here no better: in fact he led Au. in this direction. (u)

1.555    (477C5): By ἀλλά Glaucon is saying that he did not need the examples – that he is right along with Socrates. “Well I do understand” (tr.) is flaccid and vague. (i)

1.557    (478A6-11): The parallel between the infinitives γνῶναι and δοξάζειν is inadequately grasped, leading to the erroneous translation “can it know what knowledge knows” which should be “can it be the case that that it belief (δόξα) believes what knowledge knows.” (sm)

1.557f    (478A10): “what can be known” for γνωστόν, and in general the replacing of neuter adjectives (beautiful) with relative clauses (what is beautiful), imports an alien extensionalism into the logic of the argument, which is intensional – but this old habit is not the translator's invention! Still I think it can be said that this is an interpretation of the Greek rather than a translation. (c)

1.557    (478B1): ἄλλη δ’ ἑκατέρα means not “each separate from the other” in mere apposition, but  “but (in contrast to their both being faculties = δέ) each is different from the other.” (sy)

1.559    (478B6): “Is belief about what does not exist?”  The Greek says, “Is it the non-existent that belief believes?” The Loeb translators perhaps think this comes to the same thing.

1.559    (478B6-7): The translation (“Is it impossible to have a belief about what does not exist?”) misses the (intensive) καί and the (causal) γε: “Is it impossible even to believe what after all does not exist?”

1.559    (478B7): “apply” for ἐπί plus accusative is incorrect (“apply” is ἐπί plus dative, as above, A12). The sense is “Doesn't someone who has a belief refer (not 'apply') that belief to some object?” (u)

1.559    (478B12): ἀλλὰ μήν … γε, again, designates the minor premise (“Well, does …” misses this). (i)

1.559    (478C3): “But weren't we forced to concede that 'not existing' equals ignorance and ‘existing' equals knowledge?” The translation uses “equals” for ἀπέδομεν and surely is not meant to be taken seriously – but it is unclear to me what is gained by the gratuitous inaccuracy and some day it will confuse a student of Greek. Shorey: “To that which is not we necessarily assigned nescience,  and to that which is, knowledge.” (c)

1.559    (478C6): ἄρα means “therefore,” not just “in that case.” (i)

1.559    (478C6): Plato writes οὐκ ἄρα ὂν οὐδὲ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει, placing the two direct objects first. Tr. has “In that case one can't have a belief about what exists nor even about what doesn't” (there is no “even” nor any “about what” 's). Then Plato writes οὔτε ἄρα ἄγνοια οὔτε γνῶσις δόξα ἂν εἴη, placing the two predicates first (δόξα being the subject), and tr., ignoring the parallel order, reverses subject and predicate: “So neither ignorance nor knowledge would constitute a belief.” (sy)

1.560    (478C10): Au. prints Ἄρ’ οὖν and translates, “Therefore it is outside of these … ?” With “therefore” he translates ἄρα – or maybe οὖν –  but then by adding a question mark at the end he also suggests he was translating an ἆρα at the beginning.  In any event, Glaucon's reply indicates that he takes Socrates's remark as a question. Of previous editions Burnet and Chambry read ἄρα and Ast, Stallbaum, Shorey, Adam and Slings read ἆρα but none report a discrepancy in the mss. Initial position for ἄρα seems wrong to me so I read ἆρα. Cf. also IDIOM n. ad 478C13, infra. (t)

1.561    (478C10): ὑπερβαίνουσα is not “extending beyond” but “exceeding.”

1.561    (478C13): ἀλλ’ἆρα: Not “Well then …” but “To the contrary, would you say ...” (ἆρα answering  ἆρ' above, which probably should be read instead of ἄρα. (i)

1.561    (478D5): εἴ τι φανείη: “should plainly be seen” rather than “could be shown.” Below, τὸ … φανέν is the substantive (not τὸ μεταξύ: μεταξύ is only adverbial with φανέν): “the thing that shows up in the middle,” not “it would apparently be the province of the midpoint.” See next note.

1.561    (478D5/D8): The logic of the argument relies upon φανείη and τὸ … φανέν meaning the same thing but they are translated “could be shown” (subjective) and “it would apparently” (objective). In both cases it means “plainly is.” The sense is that if something came into view ... then the faculty applying to it would be neither knowledge nor ignorance, whereupon the thing (faculty) correlatively comes into view as a thing between knowledge and ignorance. Socrates’s reliance on this sense and use of φαίνεσθαι is then emphatically acknowledged and corroborated by πέφανται in both question (D11) and answer (D12). (sm)

1.561    (478E2): “what shares both existence and non-existence” (without a fellow sharer) might not be English. “partakes of” or “has a share of” for μετέχειν. (u)

1.563    (479A1-2): For ὃς αὐτὸ μὲν καλὸν καὶ ἰδέαν τινὰ αὐτοῦ κάλλους μηδεμίαν ἡγεῖται ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ καλὰ νομίζει the tr. is “who thinks there is nothing actually beautiful and no Form of beauty itself that is consistent in the same respects but thinks there are many kinds of beauty.” However, (1) to “think there is nothing actually beautiful” is not the same as “not believing there is beauty itself,” which is what the Greek says, and might not even be a correct interpretation of it; (2) the καί that introduces ἰδέαν τινὰ αὐτοῦ κάλλους μηδεμίαν … ἔχουσαν is epexegetical: it would help to make this clearer, for instance by saying, for καί,in the sense of a character of beauty itself ... ; (3) “consistent in the same respects,” which I have just asserted is epexegetical, should bring forward the language from above of which these words are a digest but instead we get vague abstractions (“consistent,” “respects”); (4) “many kinds of beauty” evinces a very deep confusion about what the passage has been saying all along. In the spirit of the passage, if there are to be “kinds” of beauty there would be either two (αὐτὸ καλόν and the πολλὰ καλά) or one (αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, the πολλά only apparently καλά). What is meant is not that the φιλοθεάμων believes in many kinds but only believes in fleeting instances, and that even though his recognition of them as such implies he is somehow thinking of one thing his inclinations impede or disable him from pursuing it. (c)

1.563    (479A3-4): ἐκεῖνος ὁ φιλοθεάμων καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἀνεχόμενος ἄν τις ἓν τὸ καλὸν φῇ εἶναι means “namely, that lover of spectacles we met earlier, who (καί epexegetic) won't abide it when anybody asserts that beauty is one, not “someone who loves watching and never tolerates anyone who claims that the beautiful is an entity.” Surely ἓν εἶναι is not “to be an entity.”

1.563    (479A6): αἰσχρὸν φανήσεται should be “look” ugly not “appear to be,” and the other two “be's” in the translation of the immediate sequel (A7-8) should be dropped. This is a problem of the translator's concept, as well as his reading of Greek, and so we will meet it later. In the meanwhile it must be said that εἶναι is saliently absent in the Greek and should not be placed into the translation, either. So continually, in the sequel (B1-8) as well. (c)

1.563    (479B6): “big and small” should be plural as in the Greek (even [B7] is plural), for Socrates is speaking of the “many larges” and “many smalls.” To replace the plural with the singular is exactly to replace the objects with the idea or form they share, which it is the burden of this passage to distinguish!

1.563    (479B6-7): μή τι μᾶλλον: cf. on 1.467, supra. (i)

1.563    (479B11): “games of doubles” for τὰ ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα is an unfortunate choice of words given the unrelated role that διπλάσια played in the discussion just above. (u)

1.563    (479C1): αἰνίγματι is singular.

1.565    (479C6): ἔχεις ὅτι χρήσῃ means “Do you know how to deal with them?” not “Can you make use of them?” (i)

1.565    (479D3): τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλά, translating with “the many notions of most people” again fails to reproduce the stressed idea of plurality, burying πολλῶν with “most.” Shorey translates, “the many conventions of the many” and adds a note.

1.565    (479D7): προωμολογήσαμεν not just “we agreed before” but “preliminary to the discussion we agreed” or “we agreed in advance” (Shorey).

1.565    (479E1): τοὺς ἄρα πολλὰ καλὰ θεωμένους αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν μὴ ὁρῶντας: “Those who look at many beautiful things without seeing the beautiful itself ...” is not quite strong enough: is not just “without seeing” but “and yet do not see.” (u)

1.567    (479E4): “have an belief” should be “have a belief.” (typo)

1.567    (479E7-8): τοὺς αὐτὰ ἕκαστα θεωμένους καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ὄντα is a climactic and triumphant formulation of all that has been brought into consciousness above.  The translator has written, “those ... who observe each of these things in themselves, always in an unchanging state … (have knowledge and not just belief).” However (1) there is no demonstrative “these:” αὐτα ἔκαστα means the “self same eaches” (it may be better to use expressions as simple and unfamiliar as the Greek ones) and refers to the real things; (2) it should be made clearer that “in themselves” etc. are attributes of αὐτα ἕκαστα not the seeing, and (as in the parallel case described above) constitute exegesis of nothing but αὐτα ἕκαστα; (3) “in an unchanging state” adds only vagueness and diffusion to the idea. (c)

1.567    (479E7): αὐτὰ ἕκαστα is not “each of these things” but “them in their distinctness.” At this point in the text, through to the end of Book Five and the end of this first of two volumes in the Loeb edition, the argument uses several distinctly Platonic idioms that constitute the ways he contrived to talk about his “forms” in verisimilar conversation – so the passages I wish to point out might better be classed as errors in CONCEPT. (i)

1.567    (479E8): For γιγνώσκειν ἀλλ’ οὐ δοξάζειν, “have knowledge and not just belief” again evinces deep confusion about the content and logic of the passage, since “just” formulates the relationship between them as a relationship of the one including the other or being something more than the other, whereas the burden of the passage is to show their essential incompatibility (rather than some quantitative difference), on the basis of the separateness of their respective objects, the ones and the manies. Thus, “knowledge instead of belief,” or “knowledge – not belief” in contrast with what was said in the previous paragraph. (c)

1.567    (480A7): “And they'll be very cross” should be “And won't they be very cross” (parallel to “we won't be too far out:” μή goes with both futures).

2.3    (484A2): διεξελθόντες is read (with Burnet and Slings) but διεξελθόντος seems to be what the translation represents. Indeed the tr. “now we have gone through” in the presence of a third plural verb is loose enough to raise the question, Why worry about the ms.? (t)

2.5    (484C8): μηδέ is not “not even” but “and not”: ignorant, they have no internal model they can “look off” to as painters do.

2.5    (484C8): μηδέ is illative: the painter simile explains the ἐναργὲς ἐν ψυχῇ. (sy)

2.7    (485B1): ἐρῶσιν is not “devoted to” but, with Shorey, “enamored of” (at the least!). (u)

2.7    (485B7-8): περί τε τῶν φιλοτίμων καὶ ἐρωτικῶν is not “who are ambitious and lovers” but “both the ambitious and the lovers” (two categories), a chiastic back-reference to 474C8-475B10.

2.7    (485C6): πᾶσα ἀνάγκη is not “total obligation” but (as usual) “logical necessity,” of the logical implication of what it is to be in love. (u)

2.7    (485C8): τῶν παιδικῶν not “the objects of his love” but “his beloved.” (i)

2.9    (485D10): “passions” is used to translate the subject of ἐρρυήκασιν, namely ἐπιθυμίαι, though elsewhere tr. uses this very general term for the θυμοειδές (435E4, 550B6, 553C5). (u)

2.9    (485E4-5): Not “why money should be a serious matter is for someone else to think about,” but “the goals for which money-making is taken seriously are things another man than he would be serious about.”

2.11    (486B7): δυσσύμβουλος is not “drives a hard bargain” but “is difficult to partner with.”

2.13    (486D2): ἐγκρίνω is not just “count among” but “include (n the group)” as in Book 2 and 3. (u)

2.13    (486D5): “disorder” for ἀμετρία is an inference from the sense, which is “excess.” (u)

2.13    (486D10): “every aspect of reality” for τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἱδέαν ἑκάστου is conceptually wrong. “to the ideal aspect of each real thing” is better. Shorey: “the aspect of the ideal reality in all things.” (c)

2.15    (487B3): ἃ νῦν λέγεις not “what you are now saying” (which makes nonsense) but “as you now are arguing” – accusative is idiomatically adverbial (as before). (i)

2.15    (487B6): μέγα τὸ σφάλμα is not “diversion” but “mighty is the fall’ (Shorey). (i)

2.15    (487B7): τοῖς πρώτοις  is not “what was being discussed at the beginning” but “the points agreed to at the start.” (i)

2.15    (487C3) οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον is again the idiom, “no more this than that,” the skeptical “burden shifting” trope, as if in itself a refutation. (i)

2.17    (487C6): “(facts he can) see” does not bring across the contrast between word and deed as well as “see with his eyes” would. (u)

2.17    (487E6): σὺ δέ γε οἶμαι οὐκ εἴωθας … “and I presume you find yourself unaccustomed to do so” (ironic, knowing that Socrates loves to use images) not “I didn’t think it was your practice to use images” (as if to hoist him on his own petard, sarcastic per n.11). (i)

2.23    (489B4): Not “accuse those who don’t use philosophers of being useless” but “blame those that do not use philosophers for the philosopher’s ‘uselessness’ ” (ἀχρηστία is a pun).

2.23    (489B5): ἐπιεικεῖς is “respectable, not “educated” (again at 489D7).

2.25    (489D1): At πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον the tr. needs to have “but” at the start of the sentence. (sy)

2.25    (489D10): In τῆς τῶν πολλῶν πονηρίας the article refers back to 487D1-2: “what forces the majority (as opposed to the ἐπιεικεῖς) to become base.”

2.25    (489E3): For ἀκούωμεν δὴ καὶ λέγωμεν, “hear each other’s arguments” is an interpretation of the Greek (listen and speak) that contravenes the notion of the dialectical method Socrates is suggesting by this formula (e.g., 358D8, 605C10, al.), in which one plays questioner and one plays answerer rather than both making (and hearing) arguments. (i)

2.27    (490A9-B1): καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμένοι is not “and not fritter away” (that would be ἐπιμένειν) but “and therefore does not.”

2.27    (490B3): αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἑκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἅψασθαι is not “grasps the nature of each and every thing” but “grasps the nature of things in their selfsame distinctness (cf. τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἰδέαν, 486D10 – on which see CONCEPT n. ad 2.13).

2.27    (490B5): In μιγεὶς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, ὄντως is subjective and τῷ ὄντι is objective:  “really communing in the real,” not “immersed in what really exists.”

2.27    (490C3): ἀκολουθῆσαι is not “flows from it” but refers to the sequence of argument that Adeimantus had objected to. (sm)

2.29    (490E2-3): τὰς φθοράς is what causes it to perish not “the ways it has deteriorated;” and διόλλυται (E2) is “tends to corruption.”

2.29    (491B7): θαυμαστότατον is not “extraordinary” (objective) but “surprising” (subjective).

2.31    (491B11): ἄτοπον is translated “extraordinary” (to answer θαυμαστότατον above, wrongly translated) but then ἄτοπα below becomes “absurd.”

2.31    (491C7): λαβοῦ ὅλου: The genitive indicates getting some grasp on the whole, not encompassing it – “get the whole meaning” is too broad. (i)

2.31    (491D4-5): The formulaic translation of που with “to my mind” leads to the awkward sentence, “evil is more opposed to good to my mind than it is to what is not-good.” (u)

2.31    (491D7-8): The tr. “inferior” – a comparative – for φαύλης (which is being contrasted with ἀρίστην) undermines the proportionate comparatives ἀλλοτριωτέρᾳ / κάκιον in a way that Plato’s superlative and positive grades avoided. (u)

2.31    (491E3): διαφερόντως is not “particularly” but “worse than the others" (Shorey). Tr. muffs the expression of relative harm – cf. his distracting translation of ἀλλοτριοτέρῳ, ibid. (c)

2.33    (492A6-7): διαφθειρομένους τινὰς does not mean “there are some youngsters” but that “youngsters are somehow” corrupted. The τινας correlates with the τινας connected with σοφιστάς (“putative sophists”) in the next line. (sy)

2.33    (492B7): σὺν πολλῷ θορύβῳ goes with the generalization ἤ τινα ἄλλην κ.τ.λ., as indicated by μέν. (sy)

2.33    (492B8): λεγομένων / πραττομένων are neuter and passive – not “those who say and do.”

2.33    (492B9-C1): In “as they shout and clap” drop “as”; in “so the place echoes” drop “so.” (sy)

2.35    (492C6): The addition of οὗτος, insisting on change of focus to new subject, is more than “it:” He will be borne off in whatever direction this other force decides regardless of his education. This causes the young man to follow (καὶ φήσειν [sc. οἴει] …). Adeimantus’s reply to the question is not, therefore, “There is great pressure on him,” but “This is quite inevitable” (the question puts great pressure onto Adeimantus, not the young man). Shorey: “This is quite inevitable.” (i)

2.33    (492C4): ἄν is deleted (with Burnet and Slings), but translated: “could withstand.” (t)

2.35    (492C6): οἰχήσεσθαι is not just “pass away” but “disappear right beneath your nose.” (i)

2.35    (492C6-7): καὶ φήσειν, printed by Au., is not καὶ φήσει, as Shorey said contra Adam, but introduces the result of the previous future inf.  Not “and will he agree, but “don’t you suppose he would.”

2.35    (492D2) τὴν μεγίστην ἀνάγκην is translated “the greatest compelling force,” but this phrase is a retort to Adeimantus’s πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, and so a one-word translation of ἀνάγκη would be better, e.g., “yet something less than the ultimate compulsion” (Quandt). (u)

2.35    (492D5-7): Tr. fails to bring across the shift between active and passive. They treat the non-persuaded as disobedient, but the Greek mediates between these with the voices. Shorey: fail to convince  / the recalcitrant. (sm)

2.35    (492D9-10, 493A6-7): Tr. fails to evince the relation between τίνα ἄλλον σοφιστήν and ἰδιωτικοὺς λόγους: it is from 492A7, ἰδιωτικοὺς σοφιστάς. (sm)

2.35    (492E3): “Never will arise some other kind” is what it means. The appearance of a virtuous ἦθος is pre-empted. (sy)

2.37    (493A8): In τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα ἃ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἁθροίζωσιν not “promulgate whenever they gather” but (opinions) “they opine whenever they gather” (cognate accusative).

2.37    (493A9): Tr. leaves out οἷονπερ ἄν before εἰ: it is a conceptual (optative) simile Socrates here introduces, to which he subsequently will compare the sophist (D, infra). But in the tr. this imaginary man of the protasis is all that is there and we are not waiting for the apodosis. (sy)

2.37    (493C2): ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ μεγάλου ζῴου δόξαις is not “according to the beliefs he had formed from the large animal” but “would denominate them in reference only to the beliefs of the animal” (calling ‘good’ what the animal liked, etc.).

2.37    (493C3-4): Not “he would have no other vocabulary” (!) for μηδένα ἔχοι λόγον, but “could give no independent explanation of them” (beyond the naming motivated by the beast’s reactions).

2.37    (493C4): τἀναγκαῖα are not “the compelling demands of the beast” but the exigencies of the situation (Shorey’s good note on this, ad loc., is ignored).

2.38    (493D8): ἤδουσας should be ἤκουσας. (typo)

2.38    (494A1): ἡγήσεαι should be ἡγήσεται. (typo)

2.39    (493E-494A): As to tr.’s “that actual beauty” for αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, versus “the many instances of it,” and then “or any actual concept for αὐτό τι ἕκαστον (vs. the many instances),the vocabulary of the “concept” and the “actual” is conceptually unclear. (c)

2.39    (494A1): πλῆθος is not “the majority” but the mass (massed together: n.b., ἁθρόοι, 492B5, cf. 493A9). Again at 494A4. (i)

2.41    (494C1-2): “anticipate and flatter his future capabilities” is taken from Shorey, but Shorey adds a note to the effect that they want to be on record having done so (implied by μέλλουσαν, C2), without which the translation is incomplete. (u)

2.43    (494D4-7): Rather than notice the close, relevant verbal allusion to Adeimantus’s speech (487A), Au. brings up the remotely relevant historical figure of Alcibiades in a note. (sm)

2.43    (494D6): “works like a slave” for δουλεύσαντι is wrong. This idiomatic simile in English has nothing to do with slavery, just unremitting work. The Greek means he will let it be his master, and will subordinate his pride – as at the end of Book Nine (590C9). Shorey translates it as Au. does but appends a note on the sense. (i)

2.43    (494D7): εἰσακοῦσαι is not “take in” but “hearken to.” (i)

2.43    (494D9): ἐὰν δ’οὖν means not “if, then” (he does hear somehow), but “if nevertheless” (by dint of his inborn talents he does see). Thus Shorey’s: “and even supposing.” Denniston cites this instance of δ’οὖν.  Moreover “has insight” is too vague: the point is that despite his disinterest his natural gifts enable him to have an immediate perception (αἰσθάνηται or preferably εἰσαισθάνηται with ms.F) of something beyond, even though he was not listening for it (εἰσακοῦσαι, D7). (sy)

2.43    (494E6-7): The two participles (ἐπιβουλεύοντας, καθίσταντας) are their means for disabling him, not just other things they would do (“and” is wrong:  it is καί … καί). (sy)

2.43    (495A2): φιλοσοφήσει is not “be a philosopher” (adj.) but “choose a life of philosophy” (verb). (sm)

2.45    (495A6): ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος is not “getting out of good habits” but “falling away from the practice of philosophy.” (τοῦ is referential). (u)

2.45    (495A8): παρασκευή is not “possessions” but “accoutrements” or (Shorey) “instrumentalities.” (i)

2.45    (495B1-2): εἰς τὸ ἄριστον ἐπιτήδευμα is not “considered from the point of view of the best practice” (=?) but “in its orientation toward.” ἄριστον and βελτίστης are sympathetic, and this is what makes the fall great. (c)

2.45    (495B5): τἀγαθά sc. τὰ μέγιστα from the foregoing parallel (B3). Hence, “do the greatest good” not just “do good.” Likewise, μέγα (B5-6) means not “great” (qualitative, i.e., good), but significantly (quantitative) good or bad. (i)

2.45    (495C3): “others” should be “other men” in order to clinch the metaphor of the sexes. Shorey: “wooers.” (u)

2.45    (495C5-6): πολλοὶ πολλῶν κακῶν ἄξιοι– not “deserving every punishment.” Socrates is quoting Adeimantus from 487D (some are worth nothing but most have a negative worth). In contrast with the worthless ones these are worthy, alright: “quite capable of many evils.” (i)

2.47    (495D4): κομψότατοι ὄντες τυγχάνωσι is not “who are actually most ingenious.” The participle is supplementary and the relative clause is causal. They show some talent and therefore begin to qualify. The translation says that they are good at something else.

2.47    (495E4): Not “are” any different but “cut a different figure from” (n.b., ἰδεῖν), introducing (again) an illustrative metaphor (cf. the beast, above).

2.47    (495E7-8): Not “owing to his master’s lack of money and friends” but “because she is destitute and abandoned by her true master.”

2.47    (496A11): πάνσμικρον … τῶν κατ’ αξίαν ὁμιλοῦντων is not “a tiny fraction of” (partitive genitive):  it is a defining genitive. “Tiny is the number that correctly pursue philosophy.” It is a remnant not a fraction.

2.49    (496B2-3): ἀπορίᾳ τῶν διαφθερούντων is an oxymoron that “in the absence of those who will corrupt him” fails to bring across. (c)

2.49    (496B6): ἐμφυές is neuter going with the small group (and is not feminine going with φιλοσοφία).

2.49    (496C1): “all other things have conspired to divert him away from philosophy” utterly fails to bring across the oxymoronic humor of τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα παρεσκεύασται which says that he was fully equipped to fail (but unfortunately his disability made him succeed). (u)

2.49    (496C4): τινι ἄλλῳ ἢ οὐδενί τῶν ἔμπροσθεν idiomatic (cf. ἤ τι ἢ οὐδέν) for “maybe nobody ever” and does not mean “anyone else or anyone in the past.” (i)

2.49    (496C7): αὖ marks the shift from few to many. Tr.’s “moreover” is unneeded and misleading. (sy)

2.49    (496C7-8): “nothing salutary” is a mere invention for idiomatic οὐδὲν ὑγιές, which idiomatically means “nothing valid.” Moreover, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν does not excuse (what Au. takes to be) a medical metaphor (“so to speak”) but the exaggeration of οὐδέν. (i)

2.51    (496D9): The shift from participles to ἀγαπᾷ constitutes a climax: “and” after “lawlessness” is therefore wrong. (sy)

2.51    (496D9-E2): The Greek is beautiful but the tr. is not. (u)

2.51    (497A1): “a not inconsiderable amount” for οὐ τὰ ἐλάχιστα buries the litotes in a double negative. (u)

2.51    (497A3): μὴ τυχών means “did not get” (as his lot), not “has not found.” (i)

2.51    (497A4): μᾶλλον here is “rather” or “instead” – not “more.” (i)

2.51    (497A6): τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας is not the subject of philosophy (this is conceptually impossible for Plato), but the situation and status of philosophy. (c)

2.51    (497C1): τοῦτο is (again: cf. ad 492C6, supra) more than “it” as translated; ἦν is “was all along” (“philosophical” imperfect) not “would be;” and “of human origin” is an incorrect expansion of ἀνθρώπινα. (i)

2.53    (497C5-6): “if the state … is what we have discussed” reverses subject and predicate. The sense is, “whether the state we made up in discussion is the ideal state you now have in mind.” (u)

2.53    (497E1): λαβέτω τέλος is not “let’s get to the end by clearing this up” (τέλος is not πέρας) but “difficult though it be (ὅμως) let our presentation achieve perfection by these things being clarified.” (i)

2.55    (497E9-498C4). The parallelism in the two paragraphs’ structure indicates their meaning but tr. continually misses this. The sense is as follows: “Even if they take up philosophy (this is the force of καὶ ἁπτόμενοι, 497E9), it is at that coltish young age that comes between childhood and adult life, and besides they give it up right when they reach the meat of the matter; and even though they quit before they got anywhere (δέ, 498A4) they plume themselves (μεγάλα φρονεῖν, A5, is their attitude about themselves, not philosophy!) with attending a lecture now and then when they have a little free time from their real jobs (πάρεργον οἰόμενοι, A6, is not deciding to make a hobby of it but avoiding it unless it fits into the main program). By old age, apart from a very few cases (n.b. ἐκτός, emphasized by δή, A7), the spark – the potential they may have reached in their youth – has gone out never to be rekindled.” That this is the sense is confirmed by the alternative description which Socrates characterizes as “the opposite on every point” (πᾶν τοὐναντίον, B3, emphatically placed) inviting us to watch for parallels in order to understand: “In that coltish (and actually childish: καὶ παῖδας, B3, is a corrective) stage they should do the version of philosophy that suits a child (μειρακιώδη … φιλοσοφίαν, B3-4, is an oxymoron that tr.’s ”education in philosophy suitable to youngsters” does not bring across), namely a somatic foundation in gymnastics (τε B4 is appositional – “just as in fact they do” makes this into a simile for something, and “they should certainly take good care ...” translates nothing); when (this is “stage two,” introduced pari passu with δέ, B6, which tr. does with un-adversative “and”) they become adults in soul (this corresponds to the adulthood of oikonomia when the former group “face the music” and take on duties that exclude philosophy but tr. takes no opportunity to make this clear) they should instead move on to a “gymnastics” that will provide them a philosophical foundation (τὰ ἐκείνης γυμνάσια, B7-8, another paradoxon which incidentally broaches the preparatory function of geometry, though it dies on the vine in the tr. “they should increase their exercises with it”). Third they should put business apart (ἐκτός [C1] echoes ἐκτός [A7] but tr. speaks of “giving up” business as though it ever had been valuable) and devote themselves to nothing else except as a sideline” (πάρεργον reappearing). (sy)

2.55    (498C1): ἀφέτους, a metaphor from husbandry, is passive (“let free to browse”) not active.

2.55    (498C5): ἐπιστήσειν is not to “prepare” a fitting destiny but to “crown” their lives with one.

2.57    (498E2,3): Tr. does not bring across the sense of the figura etymologica in ὁμοιο-. (sm)

2.57    (499A1): ἐν πολιτείᾳ ἑτέρᾳ τοιαύτῃ is not in “another city of this kind” but “in a city likewise (correspondingly) of their kind.” This is an idiom of ἕτερος. (i)

2.57    (499A9): ἀσπαζομένων in deep hyperbaton is brought to the beginning by tr. and the essential point of the passage is lost. Compare the problem noted in the next note. (sy)

2.59    (499A11): προορώμενοι is not “see before” but “foresee.”

2.59    (499D8): “But won’t you agree” should be “But the many won’t agree, say you?” and ἴσως in the answer means ἴσως ἐρῶ, not ἴσως οὐ δοκεῖ (as the sequel shows).

2.60    (500A3): Au. prints Slings’s text with τοι and translates what he prints, but adds a note to the translation (n.45) to the effect that there is a “crux” here. The reader looks across and sees no cross, but a perfectly legible text. What he has called a “crux” is only Burnet’s editorial note that these words might be a dittography. (t)

2.61    (499E1): ἀλλοίαν τοι δόξαν means (indeed, admonishes) that they would change ἃ δοκει αὑτοῖς. “a different kind of belief” in the translation should simply be “but their judgment would be different if only ...  .” ἀλλοίαν means that their judgment will change.

2.61    (500A4-5): ἢ οἴει τινὰ χαλεπαίνειν τῷ μὴ χαλεπῷ ἢ φθονεῖν τῷ μὴ φθονερῷ ἄφθονόν τε καὶ πρᾷον ὄντα is not “Or do you think that anyone who is generous and mild-tempered will be annoyed at someone who is not difficult or will resent someone who is ungrudging?” but, according to the word order,  “Or do you fancy anybody is offended by an inoffensive person or envious of an unenvious one, as long as he himself is without envy and harshness?” The tr. puts the burden onto the generous person to perform rather than saying it is only the lack of generosity that might cause trouble. (sy)

2.61    (500B8): οὐ σχολὴ τῷ means that he is too busy to deal with petty matters, not that “he has no leisure to” – it is an oxymoronic litotes. (u)

2.65    (501A6): μηδέ is just “nor,” not “not even,” even after μήτε. (i)

2.65    (501B1): ἑκατέρωσ’ ἀποβλέποιεν is not “looking away at their models,” as n.46 says (referring back to n.2 which is also incorrect), but “looking back and forth,” as the translation itself says. The ἀπό adds the sense of “referential” looking, whether from what has been painted back to model or from model back to painting. (i)

2.67    (501D7): τυχοῦσαν + gen. is “get” not “happen to find.”

2.69    (502C9): “since” for ἐπειδή sounds too causal –  “now that” would be better. In fact, the sense is “despite the difficulty we must go on,” which is the opposite of “since.” (u)

2.69    (502C10-D1): μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων is a formulaic doublet for edifying activity (cf. Lach.180A4, 182C2-4 (bis),183A1, 185B3, and 190E2; Prot.327A3-4, Rep.560B8-9, Tim.87B7): “experience” for ἐπιτηδευμάτων is wrong. (i)

2.73    (503C4): οἷοι is not lives but people, sorts of people. The text as emended (by Slings) is indeed difficult but the tr. needs to be clear. (u)

2.75    (504A1): ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις is not “in other pursuits” but (given the article) “in the other pursuits we tested him for.”

2.75    (504A7): μή rather than οὐ means he would deserve to be denied hearing the rest, not that he “would not be the right person to hear the rest” (whatever that means).

2.75    (504B5): οὕτω is not “with the result that” (which is ὥστε) but “thus it is that” or “and that is why.”

2.75    (504B8): μετρίως needs a translation that can be echoed by Socrates’s retort μέτρον (and by μετρίως, C2). Entailed also is that ἀτελές means not “imperfect” but “leaving (something) out” (ἀπολεῖπον), “incomplete.” Socrates’s expression is taut. (sm)

2.76    (504E4): ἔφη, [ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα]· should be (with Slings) ἔφη [ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα]· . (typo)

2.77    (504D8-E3): The tr. of the entire passage should be compared with the one by Shorey which it is meant to replace. (u)

2.79    (505A): Only in connection with the good do “the ‘just’ and other such terms become useful.” Surely the terms do not become useful. “Terms” perhaps translates προσχρησάμενα (as if that meant “usages”?) but the sense of this (new) term, which governs , is “because the acts that are per se just acts (etc.) are carried out also in connection with the (idea of the) good.” So, Quandt: “the thing by their involvement with which just acts etc. become beneficial.” (c)

2.79    (505A4): σχεδὸν οἶσθα is not “you more or less know” but “I am pretty sure you already know (that I will say this in addition ...).”

2.79    (505A6-B1): “But if we don’t know it, you know that, even if we were to understand everything else … , nothing is of any use to us without this notion, any more than we could acquire something without the good,” in the tr., should be “and (I am about to say that) if we do not know (the good), then even if we know the other goods in ignorance of the good, that knowledge would be useless to us, as would be any acquisition if the acquisition were acquired without the good of it being acquired.”

2.79    (505B1): Au. reads εἰ κεκτῄμεθα (the emendation of Bekker, contra all mss.), with Slings, without giving a critical note, but then translates it as if it were the opt. with ἄν. (t)

2.79    (505B1-3): “Or do you think that there is any advantage in having gained every possession apart from the Good [Au.'s capital]? Or to hold everything in high regard without the Good, but have no regard for anything beautiful and good?” should be “Or do you think that to acquire anything is advantageous, even if the thing is not a good thing? Or to contemplate any and all things divorced from their relation to what is good about them, while conversely paying no attention to what is fine and good (about them).”

2.79    (505B5): ἀλλὰ μήν καὶ τόδε γε is not “but furthermore;” rather, it is “and yet” (ἀλλὰ μήν γε idiomatic for introducing the minor premise). (i)

2.79    (505B9): ἥτις φρόνησις not “what this knowledge is” but which knowledge this is (i.e., the knowledge of what?) an idiom of τίς (cf. Dodds ad Gorg.447D1). (i)

2.79    (505B9): ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες: not “forced to conclude” but “forced, in the end, to assert.” (i)

2.79    (505B11): καὶ μάλα γελοίως is not “and silly, too” but “very ridiculously are they so compelled” (καὶ with μάλα). (i)

2.81    (505C7): “misconception” for πλάνη is not a translation of the concrete term but a vague and abstract interpretation of what it might imply. (u)

2.81    (505C10): συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς is not “it turns out that they agree” but “what happens to them is that circumstance forces them to agree” (quasi-personal use of συμβαίνειν: cf. Quandt ad Rep.502C5). (i)

2.81    (505D2-3): ὅτι μὲν μεγάλαι καὶ πολλαὶ ἀμφισβητήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ, φανερόν; is dismissive and meant merely to set up the δέ clause, which trumps the pother and focusses on the crucial axiom. Tr. has “Well then, isn’t it clear ...” which misses the dismissive function. (sy)

2.81    (505D7): δοκεῖν is “seem to be just” (not “have beliefs”).

2.81    (505D7): δοκεῖν is a surprise that is set up by D6 and is cleared up (and justified) by D8 (δοκοῦντα). Tr. misses the connection of these three uses and translates the middle one “have beliefs” (it can hardly mean this) – though it then brings across that δόξαν means appearance at D8! (sm)

2.81    (506A1): “are in the dark” misses δεῖν: “can be allowed to be in the dark.”

2.83    (506B5): οὗτος is derogatory. Missing this Au. infers that Socrates is praising Adeimantus for finally asking for his opinion! (i)

2.83    (506B6): The sense of “That’s my man” for οὗτος is unclear.  The English sounds approbatory but the Greek is idiomatically negative (cf. IDIOM n. ad loc.). (u)

2.83    (506B6): With τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦν Socrates refers not to the opinions of others than himself but others than Adeimantus, who is insisting that Socrates give him his opinion just after Socrates has said that everybody desperately knows they need to know. (c)

2.83    (506B8): οὐδέ is a riposte by Adeimantus to Socrates. (i)

2.83    (506C5): “who is willing” should be “but to be willing to.” ‘It is unjust not to be willing’ is what Adeimantus is claiming; therefore Socrates’s riposte: “It would be shameful for him to speak.”

2.83    (506E3): τὰ νῦν is not (with δοκοῦντα) “my present thinking,” as if his thinking had changed or was tentative, but “at the present moment” (with ἐφικέσθαι).

2.85    (507A4): πῃ (enclitic) is not “in any way” (that is too strong) but “in some way.” (i)

2.85    (507A7): “once having agreed and reminded you of what we said earlier ...” The pair “agreed and reminded” do not make sense together.  “Agreed” translates διομολογησάμενος, which however denotes the one partner asking the other to stipulate something for the continuation of the discussion. Shorey: “coming to an understanding.” (u)

2.87    (507B2): πολλά καλὰ … (φαμεν) is not “we say that many things are beautiful,” but “we speak of many things with the same term, beautiful – or good, or as otherwise distinct” (tr. does not translate ἕκαστα) “and thus distinguish them in our speech.”

2.87    (507B5): “And we speak of beauty itself,” not “that there is actual beauty.”  Also, “classed as many” is completely wrong. The correct sense of B6-7 is “as a something, in turn, of one character distinct in it as if that character were a single thing, saying of them that this is what they are.”

2.87    (507B9): “some of these” is wrong for τὰ μέν. Just ‘some things on the one hand as opposed to others on the other hand.’

2.87    (507C10-D2): Tr. brings τρίτον up to the front and then mistranslates προσδεῖ with “adds.” It is not “is there anything which adds some other third element” but “do hearing and sound require some supplemental and different kind of thing so that the one can do its hearing and the other can be heard, a thing which if not present as a third element the one will not hear and ...” (sy)

2.89    (507E6): ἰδέᾳ is mistranslated “notion.” It varies γένος in ἄλλο γένος from above (507C11), there translated “some other … element.” The translation conflates τρίτον with ἄλλο γένος and therefore loses the special contribution of γένος. For consistency, then, ἰδέα should be translated with “element,” not “notion!” Shorey added a note which Au. ignored. (sm)

2.87    (507E6): On οὐ σμικρᾷ ... ἰδέᾳ, what is the thought behind the statement that a “notion” might link vision and visibility? On the correct sense of ἰδέα here cf. SEMANTICS n., supra. (c)

2.89    (508A4): αἰτιάσασθαι … τούτου κύριον is not “claim is responsible” but “which do you point to as the master over this?”  κύριον is untranslated but it needs to be since Socrates is about to praise it. (sm)

2.89    (508A9): ἆρ’ οὖν ὧδε points forward (this is the idiom of the “first person” demonstrative), therefore not “is that where our sight comes from” but “would you say that sight has the following natural affinity with that god (i.e., the sun).” (i)

2.91    (508A11-B1): “neither sight nor eye is sun” is the meaning. The article prior to the two οὔτε ’s establishes that the sun is the predicate of both. Tr. has “sight is not sun or eye.” (sy)

2.91    (508B13): “in proportion to” for ἀνάλογον is too arithmetical. Shorey’s “stand in proportion with” is better. (u)

2.91    (508B13-C2): ὅτι / τοῦτο used (idiomatically) to frame a proportion (as [ὅτιπερ] A is to B … so [τοῦτο] is C to D). Thus τοῦτο is only adverbial with τοῦτον: there is no “body.” (i)

2.91    (508C7): ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης καθαρᾶς ὄψεως is “as if there were no pure power of sight in them.” The tr. “as if their sight were impaired” is an interpretation. The Greek expression however is meant to set up the contrast drawn below by ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται. The idea is that light puts vision into the eyes. (u)

2.91    (508D2): τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὄμμασιν is not “the very eyes themselves” but “these same eyes” (which a moment ago could not see). αὐτοῖς is in attributive position.

2.91    (508D4): τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς cannot be the “function” of soul, but rather its situation – like the situation of the eyes and the way they are dependent on external circumstances (though the tr. inadequately articulated this relation with the expression “impaired vision” which could be a deficiency due to internal or external factors). (c)

2.93    (508E4): ὡς γιγνομένης is printed (with the majority of edd.) but ὡς γιγνομένην is translated, which is the reading of a minor ms. reported by Slings. Is this an error or a typo? (t)

2.93    (509A9): μᾶλλον is “investigate further in this way instead” not “go on thinking further.”

2.95    (509B7-8): τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν (ὑπ. ἐκ.) αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι is not “being and reality is in them because of it,” but “existence (that they are) and essence (what they are) is added to them ... .”

2.95    (509C10): ἕκων (οὐκ) ἀπολείψω means not “I won’t miss something out on purpose” but “as far as it is up to me I will leave nothing out.” (i)

2.95    (509D1): Tr. here (as often) fails to bring across how τοίνυν takes up the interlocutor on his word. “Please don’t” (sc. leave anything out) | “Alright then try to conceive the following … .” (i)

2.95    (509D1): δύο αὐτὼ εἶναι. The conceptual emphasis of the expression is not to say they are (numerically) two, as the tr. puts it, but that they must be so because they are distinct from one another. (c)

2.97    (509D1-4): What were two “entities” at the beginning of the sentence devolve into two “concepts” (tr. of εἴδη) at the end. (c)

2.96    (509D3): Au. prints the majuscule text and the “editorial” apparatus of Slings (reproducing Wilamowitz’s argument for a majuscule error) but then translates the genitive of the mss. as if nothing were wrong with it. (t)

2.96    (509D6): In n.10, ἀν, ἴσα F should be ἄν, ἴσα F. (typo)

2.96    (509D6): The critical note (n.10) quotes Stallbaum (from Burnet) rather than Richter (from Slings). Why? (t)

2.97    (509D6-7): λαβὼν … τέμνε is not “take two unequal segments and again cut each one in the same ratio, one for the visible class the other for the intelligible” but “subdivide a line that is cut into two segments, which represent respectively the invisible and the visible, into subsections by the same ratio.”

2.97    (509D9): Not “in the first section you will have images in relation to each other by their clarity or obscurity”:  ἔσται σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ describes the relation between the two subsections of the visible, but tr. moves τὸ μέν to an early position and gives the relation nothing to compare.

2.97    (509E1-510A1): The force of the μέν / δέ construction (in this case done with ἔπειτα) does not come through. (sy)

2.99    (510A8-9): “the division of truth to falsehood is in this ratio” for διῃρῆσθαι ἀληθείᾳ τε καὶ μή misconstrues the dative(s), which are parallel to those of 509D9: “in relation to each other by their clarity or obscurity … .” In both cases the datives are hard to construe in English, but in whatever way they are construed in the first case, they must also be construed in the same way in the second. (u)

2.98    (510C1): Slings has posited a lacuna on the grounds that there are no parallels in the Dialogues for this use of λλ’ αὖθις. In his critical note (n.12) Au. correctly shows that Slings has emended against all mss. but then in an adjacent note to the translation (n.66) he tells the reader “there is a lacuna in the text here,” although by the evidence he has presented there only may be – as if Slings’s opinion is to be counted as evidence. (t)

2.99    (510C1): τούτων προειρημένων points back. It does not to introduce what follows (“after a few preliminary remarks”) for what follows is not preliminary! Au. is forced into this translation by the emendation of Slings (see TEXT n., supra).

2.99    (510C5): ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφά is not “other relationships of this sort” (?) but “kindred subjects.”

2.99    (510C6): ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά means “they make them hypotheses as such” (without further ado) not “make them their hypotheses.” (i)

2.99    (510C6-D3): Again the contrast between μέν and δέ is missed: Rather than investigate these they use them to study those. (sy)

2.101    (510D2): ὁμολογουμένως is not end up “in agreement” but that they proceed “in such a way as to maintain internal consistency.” (i)

2.101    (510D5): “as well” is not in the text unless it is meant to represent καί in οὐκοῦν καί, which was also translated with ὅτι, correctly. (sy)

2.101    (510D5): τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἴδεσι is translated “visible forms” and then via αὐτῶν (D6) and τούτων (D6) they become “actual things.” The language is conceptually inexact. “considering” for διανοούμενοι (D6) likewise does not grasp the sense:  the verb describes the path of their thought (whence this thought will soon be called διάνοια). ἐκείνων is moreover laudatory. (c)

2.101    (510D7-8): (τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ) ἕνεκα is not “on the basis of” but “about and for the sake of understanding” as ζητοῦντες, below, shows. αὐτὰ μὲν … is “the things that they make or draw, which in themselves are such as to cast shadows, they treat as images rather than things, but what they are truly (δέ) trying to do is see what is in fact invisible except through διάνοια.” (c)

2.100    (511A1): Au. prints ζητοῦντές τε and supplies no critical note. τε is read by ADM (and Slings Chambry Adam Jowett-Campbell) but δέ is read by F (and Burnet  Shorey  Adam [olim]). The sense is greatly affected: a critical note at the very least is sorely needed. (t)

2.101    (511A3-4): Tr. again fails to bring across the μέν / δέ: though the noetic (not a “class,” by the way!) is noetic, they cannot study it noetically. (sy)

2.101    (511A6): ἐκβαίνειν continues the conceit of stepping (as “upon”), which is lost by the translation “escape.” “Step outside” better. (i)

2.101    (511A6-7): αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσιν is not “the very same things of which images were made at a lower level” but “the objects considered in themselves which had been imitated by what was below them:” αὐτοῖς in predicative not attributive position.

2.101    (511A6-7): τὰ κάτω is not “a lower level” but “the lower level” (it is the only level below these αὐτά).

2.101    (511B4): “reason itself” is not specific enough for αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος, which is “reason operating alone” in contrast with the mental process described just above. (c)

2.101    (511B5-6): τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιουμένους οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις is not “using hypotheses that are not first principles but genuine hypotheses” but “treating their hypotheses not as principles but literally as things placed under … .” Moreover, ὁρμάς is not “starting points” (for these are not “genuine” hypotheses) but springboards, vel sim.

2.103    (511B7-8): On ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, the tr. “keeping hold of what follows” loses the etymological dynamic. It means it latches on to its proper objects and in doing so is latched to the next object in logical sequence. (sm)

2.103    (511C1): The πρός in προσχρώμενος is important but untranslated.  It means “using as an adjunct” (in contrast with the operation of αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος, “reason unaided,” which is also missed in tr.) so that ἀλλά in the sequel spells out αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος in contrast (C1-2). (sm)

2.103    (511C3): ἱκανῶς μὲν οὐ says Glaucon, translated “not fully;” but then Socrates denies his diffidence in reply (ἱκανώτατα, D6), translated “very adequately.” The tr. should bring across the etymological figure. Moreover, μὲν οὖν evinces Glaucon’s rising confidence (compare 510B10), and Socrates’s superlative in reply shows his unstinting approval. (sm)

2.103    (511C4): μέντοι verges on dismissing his previously voiced uncertainty. (sy)

2.103    (511C4-6): The Greek does not mean, “the part of the real and intelligible, that which is ...” is contrasted with “the part looked at by the so-called arts.” The whole (i.e. both parts) is “intelligible and (therefore) in a sense real.” The Greek means that the area contemplated by the dialectical science of the real and intelligible is clearer than the same area as it is studied by the arts. (u)

2.103    (511C5): ἡ τοῦ διαλεγέσθαι δύναμις is here translated “dialectical discussion” whereas just above (511B4) it was translated “the power of dialectic.” Why? (sm)

2.103    (511C6): The tr. has “... .  And though those ...” The period thereby placed between ἀρχαί and καί (C7) dislocates this next remark from the foregoing second limb to which alone it belongs. Who are “those making the inquiry” and what “inquiry” are they making?

2.102    (511D2): Au. prints καίτοι νοητῶν μετὰ ἀρχῆς with all mss. and gives no notice that Slings athetized the phrase. This is perfectly correct procedure except for the fact that in many cases he has accepted Slings’s emendations (they are voluminous) without a critical note. The overall effect is that Au. treats Slings’s hypotheses as evidence (not needing a note) when he agrees with them and as mere opinion (not deserving a note) when he disagrees. (t)

2.103    (511D4): ἕξιν is a state they are, in not a “practice.”

2.103    (511D6): ἐπὶ τοῖς is not “in addition to” but “corresponding to.”

2.107    (514A2): ἰδέ = “imagine;” but when Glaucon replies in kind with ὁρῶ the tr. is “I see it” (though again just below ὅρα = “imagine”). (sm)

2.107    (515A2): οἷον εἰκός is not “as you would expect” but that they make the sorts of sound that are likely, given what the shadows' outline makes them appear to be. (sm)

2.109    (515A2): φθεγγομένους is “make a noise,” not “speak” (some of the ξύλινα are animals, others are, e.g., chariots). Again at B9.

2.107    (515A4): “This image and prisoners you speak of are strange” for ἄτοπον λέγεις εἰκόνα καὶ δεσμώτας ἀτόπους, pointlessly “streamlines out” the repetition of the adjective and the chiasm – and thereby all the pathos of Glaucon’s remark and of Socrates’s reply to it. (u)

2.109    (515B4-5): This is a vexed passage but no matter what, τὰ ὄντα cannot be a mere predicate (“real”). It is at least “reality.” (i)

2.109    (515C3): πολλὴ ἀνάγκη is not “there is every reason to believe it,” but “there is no other possibility,” ἀνάγκη as often denoting logical necessity. (i)

2.109    (515C6): ὁπότε τις is not “whenever” (general). The condition is “ideal” or “future less vivid” (note ἄν).

2.109    (515C6): τις is not “anyone” but “someone” or “one of them” (after αὐτοῖς). (i)

2.111    (515C8): ἀλγοῖ, after δέ, continues the protasis; the apodosis begins at τί ἄν (D1).

2.111    (515D4): βλέποι is not the apodosis but the δέ-clause of the new protasis dependent upon  λέγοι (D2), a subordinate clause attracted into the optative.

2.111    (515E3): “see” is needlessly vague for καθορᾶν which means “make out” – so too 2.133, 516A6. (u)

2.111    (516A1): ἀγανακτεῖν ἑλκόμενον is not complain about being dragged but complain as he was dragged.

2.113    (516A9-B1): Proleptic νύκτωρ ἂν sets up the comparison ῥᾷον ... ἤ but Au. fails to see that ἤ, in hyperbaton, is comparative and translates it “or.” (sy)

2.113    (516B4): οὐδέ is not “or even.” The δέ introduces the generalization with ἕδρᾳ, a spelling out of the essential aspect of ἐν ὕδασιν.

2.113    (516C5): “the wisdom picked up there” for τῆς ἐκεῖ σοφίας fails to bring across the oxymoronic tone:  “what there went for wisdom” (a comparison he can make only now). (u)

2.113    (516C6): “delighted” is wrong for αὑτὸν εὐδαιμονίζειν: it is not to be happy about himself but “to count himself happy.” (u)

2.113    (516C9): τῷ ὀξύτατα καθορῶντι is not “anyone who could … most distinctly see,” which introduces a tone of arbitrariness, but “for him who could ... .” (u)

2.114    (516D7): κεῖνά should be ’κεῖνά; cf. ad 1.360, supra. (typo)

2.115    (516D2): “predict” for ἀπομαντευομένῳ does not get the benighted tone.  Shorey, “successful at guessing” is better. γνωματεύοντα below (E8) is likewise satirically recondite, and more than “make out.” (u)

2.115    (516D2): δοκεῖς is not “would you think” but “do you think.” There is already a “would” in the sentence. (u)

2.115    (516D5-6): ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ παρ’ ἀκλήρῳ is not just “someone else” but a person who himself is merely renting the land (a different error was made translating the same line at 1.223).

2.115    (516D6-7): “thought about” for δοξάζειν does not bring across that the person now recognizes that his consciousness in the cave was mere opinionizing. Moreover, to “undergo anything rather than what he thought about down there” does not make sense. Shorey: “endure anything rather than opine with them;” Quandt: “undergo anything before being a member of that world of opinion ... .” (u)

2.115    (516E1): πᾶν is not “everything” (that would be πάντα) but “anything.” (i)

2.115    (517A5): τόν is not “the man who tried,” but is generic: “anybody who tries.” (i)

2.117    (517B2): ἕδρα is not just a “place” but a medium. Cf. 516B5 and 510A1-3. (c)

2.117    (517B5): “take” for τιθείς (i.e., posit, consider) creates the unnecessarily awkward expression, “if you take the upward journey and seeing of what is above as the upward journey of the soul ... .” (u)

2.117    (517C2): πᾶσι πάντων the cause of all that is fine and good for everything (not everybody). (i)

2.119    (517D5): ἀσχημονεῖ is not to act “in an unseemly fashion” but “awkwardly,” whence laughable, cf. 506D). (sm)

2.119    (518B1-2): εὐδαιμονίσειεν ἂν τοῦ πάθους … The πάθος is the sudden event of confusion. Only for the latter person is this confusion something to count him happy for: he has for once in his life gotten out of the dark. But Au. counts the “former” man, who is plunged into darkness, happy. This must be because he takes the πάθος τε καὶ βίος for which he calls him happy the brighter life (φανότερος βίος, A6-7) he enjoyed before the plunge. (i)

2.119    (518B1-2): “former” indicates that Au. takes the soul that is going into light to be the pitiable one, presumably because it had not been enlightened before (n.9 spells this out, though the passage from Tht. there quoted vitiates this interpretation). (c)

2.119    (518B2): καὶ εἰ is “and if” but tr. takes makes it “even if” and therefore gets anacoluthon when the apodosis comes (at B3-4, ἧττον ἄν …). (u)

2.121    (518C5): In ταύτην τὴν ἐνοῦσαν … δύναμιν, ἐνοῦσαν is attributive not supplementary. Therefore, not “indicates that this ability exists in” but “(to turn around) this ability that exists in the soul.”

2.121:    (518C6): οἷον is “i.e.”, not “as does.” It is proleptic with οὕτω.

2.121    (518D1): ἦ γάρ is “don’t we,” not “isn’t it.”

2.121    (518D3): ἂν εἴη is not “would be” but “could be.”

2.121    (518D7): The antecedent of τοῦτο is not “devising a way to make it see,” but to bring about that it “be properly oriented and looking whither it should be.”

2.120    (518D10) Au. prints τείνειν (following Slings) without critical note. All mss. and Iamblichus and all previous edd. have read εἶναι; Slings has found τείνειν in a paraphrase of Plot. (6.8.6) but Armstrong (Loeb) does not include it in the quotation. Moreover the sense in the Plotinus passage, “come close to the body” (Armstrong) is tantamount to the sense gotten with εἶναι,  rather than the sense given to τείνειν by the tr. here (“are pretty much as extensive as”). (t)

2.121    (518D10): ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τῶν τοῦ σώματος is not “are pretty much as extensive as those of the body” but “hew rather close to those the body.” On the reading of τείνειν rather than  εἶναι of all mss., cf.TEXT n., supra. (i)

2.121    (518D10): The meaning of “are pretty much as extensive as” is unclear and leaves γάρ nothing to explain. (u)

2.121    (518E1): ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν is (to be engendered) “by habituation and practice,” not (to be implanted) “into our habits.” What they are “implanted into” is the soul.

2.121    (519A2): πονηρῶν μέν cannot be “inferior,” but “bad” or “knavish.”

2.123    (519A3-4): ὡς οὐ φαῦλον ἔχον τὴν ὄψιν κακίᾳ δ’ ἠναγκασμένον ὑπηρετεῖν ὥστε ... means “it is not because its vision is bad but because it is addicted to the service of evil (that the better he sees the worse it behaves).” The tr.’s “although” for ὡς weakens the antithesis. (u)

2.123    (519B3): περιεστρέφετο is still part of the protasis. The apodosis begins with καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἄν (B4). (u)

2.123    (519B6-7): Tr. should match εἰκός (B5) with εἰκός (B6). (sm)

2.123    (519C2): σκοπόν is not viewpoint but goal or aim (besides, one does not aim at a viewpoint).

2.123    (519C5): οὐ πράξουσιν means they will not act at all or engage in action, not “they will not do what they have to do.” πρᾶξις is being contrasted with ἐν παιδείᾳ διατρίβειν (C1-2).

2.125    (519E3): Not “that this will apply across the whole state” but “that this (happiness) will be engendered throughout.”

2.125    (520A1): For ἣν ἂν ἕκαστος, not “share the services which every individual can do” but “share the benefits that each individual brings to the mix.”

2.125    (520A2): καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμποιῶν … continues the other participles describing how the law creates happiness for all, and is not the new statement that “the law itself can create.”

2.127    (520B1-2): “share the difficulties” is too vague for μετέχειν πόνων which means “do their share of the work,” referring to 519D6. (u)

2.127    (520C1): ἐν μέρει ἑκάστῳ does not mean “one by one” but “taking turns” – the Greek does not imply that only one has gone down at any particular time. (u)

2.127    (520D2): μέλλοντες is “are going to” (it is an assignment) not “intending to” (which only weakens the crucial statement about their lacking eagerness). (u)

2.127    (520D2-4): ἀνάγκη is not just “must be true” but “must be.” (i)

2.127    (520D2): μέλλοντες here is “going to,” not just “intending to.” (i)

2.127    (520D3): Tr.’s “best way and with the least ‘equivocation’ ” (? for ἀστασιαστότατα) misses the sense of στάσις (in the context of the happy unification of the whole).

2.127    (520D4): “accordingly” for ἐναντίως fails to deliver the point: “oppositely” is needed. (u)

2.129    (521A7): On οἰκεῖος ὢν καὶ ἔνδον ὁ τοιοῦτος, the participle (also γιγνόμενον) is predicative not attributive: war becomes an indigenous or inherent matter.

2.129    (521B1): “ruling for political motives” is wrong for πολιτικῶν ἀρχῶν. It means “public office.”

2.129    (521B4): τὸ ἄρχειν is “ruling” (i.e. occupying a position of power), not “government.”

2.129    (521B4-5): ἰέναι ἐπ’ αὐτό in the context of the ἐρασταί is erotic: “woo it” not “enter it.” Shorey had a note. (i)

2.129    (521B8-9): περί τε τούτων … ἔχουσί τε is a balanced construction. The antecedent of ὧν is τούτων, made prominent by τε, not οἵ (of nineteen translators known to me from Ficino forward, only Jowett had made this mistake before). (sy)

2.131    (521C6): νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας is not a day shrouded in a “kind of darkness” (this interprets but does not translate) but a “nocturnal sort” of day. τινὸς already apologizes for the metaphor; interpreting the metaphor out makes translating τινὸς unnecessary. (sy)

2.131    (521C7): Au. prints τοῦ ὄντος οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον (accusative) but translates “an ascent to reality,” making it an appositive to the nominative subject (rather than the object of εἰς). Shorey’s Loeb prints Hermann’s emendation to the nominative (noted also in Burnet but there attributed to Cobet) in order to justify making it an appositive but this Loeb simply prints the accusative (like Slings, without critical notice of emendations) and translates it as if nominative. (t)

2.131    (521C7): The tr. of τοῦ ὄντος οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον (“the true day, an ascent to reality”) fails to disambiguate how a “day” can be an “ascent.” (u)

2.131    (521D2): ὅλκον ἀπό and ἐπί are not “transport” of the soul but “drawing” from and to. It is the direction, not the location, that is at issue. (u)

2.131    (521D4): τόδε points forward (as usual), whence the next clause is in asyndeton. “thinking out” is wrong.  He means something has occurred to him in mid-sentence. On ἅμα cf. ad 1.19 (331D9), supra. (i)

2.133    (522A4-5): κατά τε ἁρμονίαν εὐαρμοστίαν τινὰ is not “in accordance with a well-coordinated structure:” εὐαρμοστίαν is a noun and it (not “them,” the ἔθεσι) is the object of παραδιδοῦσα.

2.133    (522A4-6): “passing them on in a well-coordinated structure, not knowledge: and a balance with an orderly movement” does not make sense in itself, semantically or syntactically – besides misrepresenting the Greek (on which see prev. n.). (u)

2.133    (522A5-6): Translation does not bring out Socrates’s close semantic allusion to the argument involving εὖ in Book Three (400C7-E3) with εὐαρμοστίαν and εὐρυθμίαν. (sm)

2.133    (522A4-8): Tr. fails to recognize (from the three τε ’s) that Socrates is going through the divisions of μουσική. (sy)

2.133    (522B2): ἀναμιμνῄσκεις is “remind” not “recall,” a retort to εἰ μέμνησαι (A4).

2.133    (522B9): ἐπὶ πάντα τείνειν is not “embraces them all” but “extends” to all, i.e., “pertains” to all. (u)

2.135    (522C5-6): “distinguishing the numbers one, two, and three” for τὸ ἕν τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία shallows the conception by adding the term “numbers” which is absent in the Greek (not to mention the infamous notion that “one” is not a number in Greek). What will be the “doctrine” of number in the sequel will be something unrecognizable by that designation (526A). (c)

2.135    (522E1): ἄλλο τι (without ) is again idiomatic = “isn’t it the case that” not “another subject is.” (i)

2.135f    (522E3-4): μάλιστα is capped by μᾶλλον: “and all the more if he is to be a human being.” μᾶλλον δέ cannot mean “or.” (sy)

2.137    (523A6): In ἃ … διαιροῦμαι, the accusative relative is again adverbial (cf. ad 487B3, supra): “how I divide” not “the things to my mind that lead … and those that don’t.” (i)

2.137    (523A6): “agree with … the things that to my mind lead toward … and those that don’t” fails to translate ἃ διαιροῦμαι, which means “how I divide” (the idiomatic adverbial accusative). (u)

2.141    (524A6): ἔν γε τοῖς τοιούτοις αὖ is “such a case as this, too” not “the soul is at a loss in such a situation” – which fails to register the parallelism. (sy)

2.137    (523A10): “I am demonstrating first those things that … and those that ...” a strange use of the verb in English. (u)

2.141    (524B7-8): ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἕν ἑκάτερον φαίνεται is not “each of them appears to be both one thing and one of two things” but rather, “each of the two appear to be both one and different.” (c)

2.141    (524B10): κεχωρισμένα is not “divided” but “separated from each other.” ἀχωριστά means “unseparated,” not “indivisible.” (c)

2.142    (524C8): κείνη should be ’κείνη. (typo)

2.143    (524D7): “the number one” is again wrong. Only τὸ ἕν is there. Socrates means the one as opposed to the many and that is the aspect of τὸ ἕν that makes it “paracletic.” Meanwhile it is nonsense to think of one as a number in Greek since arithmos has significance only in the context of counting things. (c)

2.143    (524D9-E1): to “grasp” “the number one” “by some other sense” is a metaphor I cannot conceive. (u)

2.145    (524E6): “the number one” appears again (this time translating αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν), but the Greek means, what is the nature of unity – i.e.,  “can it be many and one at the same time?” (c)

2.145    (525A2): μάθησις is “study,” not “understanding.”

2.145    (525A1): θέαν is “vision” not only “contemplation” (it represents the climax of the process).

2.145    (525A3-4): Au. prints περὶ τὸ αὐτό (the reading of AD accepted by Slings Adam Jowett-Campbell) but translates, “our visual perception of this” which is ἡ περὶ αὐτὸ ὄψις (the reading of F and Iamblichus accepted by Burnet Shorey Chambry). The text is again discrepant from the translation and again no critical note is provided. The student of Greek will be stymied. (t)

2.145    (525B4-5): διὰ τὰς τάξεις is parallel to διά τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἁπτέον εἶναι.  A philosopher must study geometry in order to ... . (sy)

2.145    (525C1): ἐπὶ λογιστικὴν ἰέναι – just arithmetic, not “practical arithmetic.”

2.145    (525C2): ἰδιωτικῶς does not mean “for private reasons” but (idiomatically) “in an amateur way,” which would never reach νόησις as he goes on to say. This is why Socrates says ἕως. (i)

2.146    (525E2-3): πολλα πλασιοῦσιν should be πολλαπλασιοῦσιν. Note that in several instances, when a word is hyphenated at a page turn of the Burnet edition, this Loeb edition has printed a space where there had been a hyphen.  Perhaps this is a production glitch. (typo)

2.147    (525C5): Not “turning the disposition (?) of the soul itself” (missing ῥᾳστώνης), but “the unaided soul’s facilitation to shift its orientation” (an interesting sequence of genitives).

2.147    (525D7-8): ἐάν τις … σώματα ἔχοντας ἀριθμοὺς προτεινόμενος διαλέγηται.  The point is that if they propose talking about physical numbers the conversation will not be διαλέγεσθαι, according to the positions reached at the end of Book Six. The tr., “argue by proposing that numbers are physically visible,” does not recognize the allusion. (sm)

2.147    (525D8): σώματα ἔχοντες ἀριθμούς is “numbers that are physical” not “that numbers are physical.” The sense depends on διαλέγηται and the formulation at the end of Book Six – but in any event προτεινόμενος does not take the participle in indirect discourse (“that numbers are ...”).

2.147    (525E2): πολλαπλασιοῦσιν, lacking an expressed direct object, means only that they multiply (gather in opposition) and cannot mean “they multiply it.”

2.149    (526A6-7): μόνον goes with διανοηθῆναι (“which are only accessible to thought”) not  λέγουσιν as tr. takes it.  μεταχειρίζεσθαι then means, as usual, “deal with,” not “grasp.” (i)

2.149    (526A8-B1): “in fact it is likely that we have to” for τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαῖον … κινδυνεύει εἶναι – it means “we might just be compelled.” (u)

2.149    (526B1): ἐπειδὴ φαίνεταί γε: The γε indicates his awareness that the proposal is preposterous on its face, and explains the modality of κινδυνεύει. “in fact it is likely that we have to” misses the point: Socrates is saying that contrary to expectation we might in truth be constrained by reason to study these strange things that have virtually no content, since MANIFESTLY they force the soul (προσανάγκαζον) to approach them with pure reason. Au. misses the participial construction with φαίνεται and blandly translates “since it appears that.” (i)

2.149    (526B1): προσαναγκάζον is active and goes with μάθημα. Since it clearly forces (not “appears to”: it is the participle with φαίνεται) the soul, we are virtually forced to use it.

2.149    (526B8-9): “improve in their quickness” not “improve and become quicker.”

2.149    (526C5): For οὐκ ἀφετέον, “must not abandon” is too strong; “must not forgo” is better (or “must not neglect,” Shorey). (i)

2.149    (526C6): “those who are naturally best must be educated” buries nature with the adverb and thus attenuates the underlying distinction between nature and nurture. The point is that natural education must be designed so as to exploit natural talent. (i)

2.149    (526C8): The “counting” language (ἓν ἡμῖν κείσθω / δεύτερον δέ) is not otiose.  δεύτερον should not be left out of the tr. (sm)

2.149    (526D1): ὅσον … αὐτοῦ is “as much of it as pertains” not “insofar as some of it is relevant.”

2.151    (526D5): διαφέροι ἂν αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ is not “would be a different person,” but “would be superior to himself” (cf. αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν, 526B8-9).

2.151    (526D9-E1): εἴ τι πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τείνει is not “if it is relevant to it” but “if it is relevant to that great goal of ours (ἐκεῖνο is laudatory and points forward), namely to enable us to catch sight of reality.”

2.151    (526E2): πάντα αὐτόσε τείνει ὅσα ἀναγκάζει is not “so far as it forces” but “all that forces.”

2.151    (526E4): δεῖ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἰδεῖν means not it “must see by every means possible” but it “must use any means to see.”

2.151    (527A2): καὶ σμικρά is adverbial. Not “experienced in the finer points” but quite the opposite: “only slightly familiar.” (i)

2.151    (527A3): πᾶν τοὐναντίον is also adverbial: “is in a state quite the contrary of what it sounds to be from the arguments made by its practitioners” is the sense – not “it contains everything that’s the opposite to the arguments put forward in it by those who engage in it.” (!) (i)

2.151    (527A9): “talk” for φθεγγόμενοι does not get the incongruity between thought and action that is being satirized in connection with these “utterances” of theirs. Shorey at least adds a note. (i)

2.153    (527B3): διομολογητέον does not just mean “argue fully” but reach an agreement step by step through dialectical question and answer (rather for instance than hypothesizing things ὡς παντὶ δῆλον in the manner of the geometers).  ἔτι means to go further, reach an agreement on more. (i)

2.153    (527B9): “transport” for ὅλκον is again wrong (cf.521D2, and UNGAINLY n. ad loc., supra). This time it is πρός that makes it impossible. (i)

2.153    (527C3): τὰ πάρεργα αὐτοῦ are not “its incidental topics” but “its side effects” (from ἀπεργαστικόν, above).

2.154    (528A6): Au. prints νῦν[δὴ], the athetization of Slings against all mss. and edd.. but then translates “just now” which is the very sense that Slings emended to avoid (Critical Notes, 128). (t)

2.155    (527D5): ἡδὺς εἶ: “splendid fellow” is not the idiom. Shorey gives several passages to give the sense. (i)

2.155    (527E4):  “think” should be “will think” (for δόξεις), as parallel to the future in the antithesis. Perhaps however it is a typo.

2.155    (528A1): The meaning of the English “at once” as a tr. for αὐτόθεν is unclear.  What αὐτόθεν here means is “from this point forward.” (u)

2.157    (528A9): For μετὰ ἐπίπεδον ἐν περιφορᾷ ὂν ἤδη στέρεον the tr. puts “solids in revolution” that can only refer to the technical mathematical concept of generating a solid by rotating a plane figures on its axis – but this is surely not what Socrates means. He criticizes the leap from geometry to astronomy as moving from planar figures to solid figures moving in the great orbit of heaven. (c)

2.157    (528B3): αὔξην is not “generation” of cubes, but the (third) dimension, as below, D8. The cube is a single example and καὶ τὸ βάθος ἔχον generalizes it.

2.157    (528B4): ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε cannot be “we have not investigated,” since (1) this is what Socrates just said so that ἀλλά has nothing to be taking exception to; (2) ἡυρῆσθαι is a technical term for something being established as a public asset; and (3) the “editorial we” is inappropriate since the only “we” that matters is Socrates and Glaucon and the radically unconventional investigation they are conducting. (sy)

2.157    (528B4-5): οὔπω ηὑρῆσθαι is “has not yet been invented,” not “we have not investigated it” (which makes ἀλλά meaningless). There is no “we” in the text.

2.157    (528B4-5): “we’ve investigated” might be meant to mean “we Greeks.” but this would be wrong (cf. prev. n.), and so the unclarity of the pronoun becomes an issue. (u)

2.157    (528B6ff): The sense is, ‘nobody cares so they are studied fecklessly though they are difficult, and second people need a leader … .’  The first τε indicates that the sentence will include both of two items promised by διττά, so as to prepare for an extended and complex articulation of the first item. The second τε (B8) then announces the promised arrival of the second item. The tr. ignores this early τε and loses the interrelation of the two parts, including the need for a leader in the first element and then making people’s unwillingness to follow such a leader (if anything) the second item. (sy)

2.159    (528D7-8): σπεύδων … μᾶλλον βραδύνω, a proverb. ‘Trying to go fast I only go slow’ (μᾶλλον is “instead”). (i)

2.159    (529A1): αὕτη γε is not just “it,” but “it, being what you say it is” (γε “causal”).

2.163    (529E5): “and yet it would be absurd” should be “and yet that it would be absurd” (continuing oratio obliqua with ἡγήσαιτο).

2.163    (529E5): ἐπισκοπεῖν continues the infinitive construction dependent on ἡγήσαιτο (E3). Not “and yet it would be absurd,” but “but at the same time would regard it as absurd ... .” (sy)

2.163    (529E5): ληψόμενον is “thinking that he would apprehend” not “in order to apprehend.”

2.163    (530B1-4): Again the infinitives (esp. ζητεῖν) are dependent, but in the tr. (“the man is absurd who thinks these always occur … and seeks to comprehend …”) whether “seeks” goes with “thinks” or with “who” is unclear (strictly it would need another “he” to make “seeks” go with “thinks,” which it does). The true sense is that the man absurdly thinks that these always occur and don’t vary, and thinks that he is seeking the invariant truth though they are bodily. (sy)

2.170    (532A6): Au. follows Slings in obelizing the left side of ἐπιχειρῇ (the reading of all mss. accepted by most edd.): the problem comes when we reach the parallel subjunctive ὁρμᾷ in the next line which needs to be dependent infinitive ὁρμᾶν, a reading found in Clement and quietly adopted by most edd. Slings has re-opened the can of worms by obelizing ἐπιχειρῇ and printing ὁρμᾷ.  Au. prints Slings’s text but then simply translates ὁρμᾶν (“tries to get at”) with everybody else, again failing to provide a critical note. (t)

2.170    (532B2): τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει is not quite the “goal” of the noetic world, though it is the goal of the noetic search. Shorey: “limit.” (c)

2.171    (532B6): ἡ δέ γε λύσις ... is not “this (the dialectical path) is the λύσις” (etc.), but “As for the λύσις (etc.), the entire πραγματεία has the power to bring it about.”

2.173    (532D6): ταῦτα θέντες ὡς νῦν λέγεται is not “let’s take all this as it now stands” but “let’s hypothesize that this is true as it has been set out in argument.” Glaucon is suggesting they should proceed as the “geometers” do!

2.173    (533A2): “although my own effort would not be lacking” over-translates idiomatic τό γ’ἐμόν, which is an adverbial accusative – “for my part.” (i)

2.173    (533A4): διισχυρίζεσθαι is followed by uncompounded ἰσχυριστέον (A5). Idiomatically we should count the second as a complete equivalent to the first (dropping the prefix is otiose), but tr. gives the more forceful verb a less forceful rendition. (i)

2.175    (533C1-2): Tr. has “while they use assumptions which leave these topics undisturbed,” but to “disturb a topic” is senseless. ἕως ἂν ὑποθέσεσι χρώμενοι ταύτας ἀκινήτους ἐῶσι means “as long as they allow the hypotheses they use to remain set in position,” the demonstrative pointing to ὑποθέσεσι so as to exploit its metaphor of “setting down” (τιθέναι). There are no “topics” for ταύτας to point to. (u)

2.175    (533C3-5): Again it is hard to decide if the problem is an error in understanding or faulty articulation. is left untranslated: it refers to the hypothetical “person” to whom this path of argument belongs, who is also the subject of the two instances of οἶδεν, but tr. does not encounter the absence of this subject because it makes these verbs passive. The sense is “how can mere consistency become knowledge for the man?” (referring back to 510D2) not that a “set of premises” become knowledge. (u)

2.175    (533C5): Not “such a set of premises (can ever become knowledge).” ὁμολογία is not “premises,” but the systematic consistency of some argument based on unquestioned premises (Socrates is referring back to ὁμολογουμένως, 510D2).

2.175    (533C7-8): “(only dialectic) by removing those hypotheses proceeds in this way to the actual first principle …,” for μονὴ ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα misplaces the emphasis. ταύτῃ points forward but tr. places it after what it points to. “Those” for the article τάς is, however, just right, for Socrates is describing the opposite of ἀκινήτους ἐᾶν above, except that there the tr. made “topics” be the things that were left undisturbed. (u)

2.176    (533E4-5): The critical note (n.5) quotes Slings’s idiosyncratic remark “locus desperatus” – the remark of an editor rather than a report of evidence – omitting to mention the many considered emendations reported by Slings.  He adds a footnote to the translation that says the words are frequently omitted, which is meant to justify his decision to ignore the problem. (t)

2.177    (533E7): “we’re happy (with something)” for ἀρεσκεῖ, meaning we have no objection, is a managerial sort of expression current in English but out of place in the sort of conversation people become snared into by Socrates. Cf. UNGAINLY n. ad 1.101 (350D9). (i)

2.177    (534A5-6): Drop “all” from the phrase “between all these.” It is not in the Greek and it destroys the sense.  Socrates means the sub-properties of the doxastic and noetic realms, as he goes on to say.

2.177    (543A8) “embroiled” for ἐμπλησῃ is unwarranted.  It is not by disagreement he is deterred  but by unnecessary prolixity.

2.179    (534B8-D1): The punch of the future vivid condition is lost. (u)

2.179    (534C1-2): διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξίων is not “explore every counterargument,” which does not get the battle element, but is rather “run the gauntlet of tests, itself raising the level of the testing to the noetic rather than the doxic level.”

2.179    (534C2): οὐσίαν is here “truth” not “reality.”

2.181    (535A9-B1ff): is τὰ μὲν ἄλλα including τοὺς γὰρ ... is praeteritio, foil for the new items (πρὸς δὲ τούτοις). Au. seems not to recognize the ἄλλως τε καί type construction here since, γάρ introducing the items said to be passed over is programmatic and as such should not be translated. (i)

2.183    (535D1): “lame duck” is a poor choice of metaphor for χωλόν because it introduces a distracting political connotation at the same time that it loses the original metaphor of the Greek – that one leg is bad. (u)

2.183    (535D6-7): “He who in his love of hard work has altered course to the opposite direction is also handicapped” for χωλὸς δὲ καὶ ὁ τἀναντία τούτου μεταβεβληκὼς τὴν φιλοπονίαν is slovenly, in comparison (for instance) with Shorey’s “and he, too, is lame whose industry is one-sided in the opposite way,” which this translation will now replace in the Loeb Series. (u)

2.187    (536D5-6): καὶ πάσης τῆς προπαιδείας generalizes the list and is not a separate category (not, therefore, “and they must be taught”). (i)

2.187    (536D7-8): ἐπάναγκες … τὸ σχῆμα is “making the manner of the teaching compulsory,” not “making them learn the system of education compulsorily.” (i)

2.187    (537A10-11): εἰς ἀριθμόν τινα is “placed on a certain list” (not “enrolled into one of the units”). (i)

2.189    (537D2): μόνιμοι δ’ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις is “in war and in the lawful peacetime attitudes besides” (referring to 412D9-E8, with ἄλλοις adverbial: these are δόγματα), not “and the other things laid down for them.” (i)

2.189    (537E2): ὅσον quantitative: “how widespread” (accounting for its bad reputation) not “what sort.” (i)

2.191    (537E7): συγγιγνώσκεις is not “overlook,” but “sympathize” and “forgive” by dint of sharing a common recognition. (i)

2.191    (538A2-3): οἱ φάσκοντες γονεῖς is not “his supposed parents” but “they who claim to be his parents” – not a small difference from the child’s point of view.  Also “those who substituted him” for τοὺς ὑποβαλλομένους (A5) is vague it tends to denote his real parents rather than his foster parents. Though the Greek is ambiguous the context determines that the fosters are meant. Also, ποιουμένων (C2) is middle not passive, restating the idea of φάσκοντες. (u)

2.191    (538C7): For ἐν οἷς ἐκτεθράμμεθα ὥσπερ ὑπὸ γονεῦσι the tr. has “as we are with our parents,” meaning perhaps “during the time we are with our parents” (ὥσπερ temporal??) but this mistranslates the dative with ὑπὸ and contradicts the absence of article. The sense is that we are brought up under the influence of certain views functioning as parents. (u)

2.192    (538E5); τίμαι should be τίμια. (typo)

2.193    (538D1): “we have” is wrong – only ἔστι understood. If we “had” these habits, as tr. says, we would not be drawn to them nor fail to be persuaded (in contrast with the τούς mentioned below, D3).

2.193    (538D2): The adversative “yet” is not in the Greek (only ) and is incorrect.

2.193    (538D4): The fact that Socrates is making an analogy to the father indicates that the etymon of πάτρια should be brought across. Not “traditional” but “teachings of their fathers” (Shorey) vel sim. (sm)

2.193    (538D6): τί οὖν is over-translated by “what does this mean” – it is “and so” merely suggesting the next point is ready to be made. Au. tends to make the inferential nudge of οὖν too explicit. (i)

2.193    (538D7-8): … ὅταν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα ἐλθὸν ἐρώτημα ἔρηται· Τί ἐστι τὸ καλόν; ἀποκρινομένου ὃ τοῦ νομοθετοῦ ἤκουεν ἐξελέγχῃ ὁ λόγος … . The Greek bends over backwards to make the impersonal challenge the grammatical subject and the man a mere direct object, but tr. easily shifts back and forth for a more idiomatic translation (“and [when] he gives an answer he has heard from the lawgiver, reason proves him wrong”), losing the subjective effect on the young man, which is the principal theme. Moreover, ἐξελέγχῃ is subjunctive, and continues the ὅταν clause, whereas tr. treats it as an indicative making the description of the scenario a bland general condition instead of a traumatic vivid future condition. (sy)

2.193    (538D9): καταβάλῃ connotes not “retreat” but being reduced to a view one had resisted as for instance under the force of a sophistic refutation; and οὐδὲν μᾶλλον (idiomatically) is one of the instrumentalities that performs the “throw” (cf. ad 454E1, supra). (i)

2.193    (538E2): ἦγεν is “was holding” – imperfect not present!

2.193    (538E5): “part of himself” for οἰκεῖα in τίμια καὶ οἰκεῖα ignores that the word replaces πάτρια above (D4). Hence “binding on him” (Shorey). (sm)

2.193    (538E5-6): “While he both no longer respects these and at the same time not does know find out what is true … .” The construction μήτε / τε makes the two conditions tandem. Drop “in fact cannot.” (sy)

2.195    (539A6): συγγνώμη refers back to at 537E7 and still means sympathy, but is now translated “indulgence.” (i)

2.197    (539C1-2): “violently disregarding” is unmeaning –  τὸ μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ὧνπερ πρότερον means “total disregard.” The tr. is perhaps an attempt to improve upon Shorey’s “fall into a violent distrust” – where “violent” is an attempt to get the emphasis of μηδέν for οὐδέν. (u)

2.197    (539D4-5): οἷς τις μεταδώσει τῶν λόγων is not “(those) with whom one will engage in arguments,” but “(those) whom one will allow to participate in the study of dialectic.”

2.199    (540B5): “essential” is too vague for ἀναγκαῖον and should be “compulsory.” (u)

2.205    (543C1): μισθὸν … εἰς ἐνιαυτόν is not “a year’s keep” but “payment from year to year” (a policy whose purpose is to pre-empt the accumulation of wealth). (u)

2.208    (544C7): Au. prints διαφεύγουσα (with ADF), without Slings’s daggers, rather than reading the διαφέρουσα of Stobaeus (accepted by edd.), gives a proper textual note, and translates it “leaving (all others) behind.” But διαφεύγειν does not mean to excel, as “leave behind” can metaphorically mean in English, and so no editor has read it despite its far superior textual authority (though n.b. differens, Ficinus). Au. needs to give us a note to the translation citing similia for his interpretation of the word but instead the note he gives (n.5) claims the statement is “clearly ironic.” (t)

2.208    (544C8): δια φανεῖ should be διαφανεῖ (cf. ad 2.146, supra). (typo)

2.209    (544C3): “the first is admired by a majority of people, this is the one used in Crete and Laconia” fails to understand the force of αὕτη in ἥ τε ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαινομένη ἡ Κρητική τε καὶ Λακωνικὴ αὕτη. The sense is, “the widely praised Cretan and Laconian constitution we always hear about.” Shorey’s “your” is exactly right, and he gives a note. (i)

2.213    (545D2): στάσις (vs. ὁμονοοῦντες) is “disagreement” and hence “faction” – not “revolution.”

2.213    (546A1): The mock-heroic expression, beginning with χαλεπὸν μέν, is misrepresented by the use of the casual contraction “it’s difficult … .” Instead, Shorey’s “Hard in truth it is ... .” (u)

2.215    (546B1): (the leaders will) “no more” (achieve), for οὐδὲν μᾶλλον, is unclear: is it temporal? is it comparative? The sense is, with Shorey, that the leaders “for all that” will achieve nothing. (u)

2.217    (546D3-5): “first of all will, despite being guardians, begin to neglect us” is terribly and unnecessarily awkward. Perhaps another attempt to improve upon, or react to, Shorey: “will first as guardians begin to neglect us.” (u)

2.217    (546D8): ὑμῖν is not “our” but “your.” The Muses are speaking to Socrates and Glaucon.

2.219    (547A4-5): For stately ταύτης τοι γενεᾶς χρὴ φάναι εἶναι στάσιν ὅτου ἂν γίγνεται ἀεί, “whenever this occurs we must always say that it’s the dissension of this generation indeed” is silly and borders on the meaningless. Compare Shorey: ”Of this lineage, look you, we must aver the dissension to be, wherever it occurs and always.” (u)

2.219    (547A5): “dissension” for στάσις is adequate, but then in the epanalepsis below (στάσεως γενομένης, 547B2) he translates it “revolution” again (cf. ad 2.213 [545D2], supra).

2.219    (547C2): τροφέας is nurturers.  The many are are not maintained by the guardians but are their maintainers.

2.223    (548A9): Tr. commits the common error in English of introducing a metaphor with “literally,” where exactly the opposite is meant by ἀτεχνῶς. (u)

2.223    (548B8-C1): τῆς μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας (ἠμεληκέναι) is not “the companion of debate and philosophy” but “the companion of discussion and philosophy” (Shorey): cf. below, 549B6. (u)

2.225    (548E4-5): “somewhat less familiar with culture, fond of the arts ...” misses the tension between the two allusions to the Muses in ὑπαμουσότερον, φιλόμουσον δέ. “less enamored of culture but fond of it still” (Quandt). (sm)

2.225    (549A4-6): The semantic allusion to the traditional contrast between word (ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν, A4) and deed (ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν, A5) is not brought across. (sm)

2.225    (549B2): “moneygrubbing” is unnecessarily derogatory and crass for φιλοχρήματος.  (u)

2.225    (549B5): τίνος is not just an abrupt “what,” but (being in the genitive) “what safeguard” (referring to φύλακος, B4). (u)

2.227    (549B6-7): ἐγγενόμενος … τῷ ἔχοντι is not “born in you” but acquired (exactly the opposite!). τῷ ἔχοντι is dative of possession. The expletive “you” is inappropriate to the tone of the passage. And ἐνοικεῖ denotes a lifetime visitor.

2.227    (549B9-C2): καὶ ἔστι μέν γε is not “And this is also the character of the young man” but “As for what he is, on the one hand, that is it” (ushering in the δέ clause). “Again the background of such a person” is the translation given for γίγνεται δέ γε, but the repetition of γε could not make more plain that Socrates is making the transition from character to evolution, which this translation only obscures.

2.227    (549C2): ἐνίοτε is not “there are times when” but “once (sc. upon a time).” The sentence is interrupted before it reaches a finite verb.

2.227    (549C5): φιλοπραγμοσύνη is not “enjoyment of involvement” but “meddlesomeness” (indeed this is the way it is translated in n.21, below).

2.227    (549C5-6): Tr. does not bring across the pun in φιλοπραγμοσύνη / πράγματα ἔχειν. (sm)

2.227    (549C5, C9): “is regarded as inferior” (at C9) does not register the ironical re-use of ἐλαττοῦσθαι from above where it was translated “took a back seat.” (sm)

2.227    (549C6): Au. keeps the dash after ἔχειν found in both Burnet and Slings but translates it out. (t)

2.227    (549C7): πῇ δὴ γίγνεται means not “How does this come about?” but (impatient), “Just how does he evolve” (of the son), referring back to γίγνεται δέ γε (C2). Contrast γίγνεται with νέος ὤν.

2.227    (549C8): ἀκούῃ ἀχθομένης is not “hears his mother is annoyed” but “hears his mother complaining” (genitive of source).

2.227    (549C9): Not “because her husband is not one of the rulers” but “because she has a husband not in the ruling group” (indignant).

2.227    (549D2-6): The subject of αἰσθάνηται (D5) is the wife, as the reflexive ἑαυτήν indicates (not “her,” per translation); λοιδορούμενον (D2) is passive; ῥᾳθύμως (D3) is the wife’s derogatory term; “she is annoyed” for ἀχθομένης (D6) is again wrong – it is a reversion to the original participial construction in oratio obliqua (that she is annoyed).

2.227    (549D6): “as a result of all this she is annoyed at all this” must be an unintentional repetition. (u)

2.229    (549E3): The καί (left out of tr.) substitutes for δέ after the μέν of C8.

2.229    (549E4): λάθρᾳ is not “in confidence” but “in secret,” where they won’t be overheard.

2.229    (549E5): ὀφείλοντα is another participle in O.O., this time with ἴδωσιν.

2.227    (549E6): ἤ τι ἄλλο ἀδικοῦντα is not “does anything else wrong” but “doing him (sc. the father) an injustice, for that matter” (τι ἄλλο is adverbial). (i)

2.229    (549E7): τιμωρήσεται means “avenge” (their mistreatment of his father), not “punish.”

2.228    (550A1): Slings emended the καί of all mss. into κἂν and then chose the subjunctive ἀκούῃ from AD that it required (against the indicative ἀκούει of FM, read by edd.). This turned A1-4 into a protasis and required Slings to treat τότε δή as the beginning of the apodosis, which in turn required him to remove the full stop of the edd. before it (he replaces it with a comma). Au. now adopts the (minority) readings of Slings, without a critical note saying so, and then forgets to remove the full stop before τότε δή. In his translation however he places a dash before it which is strictly unnecessary. (t)

2.229    (550A1): κἂν with the subsequent subjunctives would better be translated with apprehensive “when” rather than bland “if.”

2.229    (550A2-4ff): τοὺς μέν and τοὺς δέ are not pronouns: πράττοντας (understood also with τοὺς δὲ) is attributive.

2.229    (550A3): ἐν σμικρῷ λόγῳ is not “of little account” but “spoken of as insignificant.”

2.229    (550A7): “sees from near at hand alongside those of the others” is spatially confused. “alongside” has to be done non-spatially so as to get the sense that he is comparing one thing with another thing that he knows intimately. (u)

2.229    (550B2): ἄρδοντός τε καὶ αὔξοντος is not “that are growing in his soul” but “which he (sc. his father) is nourishing and fostering.”

2.229    (550B2-3): τό τε ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές is translated “desire and passion,” but as elsewhere “passion” is too general for either appetite or spiritedness (for all we know the expression here is meant to be an hendiadys: on which see below ad 553C1 [and D1])). Socrates’s distinct reference to two of the three parts of soul discovered in Book Four does not come across.

2.229    (550B3-4): On διὰ τὸ μὴ κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι τὴν φύσιν ὁμιλίαις δὲ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων κακαῖς κεχρῆσθαι: The tr. has “not because A but because B” but the sense is “because both A and B” – (the Greek makes this clear with the single article τό, B3). The result of the simultaneous contradiction (both A and B) is that he strikes a compromise. (sy)

2.229    (550B6): τῷ μέσῳ τε καὶ φιλονικῷ καὶ θυμοειδεῖ that he gives in to is not a “coterie” (sic) but the “middle” aspect of his tripartite soul, between mind and desire. “Coterie,” along with the tr. of θυμοειδές with “passionate,” will mislead the unwary to imagine an alliance between the θυμοειδές and the ἐπιθυμητικόν!

2.231    (550C9): Au. accepts Slings’s deletion of the ν of πολιτείαν (against all mss.), without a critical note, but then translates with the ν his text deleted (“this kind of constitution” = μετὰ τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν). (t)

2.231    (550C11): ἀπὸ τιμημάτων is not “from one’s property” but “from property qualifications.”

2.231    (550D9): πληρούμενον is present, not perfect: not “stuffed with gold” but “ever being filled.”

2.231    (550D11): ἐξευρίσκουσιν: the prefix indicates that their “discovery” is a fabrication, and ἐπὶ τοῦτο is not “to deal with this” but “to funnel the funds to this end.” (i)

2.234    (551C5): Au. (with Burnet and Slings) prints dash after ἐπιτρέποι (Adeimantus seems to be interrupting) but translates the sentence with a full stop. (t)

2.234    (551C7): ὁτουτοῦν should be ὁτουοῦν. (typo)

2.234    (551C7): Au. prints ὁτουοῦν ἤ τινος (we have to assume that ὁτουτοῦν is a typo for the ὁτουοῦν of all mss.) and gives a critical note announcing that ἤ τινος is present in the mss. but was deleted by three editors (Burnet, Slings, Stallb.). In fact it is deleted by every editor to my knowledge except Schneider (apud Adam), including Adam Chambry Jowett-Campbell Shorey, and is absent in Ficinus. The translation says “anyone else in any other position of responsibility” – which while it may passably translate περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν ἁρχῆς (taking ἄλλου masculine and ὁτουοῦν neuter), seems in any event to show no vestige of ἤ τινος which Au. means to keep. (t)

2.235    (551C7, C11): ἀρχή (bis): Another important re-use that does not come across (“point of responsibility,” C7; “kind of rule,” C11). (sm)

2.235    (551D3); “any lesser fault” should probably be “any lesser a fault.” (typo)

2.237    (552A4-5): “Consider then whether out of all these evils this constitution is the first to admit this as the greatest” fails to bring across the emphasis in the “first person” demonstrative, τόδε. Shorey’s “Consider now whether this polity is not the first that admits that which is the greatest of all such evils” gets the emphasis without even including τόδε in the translation. (u)

2.237    (552A10): κεκλημένον not “simply known as” but “taking on the title and role of” pauper and destitute. (i)

2.237    (552B3-4): “known as” should maybe be “to be known as” or “being known as.” (typo)

2.237    (552B3-4): Nothing in an oligarchy prevents persons becoming horribly destitute, “since some would not be overwealthy, others would be altogether poor.” There is something wrong here. οὐ γὰρ ἂν οἱ μὲν ὑπέρπλουτοι ἦσαν, οἱ δὲ παντάπασι πένητες is the apodosis of a present irreal condition. We must supply the protasis “if there were such a bar” (it is γάρ that tells us to supply this); the Greek then provides a duplex negative apodosis – neither superrich nor superpoor would there be. There is no way to get this out of the translator’s words – perhaps there is a typo, but perhaps he is trying to say something else.

2.239    (552D1): “while of all those” should be “while all of those” (for πάντες ὅσοι κέκληνται). (typo)

2.240    (553B4): Au. reads βλαπτόμενον appending a critical note announcing that it was deleted by Badham without also asserting it was read by all mss. The note is imported from Slings who borrowed it from Burnet, who put it into his apparatus in this form (citing only the editor who he was following) because he bracketed βλαπτόμενον in his edition. There is therefore no need for Au., who reads it, to present a note. To top it off, however, tr. takes it to mean “prosecuted,” which is not what it means. (t)

2.241    (552E5-6): ἀπαιδευσίαν καὶ κακὴν τροφὴν καὶ κατάστασιν is not “lack of education, bad upbringing, and the setup of the constitution:”  κακήν goes with κατάστασιν also. The sense relies on the ἀ- privative with the first noun being replaced by the “sympathetic” negative adjective. (sy)

2.241    (552E10): τοσαῦτα κακά is not “kinds” of faults (that would be τοιαῦτα) but the extent of the faults – as the tag-line “and perhaps even more” confirms.  With τοιαύτη γέ τις coming before this is a typical quantity/quality doublet in dismissal, so this error might better be classed under IDIOM.

2.241    (553A3): τὸν δέ ταύτῃ ὅμοιον is not the “inhabitant” of an oligarchy but an individual whose soul is oligarchic. This conceptual confusion permeates the tr. as we shall note. At A6 the ὀλιγαρχικόν is again the oligarchic personality not an “oligarch.” See also 2.257 (557B2) “democrat” for democratical. (c)

2.241    (553A9): “suppose he has a son, first the son emulates” needs either a colon in place of the comma or needs “suppose” to be “supposing”. (typo)

2.243    (553C1): “ambition and passion” for φιλοτιμίαν τε καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές again uses the vague term, “passion,” and this time it does form an hendiadys! But below we get “ambition” translating ἐπιθυμητικόν (C5). (u)

2.243    (553C5): “ambitious” is wrong for ἐπιθυμητικόν. Just above he had used “ambition and passion” for φιλοτιμίαν τε καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές (C1). A very different zone of soul is involved and the distinction between the zones should be kept clear! Is it a typo?

2.243    (553C6): “create the Great King within himself” should be “make it (sc. his ἐπιθυμητικόν) ‘Great King’ within himself” (double accusative with ποιεῖν).

2.245    (554A2-3): “the similarity would be his high regard ...” should be “he would be similar (to the city) in the high regard accorded … .” (u)

2.249    (555A5-6): ἡττᾶτει καὶ πλουτεῖ is not “he loses while yet becoming rich” – that would have been καὶ πλουτῶν. Instead the parallelism is bathos and παρὰ προσδοκίαν. “-- and finds himself rich!” (Shorey); “he ends up a rich loser” (Quandt). (sy)

2.249    (555B3-4): τίνα τε γίγνεται τρόπον γενομένη τε ποῖόν τινα ἔχει (sc. τρόπον – 557A9 shows the sense). The translation fails to bring out that the contrast is between γίγνεσθαι / ἔχειν (i.e., γένεσις and ἕξις). (sm)

2.249    (555B3-4): τίνα τε τρόπον γίγνεται γενομένη τε ποῖόν τινα ἔχει is not “what kind of man it has in it.” The distinction is between the evolution of the constitution-type and the steady state (κατάστασις) it achieves, as throughout the entire treatment of the Decline. Here, sc. τρόπον (though in a different sense) with ποῖόν τινα ἔχει. (c)

2.249    (555B7): ὁμοίως γοῦν ... ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς means not “consistent for us” but “consistent with the way we have been going.”  γοῦν shows it is not eo ipso valid. (u)

2.249    (555B8): The subject of μεταβάλλει should be changed from HE to IT.

2.249    (555B10): Not “the need to become as wealthy as possible” but the putative goodness of that goal.

2.253    (556B1): τις is not “somebody,” “one” or “people,” but a law.  Au. needs a note on this sort of law.

2.253    (556B3): “less of the evil characteristics … would proliferate” should be “less would be spawned.” (u)

2.254    (556D7): Au. prints Ἀνδρες (a typo) and offers a critical note (#5), to-wit:

                                Ἄνδρες ADF : ἄνδρες Adam

        The order of the note suggests that he himself meant to print Ἄνδρες above, though it is incorrect to represent the mss. as having the capital he displays in his text. The citation of Adam is a second typo (he read ἅνδρες in1900 [this is the ed. Shorey, upon whom Au. is here relying, is referring to in his report of Adam’s opinion] and later abandoned his emendation of the mss. in his large commentary).  The facing tr. of Ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι is “These men are ours,” an interpretation on the face of it closer to Adam’s reading ἅνδρες (or Burnet’s ἇνδρες) than to the anarthrous ἄνδρες he prints – and so his translation (and for that matter his critical note) needs a note. The note, defending the anarthrous nominative, was supplied by Adam once he himself reverted to the mss., as being the more forceful expression for its lack of grammatical correctness. A student will be very confused by this text, this note, and this translation – unless he happens to unearth the old Adam commentary. (t)

2.254    (556D7) Cf. prev. n. (typo)

2.255    (556E4-5): In “and sometimes even without external pressure to be involved in internal faction,” “to be” has lost the syntax. The Greek is σταζιάζει not σταζιάζειν, and in fact it is the absence of the action of the verb that called for the infinitive προσλαβέσθαι that is being contemplated in the ἐνίοτε clause. Indeed, σταζιάζει is a sort of exegesis of ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω. (u)

2.257    (557A9-B1): In καὶ ποία τις, καί is exegetical on τίνα τρόπον οἴκουσι (cf.555B). Therefore not “and again” (there is no “again” in the Greek).

2.257    (557B1-2): δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ δημοκρατικός τις ἀναφανήσεται. The sense is, “Let’s describe the quality of the city since clearly that will help us find the quality of the man” (which is the goal). The reason this is “clear” was given at the beginning (544D6-E2): there is no other source of the state’s ethos than man’s ethos.The tr., “I’m sure it’s clear that a man to suit it will be shown to be a democrat,” patently misunderstands the methodology and pointlessly reverses its logic.

2.257    (557B5): ἐξουσία is “opportunity” not “means.” Also at 557B8. (u)

2.257    (557C4,C6): καλλίστη is “prettiest” (like the coat’s ποικιλία) not “finest.” (i)

2.257    (557D1): “the the” should be “the”. (typo)

2.257    (557D1-2): “and there is the useful place to look for the constitution” is unclear (what is “the constitution” and where is “there”?) What καὶ ἔστιν γε … ἐπιτήδειον ζητεῖν ἐν αὐτῃ πολιτείαν means is “this is a good city in which to find (as if one were shopping) a constitution” (since it has them all). (u)

2.257    (557D5): κινδυνεύει is not “it’s likely” but “he may just have to” (κ. does not assert a hazard but hazards an assertion beyond what we know to be true). (i)

2.259    (557D9): οὕτω idiomatic and semi-redundant, insisting on sequence (Smyth §2080 – e.g., 327C14, 368D6, 369A1, 382D3, 511B8, 576E2, 589B5, 591E3, 596B7). Not just “so” but “only then.” (i)

2.259    (557E2-558A1): The huge prolepsis – six lines long (τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν … ἐπίῃ) – the translation immediately defuses with “but the fact is,” which is not said and only adds the wrong tone.

2.259    (558B1): ἥ δε συγγνώμη καὶ οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία is not “tolerance and complete failure to concern itself with detail” – it is a success at refusing to stoop to the level of detail.

2.260    (558D6): Au. places a dash after κέκληνται (with Burnet, not Slings), but the tr. needs no dash (he adds “then” in the next sentence). Burnet had placed the dash because Socrates interrupts himself and re-begins with a hortatory subjunctive with πρῶτον, but Au. translates these words out, putting “Do you want us, then, to define first” rather than “would you rather – lest our conversation become obscure – first let us define,” which is the (halting but) true sense. (t)

2.261    (558B6): “gives us thought” is not approbatory enough for οὐδὲν φροντίζει. Shorey:  “is bothered not at all.”

2.261    (558C1): ἐὰν φῇ μόνον is “if only,” not “only if” – again the tr. misses the lassitude.

2.261    (558D4): “would certainly control” over-translates ἄρχων: Socrates’s remark is interrupted and incomplete (whence the dash at the end, absent in Slings and present in Burnet). There is no “certainly” in the fragment; καὶ before οὗτος means not “and” but this boy also (like his father, the father's influence being spelled out). Au. prints the dash in the Greek but makes the sentence complete in the tr.

2.263    (559A8-9): ἵνα τύπῳ λάβωμεν adduces an example so that we can establish an outline – “point of reference” is a different and vaguer metaphor. (i)

2.265    (559D4): πάλιν τοίνυν λέγωμεν is not “discuss again” but go back to where we left off (i.e., 558D). (i)

2.265    (559D5) “This is how most things develop” should be “It usually takes place as follows:” τά γε πολλά is an adverb, not the subject. The man is the subject.

2.265    (559D5): γε indicates that τά γε πολλά is adverbial (“usually”), not “this is how most things develop.” (sy)

2.267    (559E6-7): βοηθοῦντος αὖ εἴδους ἐπιθυμιῶν is not “the similar and related kinds of desires from the outside come to the aid of one of the parties within him,” but “a kind of desires from the outside that is related to the faction of desires within himself to which they are similar come to its aid.”

2.267    (559E7): Logic requires τῶν to be feminine plural, referring not to the parties within but rather to ἐπιθυμιῶν, so that the one εἶδος of desires can be συγγενές τε καὶ ὅμοιον with those from the outside.  (c)

2.267    (559E9): “in the same vein … in response” explains but fails to get the tone of the ἀντί in ἀντιβοηθήσειν, which verb is an hapax perhaps invented for just this context as a pseudo-technical term. Shorey’s “counter-alliance” is accurate. (u)

2.267    (559E9-10): The ἀντιβοήθησις is oligarchic in spirit and comes from (ἤ ποθεν παρὰ τοῦ πατρός ...) his father, not “countering the warnings … .” (c)

2.267    (560A1-2): “revolt and counter-revolt” should as before (cf. ad 2.213 [545D2], supra) be “faction and counter-faction.”

2.267    (560A9): τῶν ἐκπεσούσων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄλλαι is “desires other than the exiled ones.” Au.’s  “when desires have been cast aside” – as if the genitive noun were a genitive absolute – loses the connection between the “exiled” desires and the others from the outside that come to replace them.

2.267    (560A9-B1): τῶν ἐκπεσουσῶν ἄλλαι … συγγενεῖς denotes other instances of those that were expelled – “another brood” (Shorey), or “more of the same” –  not another type. (c)

2.269    (560B8-9): μαθημάτων καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων καλῶν καὶ λόγων ἀληθῶν is far from “understanding and good habits and true reasoning.” The first two terms are a pair (cf. ad 502D1, supra) for basic education, with its attractive beauty (Horace’s dulce) and the last  represents advanced thinking with its prudential truth (Horace’s utile). (i)

2.271    (561Aff): The tr. of ζῇ … ἐξ ἴσου τρέφων sorts out the Greek rather than reproducing its chaos. Compare with Shorey and other translations. (u)

2.273    (561E3): οἶμαι δέ γε ... καὶ παντοδαπόν is something of a correction of or supplement to ἰσονομικὸς βίος: not “I certainly think this is a man (and life) of all sorts” but “And I fancy we could add it is a life of many faces ...” (Quandt). (i)

2.273    (561E3-4): “this is the man of all sorts ...” is incorrect: he continues to describe the βίον (from E1), and moves to the man with τὸν καλόν τε καὶ ποικίλον.

2.275    (562A4-5): The tr. of  ἡ καλλίστη δὴ … πολιτεία τε καὶ ὁ κάλλιστος … λοιπά is, “Then it would leave us with the task of exploring the finest state and the finest man ... .” As often the tr. avoids to reproduce the prolepsis and thereby loses the ironic tone, so that he has to append a note at the bottom of the page to the effect that the passage is “deeply ironic.” (u)

2.274    (562B4): ADM read ὑπέρπλουτος and F read only πλοῦτος. Burnet printed [ὑπέρ]πλουτος out of deference to the greater textual authority of the former but Slings less deferentially printed simple πλοῦτος.  Au. takes over the text as presented by Slings and gives no critical note at all, leaving no vestige. I defend the reading of ADM in my Commentary ad loc. (t)

2.275    (562A10): τροπόν τινα τὸν αὐτόν is not “virtually the same way” but “the same way, in a sense” – so that the next question, πῶς, means “In what way?” (i)

2.277    (562B11): λέγεις δ’ αὐτὴν τί ὁριζεσθαι means not “What are you defining as ‘it’?” but “What are you saying she (democracy) singles out as being good?”

2.277    (562C1-2): “how very good it is and for this reason is the only place worthy ...” for ὡς ἔχει τε κάλλιστον καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐν μόνῃ ταύτῃ ἄξιον … . In Greek the subject changes but the English does not allow this. (u)

2.277    (562C2): For φύσει ἐλεύθερος “naturally free” is not emphatic enough: φύσει evokes the contrary, νόμος. Shorey: “a man of the spirit;” Quandt, “given his sense that it is his natural state to be free,” with a note on Rousseau.

2.277    (562C3): ῥῆμα goes untranslated (“Yes I can tell you this is often said”). It connotes that the statement is a slogan, a democratic praise of democracy. (i)

2.277    (562C8-D4): Again avoiding the natural prolepsis of a condition in which the protasis comes first, the tr. starts with expletive “I think it’s when” and fails to bring across the shock that the rulers (τοὺς ἄρχοντας δή appearing at what ends up being the head of the apodosis with emphatic δή) are blamed for what has happened. (sy)

2.277    (562D1-2): πορρωτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἀκράτου αὐτῆς μεθυσθῇ means”becomes drunk from drinking too much of a wine unmixed” (because of the evil pourers) not “gets drunk because of its excessive need to have the wine unmixed.” τοῦ δέοντος is a genitive of comparison with πορρωτέρω (there is no “need” in the sentence). Au. loses the causal relation between the protasis and apodosis and translates away the powerful hyperbaton.

2.277    (562D2-3): Tr.’s “if they are not very easy going” has lost the tone of ἂν μὴ πάνυ πρᾷοι ὦσι, which is “if it strikes them that they are not quite lenient enough.” Shorey: “if its so-called governors are not extremely mild and gentle ...” Quandt: its rulers, such as they are, unless they are terribly mild ... .” (u)

2.279    (562E7): πατέρα μὲν ἐθίζεσθαι παιδὶ ὅμοιον γενέσθαι is not “father gets into the habit of becoming like a child,” but “father adopts the habit of acting (i.e., tries to become) like a child.” The phrase, “gets into the habit of becoming” is, moreover, redundant. (u)

2.279    (563A2): γίγνεται οὕτως means “it does happen,” not “it is happening” (Socrates is talking about the γένεσις phase). So again, A3. (sy)

2.279    (563B4): “Further, the ultimate ...” should be “And yet, the ultimate ... .” (u)

2.283    (564A3-4): “evolves into” (εἰς) should be followed by “evolves from” (καθίσταται ἐκ), not “is based on.” (u)

2.285    (564D4): πολὺ δριμύτερον is without reason taken as an adverb (“more fiercely”) and then the semantics shifts when just below (D9) it is translated “keen.”  We need a word that works in both places, for instance “vigorous,” or at least two close words. (u)

2.285    (564D7): ἀγύμναστον καὶ οὐκ ἐρρωμένον γίγνεται is not “gets out of practice and lacks strength” (it never was “in practice”!) but “lacks strength for never experiencing.” (u)

2.285    (564D8, E2): ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων / χωρίς τινων ὀλίγων: The repetition of ὀλίγοι foretells us these are the “elite” that the demagogue will vilify in the face of the masses. Not hearing this, Au. speculates instead about contemporary bureaucrats in Athens (n.60) – despite the fact that this elite group is the very next subject. (i)

2.287    (564E6): οἱ κοσμιώτατοι φύσει become rich, says Socrates. The tr. is “those naturally best organized,” a phrase that needs some kind of unpacking to mean anything. The plain sense of κόσμιος in the passage is “moderate” (σωφροσύνη), but the tr. appears to pull something out of thin air that at least might sound likely.  Shorey’s “orderly and thrifty” relevantly and correctly gets two aspects of σωφροσύνη, but tr. has borrowed one of them not recognizing Shorey’s allusion to the virtue. (u)

2.287    (564E13): πλούσιοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι καλοῦνται κηφήνων βοτάνη is not “men like this, who are known as the rich, are the garden of the drones” but “this sort of rich men is dubbed the garden of the drones.”

2.287    (565A6-8): The construction is δύνανται … τὸ πλεῖστον ἔχειν, but tr. elevates the second participle (διανέμοντες) to ordinate rank and makes δύνανται ἔχειν subordinate (“while being able to keep”).  This loses the fact that the ring-leaders pay them only out of the lion’s share they keep. (u)

2.287    (565A7): οὐσία is not “livelihood” (which constitutes only the necessities of life) but “wealth.” (c)

2.291    (566A6): οὗτος ὁ στασιάζων γίγνεται ...  is not “This is he who becomes the agitator,” but “This is what the agitator turns out to be.”

2.293    (566B10-11): θαρρήσαντες ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν is not really “confident in their own power” (for they have none), but “risking their own interests.” Shorey: “unconcerned for themselves.” (u)

2.295    (566D5): εὐδαιμονίαν is here metonymy for βίος. The usage deserves a note. (c)

2.299    (567E4): Au. prints ἐθελήσειέν πως τοὺς δούλους, a reading Slings was first to report from the  Monacensis, and which he adopted in his text against the superior testimony of ADM, which read πῶς and which attribute it to Adeimantus (as an interruption) with Socrates immediately replying with τοὺς δούλους, effectively ignoring Adeimantus’s interruption. Unaccountably Au. gives no critical note and so an inferior reading is adopted without notice, perhaps on the force of Slings’s defense of his alteration of the text, though he advanced it with “reluctance” (Critical Notes, 153 – I find his argument characteristically weak: cf. my comment ad loc.). Conversely, the majority reading τίς δ’ αὐτόθεν a few words earlier is printed without critical reference to τί δέ, a scribitur in this same Monacensis. Finally, the tr. takes the (now) enclitic πως not with ἐθελήσειεν, the word that comes before it, but, impossibly, with ἀφελόμενος τοὺς πολίτας, which comes a few words after. (t)

2.299    (568A4-5): οὗτοι goes with both ἑταῖροι and  πολῖται: “these new citizens.” (i)

2.299    (568A11): ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο is not “because one thing he said showed insight,” but “because here as elsewhere (καί) the tragedian said something ripe with wisdom.”

2.303    (568D5): πάλιν is (again: cf. 559D4) “go back to” not “once again.” (i)

2.303    (568E7): “What do you mean?” requires proper intonation to convey the sense of πῶς λέγεις. Translate “How can you say that?” or at least “What are you saying?” Again at 2.305, 569B3. (i)

2.305    (569B8-C2): φεύγων ἂν καπνὸν δουλείας ἐλευθέρων εἰς πῦρ δούλων δεσποτείας ἅν ἐμπεπτωκὼς εἴη is not “fleeing and freeing themselves from the smoke of enslavement would have fallen into the fire of despotism.”  (1) ἄν plus optative continues an ideal apodosis begun above, about what “tyranny would be,” which Au. had translated with a mere indicative; (2) “would have” is the wrong English for the perfect optative, for it cannot but import the sense of a past irreal condition: the perfect is part of the proverb and is an intensive perfect, in contrast with the conative present of the parallel participle, φεύγων; and (3) “freeing” is wrong, as if Au. took ἐλευθέρων to be the participle ἐλευθερῶν. A correct translation of this hugely eloquent passage would be: “in its attempt to avoid even the most fleeting sense of enslavement as free men, the deme would now find itself subjected to the nightmare of slaves under a dynasty” (Quandt) or Shorey’s freer “trying to escape the smoke of submission to the free would have plunged into the fire of enslavement to slaves.”

2.305    (569B8-C1): κάπνος δουλείας ἐλευθέρων || πῦρ δούλων δεσποτείας is 1,2,3 || 1,2,~3. (sm)

2.305    (569C6-7): οὐκ ἐμμελῶς ἡμῖν εἰρήσεται ἐὰν φῶμεν … is not “will it not be appropriate if we agree that we have discussed … ,” but “we won’t be speaking out of order if we assert that ... .”

2.307    (571A5): ποθῶ ἔτι is to feel something is lacking: “am anxious” is too general and too specific.

2.309    (571C3): “the the” should be “the.” (typo)

2.309    (571C3-7): ἐγειρομένας ὅταν τὸ μέν tells which ones by describing their circumstances, with μέν and δέ.  Au. treats the μέν clause as a protasis and the δέ as an apodosis (unless the tamed savage side needed an “and” before it – a typo – who knows?). σκιρτᾷ might have looked like an indicative (though subsequent and parallel ζητῇ does not!).

2.309    (571C9): μητρί anarthrous, is “Mother” the proper name, not “a mother.” (i)

2.309    (571D3): “won’t touch” is too weak for ἀπέχεσθαι. Better is “keep his hands off.” (u)

2.309    (571D3-4): Tr. has,“In a word it isn’t lacking in any folly or shamelessness.” This ‘word’ could hardly be weaker! Shorey: “In a word, falls short of no extreme of folly and shameless,” of which the tr. is a poor imitation. Shorey’s litotes works because of the superlative “extreme.” Socrates achieves the same with οὐδέν and the genitive, but tr. could just as well have been translating ἀνόητόν τι. (u)

2.309    (571D6): Healthy and temperate “in himself” for αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ fails to bring across the allusion to self-mastery, which is the true meaning of the genitive. Cf. Quandt ad loc. (u)

2.309    (571E1): At “he does not starve,” Au. thinks he is in the apodosis but the actions described took place in waking hours.

2.309    (571E1): δούς (aorist) with ἐγείρας, which he translates “having previously aroused” (aorist), now is translated “does not,” (present). ὅπως ἂν κοιμηθῇ καὶ μὴ παρέχῃ means to go to sleep “rather than bringing on” a ruckus, not “without rousing” one.

2.309    (571E2): θόρυβος means troublesome noise – and is left out of the tr.

2.309    (572A1): χαῖρον ἢ λυπούμενον: the participles are NEUTERS with τὸ ὲπιθυμητικόν, but by now Au. has lost all control of the syntax and has semantics only, so he translates “(arousing) any painful or joyful feeling” (taking the neuters to be accusative nouns, objects of παρέχῃ).

2.309    (572A2): καθαρόν is not “unsullied” – it means “unmixed” (with the element of desire). Shorey: “in isolated purity.”2.309

2.309    (572A5): What ἀλλ’ ἡσυχήσας denies is πραΰνας καὶ μὴ ἐλθών, not καθεύδῃ, and the μέν dismisses them to introduce (with δέ) the one that matters; but even that is done with a participle (κινήσας), and then comes a summary of the whole protasis with οὕτως ἀναπαύηται.  Only thereafter comes the apodosis. This error turns the paragraph into a description of how he goes to bed rather than what happens in his sleep! (sy)

2.311    (572B5): εἶδος is a type, not a group (as if Au. were thinking in terms of set theory) of desires. (c)

2.311    (572B10): “inclined toward democracy” for δημοτικόν is wrong: it is here not a tendency but an outcome. (c)

2.313    (572E3): παραβοηθοῦντες (an hapax) is a joke = “counter-supporting.” (sm)

3.313    (572E5-6): ἔρωτά τινα αὐτῷ μηχανωμένους ἐμποιῆσαι προστάτην is not “contriving some passion in him to become champion,” but “contriving to instill or introduce into him a certain desire that will play the role of master.”

3.313    (573A2): ἤ τι ἄλλο οἴει … means “or do you think this is a correct characterization of the desire people take on (i.e., that it is a big winged drone),” not “whether the desire is for anything else” (sic).

2.315    (573B2): ἐπαισχυνομένας is not pleasures that make him feel guilty but that he thinks are shameful (cf.574D5-6).

2.315    (573C7): “tyrant” for τυραννικὸς ἀνήρ again confuses the political field and the field of the soul. So again at 576B7 (2.325) and 578A12 (2.341). (c)

2.315    (573C8): On the sense of φύσει:  The tr. fails to represent that it is the attributes denoted by the adjectives (μεθυσθείς, μαινόμενος, ὑποκεκινηκώς) that at some point lead to the attribute, τυραννικός (adjective), these three adjectives bringing forward what was just said (in B-C). The man has crossed the line when these attributes become “second nature” to him (φύσει ἢ ἐπιτηδεύμασι). (sy)

2.315    (573C9): “depresssive” should be “depressive.” (typo)

2.317    (573E5): It is τούς not τάς, referring therefore to the persons not the pleasures (note δέ with change of subject). (i)

2.317    (573E8): In “don’t they see who has anything which can be taken,” “see” for σκοπεῖν is horribly anticlimactic after οἰστρᾶν – at least “go on the lookout” or “watch for.” Shorey: “look to see.” Quandt: “rove amuck on the lookout.” (u)

2.317    (574A3-4): As to the tr. “again he’ll have to get it from every source,” (1) “he” should be “they” (τοὺς δέ plural, above), (2) φέρειν should be “plunder,” and (3) ἀναγκαῖον at A3 picks up the “force” of the pleasure (573E3). It is not just “he’ll have to” but they will be compelled, as Adeimantus notices (A5).

2.316    (574A9-10): Au. prints ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐὰν τὸ αὑτοῦ μέρος ἀναλώσῃ, ἀπονειμάμενος τῶν πατρῴων, borrowing the punctuation of Burnet Shorey Slings, but translates as if (contrary to his punctuation) ἀπονειμάμενος modified ἀναλώσῃ: “and take from them, if he spends his own portion by taking his share of his inheritance” (rather than “rip them off, once he spends his own portion, on the argument of arrogating to himself what he will inherit,” which is the true sense). (t)

2.317    (574A10): ἐὰν τὸ αὑτοῦ μέρος ἀναλώσῃ ἀπονειμαμένους τῶν πατρῴων means “once he has spent his own money (aorist) he needs to allocate to himself what is truly theirs to bequeath.

2.319    (574B8-9): “hold back from doing anything tyrannical” again fails to get the punch. Tr. leaves out φείσαιτο – “take care to go easy on them so as to avoid doing something only a tyrant could do” is the sense. (u)

2.319    (574B13): “no necessary relationship” is too weak for οὐκ ἀναγκαίας. The term combines a sense of duty and natural kinship for which “necessary” is too abstract. At least “necessary tie” (Shorey, with note). (i)

2.319    (574C7): “A pretty fine thing” for σφόδρα μακάριον replaces sarcasm with litotes, and loses the emphasis of Adeimantus’s reply. (i)

2.321    (574D7): In αἱ νεωστὶ ἐκ δουλείας λελυμέναι, νεωστί goes with λελυμέναι only: the desires are not “new ones” but always had been there. (c)

2.321    (574D6): “beliefs he considered just” is wrong for τὰς δικαίας ποιουμένας. The passive indicates it means “beliefs conventionally held to be true.” Also at 573B on which cf. n. ad 2.315, supra. (i)

2.325    (576B7): οὗτος γίγνεται ὃς ἄν means that this type is what results whenever a soul that has become (internally) tyrannical (φύσις is a second nature) becomes (externally) a monarch (the aorist is ingressive). The demonstrative (idiomatically) refers to a type as before in Book Eight. (i)

2.325    (576B7): ὃς ἂν τυραννικώτατος φύσει μοναρχήσῃ does not say and does not mean that the person becomes monarch “since he is naturally most like a tyrant.” The whole point is that a man with a tyrannical soul becomes even more wretched if by some chance or circumstance beyond his control he becomes the monarch (cf.578C): office magnifies the internal pain of his deficiencies. (c)

2.325    (576B7-8): ὃς ἂν τυραννικώτατος φύσει ὢν μοναρχήσῃ does not mean “a person who achieves sole rule because he is naturally most like a tyrant,” but “whenever a person whose inner nature is (already) most tyrannical goes on to take the throne.”

2.327    (576C3): The perfect γεγονώς is intensive, not preterite: the person who rules achieves the most intense and long lasting sort of wretchedness. (i)

2.327:    (576D3): οἵαν τὸ τοιοῦτον διήλθομεν means “the relation of a tyrannical state to a monarchic state of the sort we described at the beginning of our investigation,” (i.e. before going through the πολιτεῖαι in the Decline) not “the relationship of a state ruled by a tyrant to one ruled by a king in terms of virtue as we first discussed them” (= ?).

2.327    (576E2): In οὕτω δόξαν ἀποφαινώμεθα the οὕτω is (again: cf. ad 2.259, supra) semi-redundant (not “by this means”) and otiose, and ἀποφαινώμεθα means to promulgate a resolution (not “we shall defend”): “only after having done this let us make our proclamation.” Cf. 580B1, where tr. gets it right. (i)

2.327    (576E3): προκαλῇ is more than “propose.” Like ἀποφαινώμεθα it is a legal term. It denotes criteria stipulated in limine about how the judgment is to be reached. (i)

2.329    (577A4): “for the benefit of” for πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω (‘in order to impress those on the outside’) is an expression inappropriate in this context, which itself is questioning what is truly beneficial. (u)

2.329:    (577A5): “see sufficiently clearly” is too weak for ἱκανῶς διορᾷ. Because of διά the sense is “see through to the core issue.” (u)

2.329    (577A6-7): In τοῦ δυνατοῦ μὲν κρῖναι, συνῳκηκότος δέ, the μέν / δέ construction invites us to recognize a distinction between ability and evidence that does not come across in the translation. The pair re-appears in the question below (577B6-8). (sy)

2.329    (577B2): κελεύοιμεν is not “shouldn’t we tell him, since he has seen πάντα ταῦτα” (there is no ἄν). Rather, the optative is a continuation or bringing forward, following καί (B1), of the optative with which the sentence began, εἰ οὖν οἰοίμην (A5). The apodosis comes only with Glaucon’s interruptive answer (ὀρθότατ’ ἄν). (sy)

2.329    (577C4): Glaucon’s question τὰ ποῖα is referring with the neuter plural to Socrates’s use of παθήματα in the previous line, which tr. renders with “conditions” – so the question should be rendered “What kinds of conditions?” not “What kinds of things?” which needlessly unlinks it. Cf. on 2.225 (549B5), supra. (u)

2.331    (577E2): “by the gadfly” for ὑπὸ … οἴστρου is the wrong word to put into the mouth of Socrates. Shorey’s “gadfly of desire” expands the expression to avoid or at least mitigate the problem. (u)

2.333    (578A1,4): πενιχρὰν καὶ ἄπληστον || φόβου γέμειν : the tr. does not bring across the paradox. (sm)

2.333    (578A8,10): Socrates is careful to treat state (ἄλλῃ fem., A8) and then man (ἀνδρί, A10) but tr. leaves this obscure by leaving out “state” at A8. (sm)

2.333    (578B2): In τήν γε πόλιν, the γε sets up a contrast with the man, coming next (the variant τε [for which there is no critical note] produces a similar meaning).  Translate “as a city.” (i)

2.333    (578B3): οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς means “And I was right, no?” (not “would be”).

2.333    (578B4): On αὖ, “what can you say more” should be “what can you say in turn.” (i)

2.333    (578B9): οὔπω … οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα is not quite “this man is not like the one at the extreme” but “is not the one who is most like this.” (u)

2.334    (578C1): κατα βιῷ should be καταβιῷ (cf. ad 2.146, supra). (typo)

2.335    (578C3): ἐκπορισθῇ is passive (cf. ἀναγκασθῇ, 579C7): not “as a result of some disaster contrives to make himself an actual tyrant” but “is unlucky enough that he is provided the opportunity to become tyrant” (ironic).

2.335    (578D5): διαφέρει means “is greater”(whence the answer is in the singular, and is not “yes they do differ” but “yes it is greater”).  

2.337    (578E1): εἴ τις θεῶν is not “one of the gods” but “some god.” (i)

2.337    (579A6-7): εἴ τις ἄλλος ἄλλου δεσπόζειν ἀξιοῖ not “thought he was fit” but “thinks anybody is justified to enslave anybody” (this is the ἄλλος ἄλλου idiom). (i)

2.337    (579A6-7): Not “so he has many neighbors who wouldn’t tolerate.” Besides mixing moods in the English there is no “so:” that the neighbors will not tolerate slavery is part of the hypothesis. (u)

2.337    (579A8): For τιμωροῖντο the tr. has “they’d punish him” as if we had reached the apodosis, but there is no ἄν. Socrates is still in the “what if” stage.  The same error is made at 577AB (for which cf. n. ad loc., supra). (u)

2.337    (579B3-5ff): The translation misses the tension between μέν and δέ: the outer situation (μέν) presses in on him, but (δέ) his inner mood makes it only worse since he more than anyone needs to break out. (sy)

2.339    (579C8-D2): ἀναγκάζοιτο goes with all four participles (διάγειν is otiose), therefore not “were to take issue and be forced” (there is no “taking issue”). (sy)

2.339    (579E1): “flatterer of the meanest sort” is ambiguous in English (but the genitive τῶν πονηροτάτων is unambiguously objective in the Greek). (u)

2.341    (580A1-2): ἀποδώσομεν … ἃ πρότερον εἴπομεν is not “the qualities we attributed to him earlier.”  “Qualities” is a dutiful attempt to get the plural , but what we had “attributed” to him (more exactly repaid him with) was additional perils, not qualities. As before (ad 2.137, 2.15, and 1.539, supra) is idiomatically adverbial. “Shall we further freight him as we did before.” (i)

2.341    (580A4): πάσης κακίας is “of all evil” not just “of evil:” Socrates is capping his list with a generalization.

2.341    (580A5-6): “and as a result of all these things he’ll be a particular victim of ill-fortune and he’ll make ...” has become independent of the syntactical governance of ἀνάγκη. Please add “that” after “things.”Also, μάλιστα μέν means not that he is a “particular victim” (=?), but denies to the μέν clause its usual concessive role. Shorey, “be himself most unhappy and make all about him so.”

2.341    (580A5): μάλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ δυστυχεῖ is not “a particular victim of ill fortune” (Is this use of “particular” a British idiom?), but with μέν proleptically sets up a contrast between himself as an individual and the plurality (δέ) of persons around him. (i)

2.341    (580B9-C4): The tr. shifts from oratio obliqua (“to be the happiest”) to direct (“and it is he”) but the Greek did not. (sy)

2.341f    (580B8-C4): Again the τυραννικώτατος is not a man “most like a tyrant within himself” but a man the structure of whose soul resembles the structure and operation of a tyrannical state (“most like a tyranny in himself” would be closer). The point of the paragraph is to ask whether justice makes a man happy and injustice wretched, and to answer it by observing the likenesses of the internal personality types to the more and less happy or wretched political forms. (c)

2.341    (580C1): βασιλικώτατον is (once again) most kingly in his internal disposition, not “most fit to to be king.” (c)

2.343    (580C3): αὖ is not “moreover,” but parallel with τοῦτο δέ at C1. τυγχάνειν is used to connect the related attributes of moral depravity and unhappiness with one or another of the candidates listed in the decline. “Actually” is almost right but to the extent it is right it vitiates the tr. of αὖ. (sy)

2.343    (580C5): ἀνειρήσθω σοι is third person. “Yes, you make the proclamation” unnecessarily sacrifices the impersonality, and therefore Glaucon’s avowal that he is committed to the objective truth of Socrates’s proposal. Rather, “Go ahead and proclaim it on behalf of a hired herald.”

2.343    (580C6): προσαναγορεύω is not “also proclaim” but “proclaim in addition” – to add something to the edict. The subordinate construction is continued without re-referring to the leading construction.  Shorey: “Shall I add the clause ... ?”

2.343    (580D10): “angry” for θυμοῦται followed by “passion” for θυμοειδές (581A9) again obscures the argument. Cf. ad 1.403 (435E4), 1.545 (475B4), 2.9 (485D10), 2.229 (550B2-3), 2.243 (553C1), supra. (u)

2.345    (581A10): ὅλον means “as a whole” – in every part of itself. It is pure θυμός. The tr. “wholly” obscures the sense needlessly (compare πᾶν below [B6], well translated with “the whole of it”). (u)

2.345    (581B6-7): χρημάτων τε καὶ δόξης ἥκιστα τούτων τούτῳ μέλει is not “the last thing it is concerned with out of these is money and reputation” but “this part less than all those parts cares about money and reputation” – idiomatically clear by the juxtaposition of the pronouns but conceptually necessary also by the context in which the relative interests of the parts are being compared. Moreover money and reputation are two things, not one, the one beloved by the ἐπιθυμητικόν and the other by the θυμοειδές, and as such they could not both be last. (c)

2.347    (581D2-3): Similarly, “it” should be “they” or “one of them” (but tr. does not translate αὐτῶν) for there are three distinct fields. The tr. leaves only “pleasure” to be the antecedent of “it” which is conceptually incorrect. Shorey’s “they” does the trick. (c)

2.346    (581E2): Au. prints μανθάνοντα; οὐ πάνυ πόρρω; – which happens to be the text presented in Slings’s edition – and appends a critical note (n.3), to-wit:

                ante οὐ legunt τῆς ἡδόνης  ADF :  τῆς ἡδόνης  post ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ  Adam

The textual note seems to justify reading τῆς ἡδόνης before οὐ rather than to justify omitting it. In fact, the only historical grounds for omitting it are presented in Slings’s apparatus though that is omitted here, i.e., the detail that the τῆς ἡδόνης reported in A is dotted for deletion. To add to the confusion, the tr. has “far removed from pleasure” to which is attached a footnote (to the translation, n.25) telling us to read τῆς ἡδόνης with ADF, after all. The student will be hopelessly confused by the fool’s errand he will be sent upon trying to make sense of this. (t)

2.349    (581E6): For ἀμφισβητοῦνται tr. puts “are in contention” but the sense is that men are arguing about them. The verb is passive. (u)

2.349    (581E7-582A1): μὴ … μηδὲ … ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἥδιον the run-up through negatives leads to αὐτό: solely, purely, only – not “actually.” (i)

2.349    (582B2-3): τῶν ἑτέρων must be “both of the two” – “of both the one and the other” (~ ἀμφωτέρω, B8) not of the “others.” There are only two pleasures being considered here. (i)

2.349    (582B9): ἐμπειρίᾳ is a dative of respect not of means: “superior in terms of his experience,” not “through” it.

2.351    (582C8): γεγεῦσθαι: The perfect  is “empirical” – not ‘no one can taste except the philosopher’ but no one else has had the experience of tasting. Hence ἀδύνατον refers to logical impossibility not a lack of ability. (i)

2.351    (582D8): οὐδέ is just “nor,” not “nor even.”

2.351    (582D10): “Which one is that?” is again needlessly vague: the neuter τὸ ποῖον points to ὄργανον. (u)

2.351    (582D13): Not “reason is above all (sc. other faculties) the faculty which the philosopher uses” but “reason is the particular province of the philosopher” (as opposed to the provinces of others): τούτου is possessive.

2.351f    (582D15-E9): The casual and perhaps unintentional shift in the tr. from contrafactual (D15-E2) to “future most vivid” (E4-5) loses track of the fact that the second alternative has been refuted just as the first one had been, leading by eliminatio to the conclusion that the third is the true criterion. ἐπειδή thereupon (E7) means “since” (concluding to the third), not “when” (tr.), and ἄρα at 583A1 (not translated) is “therefore.” Glaucon’s ἀνάγκη is not “then” (designating a conditional necessity under the third hypothesis, answering incorrect “when”) but rather a recognition that the eliminatio is complete. Since the philosopher is the one who uses ἐμπειρία and φρόνησις and λόγος, his choice is dispositive over the others. (c)

2.351    (582E4-5): “would” (of an irreal construction) gives way to “will be” though by absence of a second verb in the Greek it is certain that the irreal construction is continued. (u)

2.353    (583A4): γοῦν is not a retreat into part-proof. Its γε is “causal” (or vi termini) with κύριος. This term embodies what the eliminatio just proved. Not “the intelligent man at least speaks with authority,” but “it is as the man whose praise is definitive that the thinking man praises this life.” (i)

2.353    (583A8): Not “those of” but “that of:”  “warrior and lover of honor” is an hendiadys. (u)

2.355    (538D6-9): The tr. is ungrammatical. The syntax is ‘You see men undergoing any other things like this, in which during the time they are in pain they praise non-pain as the most pleasurable thing, rather than joy.’ The construction is that of the participle (γιγνομένους) in oratio obliqua with a verb of perception. (u)

2.357    (583D10): Tr. misses that the language τοῦτο … ἡσυχία is repeated by τοῦτο …. ἡ ἡσυχία at 584A7, but translates the second τοῦτο as demonstrative with ἡσυχία and therefore leaves out the sense but misconstrues the Greek instead. (sy)

2.357    (583D10-11): τοῦτο γὰρ τότε ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαπητὸν γίγνεται, ἡσυχία means “under those circumstances ‘calmness’ becomes pleasurable in the sense of being welcome.” γίγνεσθαι often plays a conceptually important role in Plato, for describing a situation improperly understood. γίγνεται here picks up γιγνομένους above. (c)

2.357    (583D10-E2): The point is that one thing, ἡσυχία, is now pleasant, now painful. But tr. uses different words for the single term (“relief” / “respite”) and defeats the paradox or contradiction. (sm)

2.357    (583E9): καὶ μήν ... γε (introducing minor premise, like ἀλλὰ μήν γε) is not “and again” but “and yet.” (i)

2.357    (583E9): τό γε ἡδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον is not “the pleasure that occurs (in the soul)” but the event of pleasure. (c)

2.357    (584A7-8): οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο … τότε ἡ ἡσυχία recalls the language above (τοῦτο ... τότε ἡδύ, ἡσυχία) in order to contradict it. “Is not really (ἔστιν emphatic) but only seems, in comparison with the painful, pleasant,” not “is not a reality” (=?). (c)

2.357    (584B2): ἐν τῷ παρόντι is not “for the present” but “on the spur of the moment” (like idiomatic οὕτως).  οἰηθῇς is aorist (not present) so it means “lest it pop into your mind that” rather than “go on thinking.” (i)

2.358    (584B5): θέλεις should be ’θέλεις (cf. ad 1.360, supra). (typo)

2.359    (584B5-6): εἰ ’θέλεις is not “if you want to think about them” but “if you would please think about them.” (i)

2.359    (584C6): τούτου τοῦ εἴδους: “of this kind” not “of this form.” (i)

2.359    (584C9-11): The tr. of the passage does not make sense in English but also does not say what the Greek says. Socrates asks if a certain set of pleasures and pains also falls into the kind or type – κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχουσιν – that consist of a surcease of pain or pleasure, namely the pain/pleasure of anticipating future pain/pleasure. (u)

2.359f    (584DE): The tr. “top” and “bottom” evince conceptual misunderstanding (cf. n. ad 584D3-4, infra). (c)

2.359    (584D1) The tr. of οἷαί εἰσιν καὶ ᾧ μάλιστα ἐοίκασιν melds the two ideas into one (“what sort they are like”), but the sense is “what their nature or quality is and what thing in particular they thereby resemble,” introducing an εἰκών (ἐοίκασιν is not otiose) that will illustrate the οἷον. (u)

2.359    (584D3-4): τὸ μὲν ἄνω / τὸ δὲ κάτω is not top/bottom but up (or even upwards) and down (downwards) – as they must be translated in the sequel (D6-7). The ἀληθῶς ἄνω is not the “most high” as he makes it next (the “real top”) but the “up” in nature’s (absolute) way of measuring things (ἐν τῇ φύσει, D3).

2.361    (584E8): μὴ ὑγιεῖς δόξας ἔχουσιν means they have unsound opinions or that they do not have sound ones. (c)

2.361    (585A2): σφόδρα is not “seriously;” it is to have a “strong fancy” (μέν).

2.360    (585A3): Au. prints ὥσπερ ⟨δὲ⟩, following Slings but appends no critical note (Burnet has ὥσπερ only, followed by Shorey Chambry). According to the apparatus of both Burnet and Slings, δὲ is a scribitur in the Monacensis (it was read by Adam). Au. should have added a critical note in defense of adopting his weakly attested choice (by my lights, the work of δέ is already done by οὕτω, below, whereas reading it leaves either καί or οὕτω redundant: Cf. my Commentary ad locc.). (t)

2.360    (585A8): Au. prints ⟨***⟩ ὧδε γοῦν, again following Slings, and again supplies no critical note. Slings posited the lacuna (believing that Socrates’s remark does not immediately follow), reporting moreover γοῦν to be the reading of the mss. without commenting on Burnet’s report that they read γ’οὖν (read also by Jowett-Campbell Adam Shorey Chambry). Still, Au. adds no marking of a lacuna in the corresponding place in the tr. nor a note to the effect that there is a gap in continuity (contrast the business at 2.98-99, 510C1, where Au. does both). Instead, the tr. creates a segue by saying, “Then think about it this way,” where ‘then’ would seem to be a translation of Burnet’s γ’οὖν (which does makes the text more consecutive than Slings’s γοῦν – Stallbaum’s defense of it notwithstanding). Cf. my n. ad loc. (t)

2.363    (585B7): ἴσχων means getting grasp of intelligence (νοῦς objective) in order to be parallel with τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων. The “strengthening” of one’s mind that the translation speaks of would be the result of his νοῦν ἴσχειν. (i)

2.363    (585B9): πλήρωσις is not gratification but fulfillment. (c)

2.363    (585B11): τοῦ μᾶλλον is “of the more real, not just “the more real.” Again the connection between question and answer is needlessly weakened. Cf. ad 2.329 (577C4), supra. (u)

2.363    (585C2): ἐχόμενον brings forward and restates μετέχειν from above and does not mean “comprise.” (c)

2.363    (585C2): θάνατον at C2 is contrasted with θνητόν at C4, but the contrast does not come across with “immortal” / “transient”. (sm)

2.363    (585C3): “occurs in such an environment” is too vague for ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον. Shorey: “is born in a thing of that nature” is clearer. (c)

2.363    (585C6): τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου = τὸ τοιοῦτον. This is translated out with “the one that is always consistent.” (c)

2.363:    (585C10): τί δὲ ἀληθείας;  Clearly the tr. presumes this means “Does it have a larger share of the truth?” (μᾶλλον sciendum), but instead of spelling this presumption out tr. says only what the Greek has (“What about its share of truth?”) and so it becomes unclear in English as to whether Socrates is asking whether the οὐσία of the same has a greater share of truth than ἐπιστήμη does or than οὐσία does. (u)

2.364    (585D1-2): γένη γῶν γένων should be γένη τῶν γένων. (typo)

2.365    (585D7-8): αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ὂν ὄντως μᾶλλον πληροῦται is a chiasm of cause and result. Not “is itself more real and is truly more satisfied” but “what is fulfilled by what more truly is and itself more truly is, (is) more truly filled” (Shorey). (sy)

2.365    (585D7): τὸ τῶν μᾶλλον ὄντων πληρούμενον is not the thing that is “filled by things which have a larger share of reality:” μετέχειν is not here, as it was above. μᾶλλον ὄντων means “realer” (“what more truly is,” Shorey). (c)

2.365    (585D12-E4): τὸ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληρούμενον is “that which is really fulfilled by the more real things would the more feel joy” not something satisfied that is “in fact more real.” τῷ ὄντι and τῶν ὄντων, in attributive position, are to be construed with the participle πληρούμενον, and are not predicates of the noun its article creates. Likewise τὸ δὲ τῶν ἧττον ὄντων μεταλαμβάνον is “what shares in the less real” not “what has a lesser share in the real.”

2.365    (585E3): βεβαίως is not “assuredly” but “securely.” It is objective, not subjective.

2.365    (586A2): ὡς ἔοικεν is not just “it seems” but “in terms of the εἰκών involving up and down” (cf. ἐοίκασιν, 584D1).

2.365    (586A3): ταύτῃ is local, not modal (γῇ not ὁδῷ).

2.365    (586A4-6): οὔτε ἀνέβλεψαν πώποτε οὔτε ἠνέχθησαν … is not “they go neither … nor even look.” The verbs are aorists (with πώποτε), which were set up by calling the persons ἄπειροι at the beginning (A1).

2.365    (586A5): τοῦ ὄντος τῷ ὄντι is again “truly filled with the true” or “really filled with the real” (cf. 585D12-E1), not just “filled with reality.”

2.367    (586A6): Tr. has “steadfast pure pleasure” for βεβαίου τε καὶ καθαρᾶς ἡδονῆς, eclipsing forever Shorey’s far better “pleasure steadfast and pure,” which it imitates. (u)

2.367    (586B5): παντελῶς is not just “all in all” which if anything undercuts the remark, but “with utter perspicacity.” (u)

2.367    (586C7): “the passionate side” is an unfortunate choice for τὸ θυμοειδές, since (1) passion is again too general for θυμός, and (2) the metaphor of “sides” suggests two parts whereas the soul has three. (u)

2.367    (586C7): τοιαῦτα … ἀνάγκη in answer (586D3) requires the τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη it points to above (C7) to have a different sense from what the intervening translation gave it, but Au. did not hear the echo and so left the wrong interpretation intact. (sy)

2.367    (586C7-8): ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι is “a similar and corresponding thing inevitably happens” (if somebody indulges his thumos, since he is pursuing without nous and logos), not “aren’t there other things which must motivate anyone who succeeds … .”

2.367    (586C8): αὐτὸ τοῦτο is not just “this part” but “this part solely and on its own terms” (whence ἄνευ λογισμῶν τε καὶ νοῦ, below, D1-2). (i)

2.369    (586D4): θαρροῦντες sets the tone for confident ἄρα at the beginning of the subsequent paragraphs (586E4, 587A3, 587B8): translation correctly puts “therefore” only with the first. (sy)

3.369    (586D8-E1): “follow the truth and what is appropriate to them” is ambiguous. τε … καί pre-empts misunderstanding, if noticed.  A comma between “truth” and “and” would do the trick (drop also the comma between “them and “if”).  (sy)

2.369    (586E5): εἴς τε τἆλλα introduces an ἄλλως τε καί construction, with καὶ δὴ καί capping. Shorey: “it in all other respects keeps to its own task and is just, and likewise that each enjoys … .” Tr.’s  “can deal with its other functions and be just” is completely wrong! (i)

2.369    (587A3-5): “in fact” misstates the connection between the two infinitival phrases, linked by τε, and ὑπάρχει which governs both is not translated. The sense is “... what is in store for it is that for itself it cannot find its proper fulfillment and as for the other parts it compels them to search for ones alien to themselves.” The parallel idea expressed in the previous paragraph was also missed. (sy)

2.371f    Again fails to distinguish between the office and the type – but at this late stage, so does Plato. (c)

2.371    (587B5): “true appropriate” should probably be “true and appropriate.” (typo)

2.375    (588B11): οἷα ἔλεγεν is not just “what he meant,” but “the stunning implication of what he was saying.” Shorey: “precisely what it is that he was saying.” (u)

2.375    (588C3): φύσεις is not “creatures whose nature is recorded ...” but the idiomatic usage in the plural for “creatures” or “specimens.” (i)

2.377    (588C7): πλάττε is “mold” not “put together.”  The metaphor Socrates uses is not otiose – πλάττειν characteristic for the operations of free and arbitrary imagination. (i)

2.377    (588D7): συμπεφυκέναι is not just “fused” but “grown together” as a living thing. (i)

2.377    (588E4-5): οὐδὲν ἄλλο is “just that,” “exactly that,” not “nothing more than that” (more and less are, moreover, particularly inappropriate here).

2.379    (589A5): ταῦτ’ ἂν λέγοι is not “would say” but “would be saying” – i.e., the unintended implication of what he said. So also λέγει at B7 below. (i)

2.379    (589C1-2): πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν καὶ ὠφελίαν: the repetition of πρός is significant.  Tr. translates it only once, but by repeating it Socrates has set the second two apart from the one he has just finished dealing with – and so this does not come across. (sy)

2.379    (589C3): οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ’ εἰδὼς ψέγει neatly expresses that his criticism is neither valid nor informed, but tr. says “because he doesn’t know” (without warrant), failing to see the parallel between οὐδέν and οὐδέ. (sy)

2.381    (589D6): γίγνεται means is happening, not can.

2.381    (589E1-590A2): Tr. fails to bring across that the argument is a fortiori – an irreal denied plus a stronger inverse case asserted (in the present indicative). ἄρα (here untranslated) is the signal that it is an a fortiori argument. (sy)

2.381    (589E1-3): Takes the irreal condition as ideal (or “future less vivid”), parallel with the mistake about γίγνεται just above.

2.381    (589E2) καὶ ταῦτα, “to boot,” is simply left out of the translation. There are two separate points each being made on its own merits – enslavement and enslavement to horrid masters. (i)

2.381    (589E5): ἐλεεῖ is not “shows” no pity, but “feels” none – as different as shame is different from guilt. (c)

2.381    (590A6): ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ is passed over in the translation.

2.381    (590B1): συντείνηται is “concentrate,” not “extend,” contrasted with χαλάσει τε καὶ ἀνέσει just below.

2.383    (590B7): θυμοειδές is (misleadingly) “passion” again. (u)

2.383    (590C3): ἢ δι’ ἄλλο τι … ἤ is not “(is it) exclusively.” Idiomatic ἄλλο τι is mere variatio for other question-formulas expecting “yes.” (i)

2.385    (591A6-7): ἐξ ὧν πονηρότερος μέν … is not “as a result of which” but “on the force of the argument that” (μέν is again concessive). (i)

2.385    (591B4): εἰς τὴν βελτίστην φύσιν καθισταμένη  is not “naturally made the best” but “brought to the highest potential of its nature.” Shorey: “returning to its nature at the best.” (u)

2.387    (591C2):  is not “things it learns which” but “those studies which” (i.e., the following relative clause is “restrictive”). It is because he honors them that he studies them and only then benefits. “The rest” (for subsequent τὰ δὲ ἄλλα) is too loose: Socrates is advocating the radical idea that the soul drop all other studies, including for instance the study of the Classics. (u)

2.387    (591C5ff): The tr. of ἔπειτα … φανεῖται can tellingly be compared with the translation of Shorey that it is replacing. (u)

2.387    (591D3): φανεῖται is not “it constantly will be clear” but “his behavior will at every moment evince an attitude that ... .”  Shorey: “always be found.” N.b. ἁρμοττόμενος is “trying to adjust.” (i)

2.387    (591D4-5): “naturally attracted” is an obscure expression for ἀληθείᾳ μουσικός, which refers to 443D-444A (not 412A). Glaucon is commenting on Socrates’s use of συμφωνία in the previous line. (u)

2.387    (591D7): τὸν ὄγκον is epexegesis of καὶ τὴν ... συμφωνίαν in the previous line. (i)

2.387    (591D9): ἀπέραντα κακὰ ἔχων is “while in truth it is boundless evils that he has taken on,” not “and so acquire countless faults.” (u)

2.387    (591E3): οὕτως again semi-redundant: not “in this way” but “only thus.” (i)

2.387    (591E3-4): For οὕτως κυβερνῶν προσθήσει καὶ ἀναλώσει τῆς οὐσίας καθ’ ὅσον ἂν οἷός τε ᾖ the tr. has “in this way as far as he can he’ll steer and accumulate and spend his resources.” Compare Shorey, “will so steer his course and add or detract from his wealth on this principle,” or Quandt: “this will be his compass for steering the safest course he can, saving some now and spending some then.” (u)

2.389    (592Aff): μέν in τῶν μὲν μεθέξει καὶ γεύσεται is concessive: “While he will take in and enjoy (not just “taste”) those that might make him a better man, any that threaten the order he has established in his soul (not just “his existing state”) he will flee and shun (not just “avoid”) in both in his private and public life (the dichotomy is emphatic and triumphant, setting up the sequel). (u)

2.389    (592A1): μέν is concessive (cf. prev. n.). (i)

2.389    (592A1): τιμάς is not “rewards” but public accolades or office – hence the subsequent inference (ἄρα) by Glaucon about πολιτικὰ … πράττειν.

2.391    (595A2): παντὸς … μᾶλλον is not “more than anything” but part of the foil of the πολλὰ μέν clause. (i)

2.389    (592A7-8): For ἔν γε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει … ἔν γε τῇ πατρίδι,  “in his own state” vs. “in his native city” does not get the antithesis. Socrates is telling a riddle. Shorey: “in his own city but not the city of his birth;” Quandt: “the city that is his own” vs. “the city of his birth.” are close. To bring the riddle across, we need one thing different and the other the same. (u)

2.389    (592A10): ‘ “I understand,” he said, “you mean ...” ’ should be ‘ “I understand,” he said. “You mean ...”. ’ (typo)

2.389    (592B4-5): “He’d only involve himself in its affairs, not those of anywhere else” loses the triumphant tone achieved by Socrates’s prolepsis in the Greek and abandons the riddle of two “cities” or “constitutions” (τὰ γὰρ ταύτης μόνης ἂν πράξειεν ἄλλης δὲ οὐδεμιᾶς). Shorey: “the politics of this city only will be his and of none other.” (u)

2.392    (596B1): θέλεις should be ’θέλεις again. (typo)

2.393    (595C5): “Fire away” for ἐρώτα is pleasantly colloquial but leaves behind the very important detail that Plato is here announcing that the interlocutors have agreed to embark on a dialectical examination, a transition very important to the dialectical method and the dialogue form. (c)

2.393    (595E8): τί βούλεται εἶναι is not “what it is supposed to be” (too subjective) but “what it’s really about.” Shorey: “what it would be at.” (i)

2.393    (596A6): The tr. puts ‘Form’ (capitalized) for εἶδος but the conceptual significance of the capitalization is unclear. (c)

2.393    (596A7): ἕκαστα τὰ πολλά is any plurality of things that have a distinct character, not “each of the many groups of things” (again as if we could rely upon the logic of sets: cf. ad 2.311, supra). (c)

2.393    (596A7): ἐπιφέρομεν is not “can apply” but do apply – very important. (c)

2.393    (596A10): ὅτι βούλει τῶν πολλῶν is not “any of the pluralities” but “whichever you want out of the many possibilities.” (c)

2.393    (596B3): σκεύη is not “items” but “furniture,” setting up χρώμεθα below, 596C8. Cf. IDIOM n. ad 2.45, supra (495A8). (sm)

2.395    (596B6-8): ὁ δημιουργὸς ἑκατέρου … πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων ... ὁ μὲν τὰς κλίνας ὁ δὲ τὰς τραπέζας: μέν / δέ divide the single idea (πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων) of the original being imitated into two indifferent examples. The bed a craftsman makes he makes looking off and the table another craftsman makes he makes looking off.  But tr. brings the division to the top and gets “one craftsman makes one and another another,” placing a distracting emphasis upon which does which. (sy)

2.396    (596D9): Again θέλεις should be ’θέλεις. (typo)

2.397    (596E4): φαινόμενα is not “things we can perceive” (as opposed to ὄντα which presumably are invisible?) but “the appearance of things.”  It is as if Au. were trying to make Glaucon sound like a “Platonist.” He gets it right, below at 596E11. (c)

2.397    (597A2): ὃ δή φαμεν εἶναι ὃ ἔστι κλίνη is not “I mean the thing we say is the actual bed,” but “which, as we put it, is ‘what bed really is.’” (c)

2.397    (597A2): In the immediate sequel, ἀλλὰ κλίνην τινά is not “but just a particular bed” (the Latinate polysyllables “actual” and “particular” are not as conceptually self-explanatory as they might sound!), but “a sort of bed” or “a bed, sort of.” (c)

2.399    (597A8-9): οὔκουν ὥς γ’ ἂν δόξειεν τοῖς περὶ τοὺς τοιούσδε λόγους διατρίβουσιν is not “No he wouldn’t be – at any rate that’s what it would appear to be to those who engage in these kinds of argument ...” but “No, he would not, at least in the judgment of those who engage in our kind of analysis.” (u)

2.399    (597B3): τίς is not “who” but what his identity is – i.e., how to classify him (see Dodds ad Gorg.447D1 for the idiom, and IDIOM n. ad 505B9 [2.79], supra). “who he actually is” begs the question of what “actual” means. (i)

2.399    (597C3): “one actual Form which is a bed” now combines the Latin with capitalization, but the concept is again left unclear. μίαν (μόνον) αὐτὴν ἐκείνην ὃ ἔστιν κλίνη is “only one bed, that bed that is bed”  (NOT “a” bed – for that is again κλίνη τις). (c)

2.399    (597C7): εἰ δύω μόνας ποιήσειεν, after δύω ἢ πλείους (C4), means “if he were to make even just two.” (u)

2.399    (597C8): ἀναφανείη is would “pop up” or come into view, not would “be discovered.”

2.401    (597C8-9): καὶ εἴη ἂν ὃ ἔστιν κλίνη ἐκείνη is not “and that would be the actual bed” but “a second bed would pop into view whose essence both itself and the other bed would have, so that it would be that bed and there would not be two.” The emphasis is on εἴη. (c)

2.401    (597D3): μίαν φύσει αὐτὴν ἔφυσεν means “he made bed to be one in nature (μίαν is predicative), not “the one which in its nature is unique,” borrowed perhaps from Shorey’s “produced it in nature unique” imperfectly understood.

2.403    (597E10-598A3): The tr. has “”What about the painter? Does the artist …”  but the Greek does not change subjects. (u)

2.403    (598A5): οἵα ἔστιν ἢ οἵα φαίνεται; is “as they are or as they appear?” There is no “to be” as added by the tr., and conceptually there cannot be. (c)

2.403    (598A7): θεᾷ is not “examine” but “look at” or even “stare at.” (c)

2.403    (598A9): “and similarly with the rest” is unnecessarily vague for καὶ τἆλλα ὡσαύτως: Socrates generalizes to any “visual object.” At least “with the other things.” (u)

2.403    (598B1): αὐτό is left out of the translation. Socrates means “focus on this.” (i)

2.403    (598B2): ὡς ἔχει is “how it is” not “what it is.” If these expressions are interchangeable for Au. there is a problem in concept, not just translation. (c)

2.405    (598B8): καὶ τοῦτο εἴδωλον is not “and this is an image.” καὶ τοῦτο is idiomatic:  “(not only is it small [quantitative] but) a likeness [qualitative] to boot.” (i)

2.405    (598C1-4): Of ἀλλ’ ὅμως παῖδάς γε καὶ ἄφρονας ἀνθρώπους … the sense is, “children he could deceive, if he were a good painter” but tr. disregards the word order: “if he were a good painter, and showed his painting to some children … from a distance, he would trick them ...” needlessly losing the swiftness and directness of the original. (sy)

2.405    (598D1-5): “we must take him for a simpleton ... and it seems he has been duped,” leaving out “that” before “it seems” again shifts out of oratio obliqua to recta (cf. nn. ad 1.225 [318E3],  2.163 [529E5]; SYNTAX nn. ad 1.143 [364A1-4], 2.341 [580B9-C4], 2.425 [603B5-7]; UNGAINLY n. ad 2.485 [620D2]). The error is “consistent” enough to imagine that Au. considers it idiomatic in English to do so, but strictly the practice needlessly threatens to lose the consecutiveness of the argument. (u)

2.405    (598D4): αὐτός focusses the verb onto this person he is imagining. Its omission in translation, here, leaves the translation ambiguous. (i)

2.404    (598E5): Au. prints τ⟨οι⟩ούτοις, the text presented by Slings (against τούτοις, the unanimous reading of the mss.), an emendation that Slings, and Au. following him in his critical note, attribute to H.Richards (Platonica [1911]148) who there suggests changing the text since Plato should not have presumed that imitators are eo ipso ignorant and should at this point have limited his remarks to only such imitators as he just now is describing – a sense that Richards thinks can be achieved by adding οι. But it is the fact that it is an imitation that deceives them, regardless of the artists’ knowledge (whence the imitators are in the dative with ἐντυχόντες rather than constructed as agents with ὑπό + gen. vel sim.), and so Richards’s emendation is pointless. But besides commemorating this silly emendation from Slings,  Au. does not bring Richards’s point across in the tr. with any emphasis, and so once again we have a disconnect between text and translation and the careful reader is sent on a fool’s errand. (t)

2.405    (598E2): καὶ τά γε θεῖα clearly adds θεῖα to ἀνθρώπεια not to ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν – as Au.’s own punctuation of the Greek shows (is there a typo?). With γε it means “not to mention divine.” (i)

2.407    (599B4-5): In ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις … ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς μιμήμασι, the ἔργα are the are the subjects of praise in poetry, not poetic works (whence the distinction ἐγκωμιαζόμενος / ἐγκωμιάζων at the end of the sentence). “deeds” must be the translation at (588B6). The idiomatic λόγος / ἔργον distinction lies behind the passage. (i)

2.407    (599B9): τῶν μὲν ἄλλων πέρι is foil (as the anastrophic word order tries to make unmissable) in a praeteritio that the translation does not bring across. (i)

2.407    (599C2-3): τίνας ὑγιεῖς is the beginning of the apodosis: there is no “or” to make this a second question.

2.409    (599C5): For ἐκγόνους, i.e. the Asclepiads, “descendants” is a hazardous translation since English does not as easily as Greek conceive of students as offspring. (i)

2.409    (599D1): πυνθανομένους is not “looking at these.” It is absolute in the Greek, its subject is ἡμᾶς (sc. out of ἐῶμεν above), and it means “by way of seeking information from him.” Socrates is suggesting they take the edge off the challenge (as at 476E5: cf ad 1.553, supra). (i)

2.409    (599D5): ἐπιτηδεύματα is not “essential characteristics” but (as before) activities, exercises or disciplines, often used in a doublet with μαθήματα. Moreover, attributes or characteristics cannot make a person good; and if “make” refers to satisfying criteria, as it can in English, then the Greek ποιεῖν has been misunderstood since it, on the other hand, cannot. (i)

2.409    (600A4-5): οἷα εἰς τὰ ἔργα σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐπίνοιαι is “the sorts of practical contraptions of a clever man” not “as would be expected of the deeds of a wise man” (= ?). Behind the language is the distinction of word and deed. (sm)

2.411    (600A10): αὐτὸς ζῶν is “when he was himself alive” not “Homer in private life.” (sm)

2.413    (600C8): τοῖς ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν is “upon their contemporaries” (again at D5 below, “contemporaries” not “fellow men”); and συγγενόμενοι (nominative) is “by their séances.”

2.413    (600E6): ἀλλά is not “yet as we were saying,” but German sondern: “but rather that, as we have now argued.”

2.413    (600E7-601A1): σκυτότομον ποιήσει δοκοῦντα εἶναι is not “will portray a cobbler who seems to be real” but “will produce what seems truly to be a cobbler” (rather than what truly is a cobbler – “true,” not “real,” from ἀλήθεια, above).

2.413    (601A1-2): The τε … καί linkage in ἀὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπαΐων περὶ σκυτοτομίας καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐπαΐουσιν conjures the image of a folie à deux that does not come across in the translation. (sy)

2.413    (601A2): δέ is “but instead,” not “since.” (sy)

2.413    (601A6-7): ἑτέροις τοιούτοις is derogatory (an idiom of ἕτερος): a similar “ilk” would be better than a similar “sort.” (i)

2.415    (601B2): ἐπεί γε, undercutting what he has just said, is just left out of the tr. (i)

2.415    (601B4): οἷα φαίνεται is “how they appear” not “what they appear to be.” (u)

2.417    (601E7): πίστιν is trust not opinion, coming out of πιστεύων (E5). It becomes δόξα only in the next paragraph via repetition of the transitional term, ὀρθή (602A4). (sm)

2.421    (602D1): The antecedent of αὕτη is “sight.”

2.421    (602D7-9): μὴ ἄρχειν … τὸ φαινόμενον μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ πλέον ἢ βαρύτερον ἀλλὰ το λογισάμενον ...” is translated, “so that apparent differences in size, number and weight don’t rule in us.” Strictly this is wrong, and in any case unnecessarily loose. It is appearances rather than the differences he is worried about, and in particular that the apparent size should take precedence in our understanding as opposed to the true size known by calculation. (sy)

2.421    (602E4): The dative participial phrase is governed by τἀναντία. The sentence means that what appears to reason is often opposite and contrary to what had appeared to sense (setting up παρά and κατὰ τὰ μέτρα below, 603A1-2).

2.423    (603A10-B1): The antecedent of “it” is plural and the verbs shift from plural (accomplish what is their function) to singular (it associates itself) – perhaps because in the Greek the original subject (ἡ γραφικὴ καὶ ὄλως ἡ μιμητική) was an hendiadys treated as singular (ἀπεργάζεται). (u)

2.423    (603B1-2): The syntax of “and has no healthy or even true purpose” is unclear: is the subject of the verb “that part” or is it the “it” from above (namely painting and mimesis in general)? The trouble began when tr. underplayed the anaphoric πόρρω μέν / πόρρω δέ structure. (u)

2.423    (603B4): “rubbing shoulders” in American English at least is not an erotic enough metaphor for  συγγιγνομένη. Better is “consort” (Quandt) or “cohabit” (Shorey). In the same vein γεννᾷ refers to offspring (more specific than “produce”). (u)

2.425    (603C4): προθέσθαι is not make a proposal but propose a problem. (i)

2.425    (603C5-7): “and if as a result ... they are ...” has dropped the fact that we are still in oratio obliqua. All those results (ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν … χαίροντας) are part of poetry’s depiction. (sy)

2.427    (603C7): Au. prints ἦν, the brilliant emendation of Ast accepted by Burnet (AM : FD) but translates (which is what Slings printed): “are you sure (μή + subj.) there’s nothing beyond this?” No critical note. (t)

2.425    (603D6): ἐναντιωμάτων ἅμα γιγνομένων means not that the contradictories “all arise together” but that they are contradictory at the same moment (ἅμα is formulaic in this sense: cf., e.g., 436B9, C5, C11, al.). (c)

2.425    (603E8): “get under control” for μετριάσει fails to produce the etymon Socrates is interested in, upon which the argument depends (μέτρον). “moderate” (Shorey) is closer. (sm)

2.427    (604A8): δέξαιτο is not “allow” (having to do with force) but “accept” (having to do with will). (i)

2.429    (604C7): As to “in the way that reason determines what is best,” the Greek has no “what.” The object of αἱρεῖ is the unexpressed antecedent of ὅπῃ. The translation moreover leaves out the generalizing force of ἄν, by which Socrates makes the remark a rule of thumb.

2.429    (604C7): ἀλλὰ μή should not be rendered with “yet without” after a semicolon, but with “rather than.”

2.429    (604C9): “and instead always get” for ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἐθίζειν has lost the infinitival construction. We need either infinitive “to get” or gerund “getting.” (sy)

2.429    (604E5-6): The syntax of “of a kind” in “for the imitation is of a kind which is an alien experience” is unclear. One of its possible senses is the correct one, which is that the mood being imitated is of a kind that comes across as alien to them (ἀλλοτρίου γάρ που πάθους ἡ μίμησις αὐτοῖς γίγνεται), but the reader of a translation must at all costs be provided the right meaning. (u)

2.431    (605A8): οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐπιλαμβανοίμεθα is not “Should we rightly ...” but “Would we not be justified if we ... .” And πρὸς ἁλήθειαν is not “as regards truth” but “measured against truth.”

2.431    (605A8-B2): Tr. fails to see the gradus from δικαίως ἄν at 605A8, to ἤδη ἂν ἐν δίκῃ at 605B2.(sy)

2.431    (605A10): ἕτερον τοιοῦτον means not “another similar” but “a counterpart of the same ilk” (as above). (i)

2.431    (605C6-8): τό γε μέγιστον … τὸ γάρ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς … πάνδεινόν που. does not claim that ‘its capacity ... is in my (Socrates’s) view most damning” but simply that ‘its ability to harm ... is clearly a menace to all.’ Note that Glaucon’s response makes no sense if we accept the tr. of this remark by Socrates. (u)

2.433    (605C11): “representing” rather than “imitating” for μιμούμενον loses grip of the argument’s crucial point: that it is μιμούμενον – imitated – keeps in the forefront that it will be external (this is the context). (u)

2.433    (605D3): “as we follow” for the (main) verb ἑπόμεθα is neither syntactically nor semantically as emphatic as it needs to be: we follow right along, suffering right along with them. (u)

2.433    (605E1-2): “while what we approved of before is what women do” barely gets the sense of ἐκεῖνο δὲ γυναικός, ὃ τότε ἐπῃνοῦμεν, which is ‘whereas to do that other thing would be womanly – the very thing we just praised.’ Tr. conflates the δέ clause with the ὃ τότε clause which goes with both μέν and δέ. (u)

2.433    (605E5): αἰσχύνοιτο (sc. εἶναι): not “ashamed of” but “ashamed to be.”

2.435    (606C3): Au. prints ὅτι, ⟨ ἂν ἃ⟩ ἃν αὐτὸς and gives no critical note. The text is difficult and has been emended many ways (for a recent account cf. my n. ad loc.). I believe the ἃν printed by Au is a typo (in addition to the unwanted space after the left bracket) and that Slings’s reading,  ὅτι, ⟨ἂν ἃ⟩ ἂν αὐτὸς, is what he intended. This at least is what the tr. seems to be reading. A critical note would have cleared things up; students will be confused. (t)

2.435    (606C4): “and you would enjoy them and not revile them” translates χαρῇς a second time. It was already translated above, with “which you would enjoy very much.” (u)

2.435    (606C5): A comma is needed after “you see” (translating γάρ). (typo)

2.435    (606C7-9): The meaning of “making it strong you often don’t realize you have been betrayed into creating the comedy yourself” is unclear. The sense of the Greek is, “with that rash act you face the likelihood of being carried off before you know it and turning out to be a comedian in your own right after all.” (u)

2.435    (606D1): θυμοῦ means “anger” but is (again) translated “passion,” especially inappropriate when it is being contrasted with erotic desire (ἀφροδισίων … καὶ θυμοῦ). (u)

2.437    (606E4): ἀναλαβόντι μανθάνειν is not “who takes him up to learn” but “who takes him up and learns.” (i)

2.437    (607A1-3ff): The contrast created by μέν / δέ does not come across, nor the concessive tendency of μέν.   “while recognizing” in the δέ clause is much too weak: rather, “but know and keep in mind.” (i)

2.437    (607A7): τοῦ κοινῇ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου is “the argument that is judged best (or noblest) at the time,” not “the thing which appears to be best for the common interest at all times, namely reason.” κοινῇ refers to the consensus reached by deliberation: cf. Crito, 49D5-E2.

2.437    (607B2): ὅτι is “that” not “because” (i.e., it presents the content of the ἀπολογία).

2.437    (607B3): τοιαύτην οὖσαν is not “for being what it is,” but “for being such (i.e., such as we have shown it to be).”

2.437    (607B7): “greet” should be capitalized as the other initial words are – or none should be. (typo)

2.438    (607D1): καὶ σύ … . Not “even you” but “you also (as I am).” It underlines the sincerity of Socrates’s own remark just before (ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ...).

2.438    (607E4): ἐρα two lines from the bottom needs a hyphen. N.b., it is at another Burnet page-break; cf. n. ad 2.146, supra. (typo)

2.439    (607E4): “and yet if she isn’t” answers ἐὰν … φαίνῃ … ὠφελίμη, which was translated “but if she doesn’t (so appear)” and so the tr. is totally unclear. (u)

2.439    (607E4): οἱ ποτέ του ἐρασθέντες is not ‘those who once loved her’ (i.e., poetry). του is τινός, not αὐτῆς! Socrates is speaking generally about a person “who once was in love with somebody” and had to get over it.

2.440    (608A3): ἀκροσαόμεθα should be ἀκροασόμεθα. (typo)

2.441    (608A6): δ’ οὖν is not just “so,” but “at least, be that as it may” – i.e., “at least we can be sure ... .” (i)

2.441    (608A6): σπουδαστέον is not “indulge” but “take seriously.”

2.441    (608B1): τῷ ἀκροωμένῳ, περὶ τῆς ἐν αὑτῷ πολιτείας δεδιότι (Au. does punctuate the Greek this way) is not “whoever fears … must take care that … for the listener,” since he himself is the listener according to the syntax. It is simply, “care must be taken by the listener out of fear for the order of his own soul.”

2.441    (608B5): γενέσθαι is not “become” but “turn out.”

2.441    (608B6): ἐπαρθέντα means not “exalted” but “aroused to distraction” – The idea is that of 416D1 and 434B1.

2.441    (608C4): μείζω ἐστὶν ἄλλα means not “the rest is greater” (that, idiomatically, would require the article), but “if there are greater things than what we have mentioned.” (i)

2.443    (608C8): οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν answers τί δ’ ἂν μέγα γένοιτο; and means “nothing would be big,” which the tr. gratuitously expands: “It would be so small as to be nothing.”

2.443    (608D2): ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο λέγεις; means not “What do you mean by this,” but “What ‘thing’ are you talking about?” with τοῦτο referring to πράγματι, C9.

2.443    (608D11-12): “Just listen” and “Please speak” again misses the acknowledgment by the interlocutors that they are embarking upon question and answer dialogue (cf. IDIOM n. ad 2.25  supra). (i)

2.433    (608D13): τι is adverbial: not “do you speak of” but do you “use the terms” good and evil. (i)

2.445    (609B4): “something … which contains an evil element which makes it weak but yet is unable to …” is wrong. “to which is correlated a certain distinct evil” is what the dative means, and has meant over and over above. Also “contain” is wrong in the next line (B9), with ψυχῇ.

2.445    (609B6): τοῦ πεφυκότος οὕτως means “a thing so constituted” – i.e., as to have a correlate evil that does not destroy.

2.447    (609C5): “which is a deficiency of soul” for πονηρίας οὔσης ψυχῆς fails to locate this assertion as part of the mistaken οἴησις. Translate rather: “as being the corruption pertinent to soul.” (u)

2.447    (609D1-2): “which attaches itself to a thing, indwells and destroys” for τῷ προσκαθῆσθαι καὶ ἐνεῖναι διαφθειρούσης (sc. κακίας) should be “(its particular evil) corrupting it by (dative of means) besetting and dwelling within it” (the thing ceases to be what it is). Compare D5-6 below for the construction. (u)

2.447    (609D2): “a state of non-existence” is incorrect. εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι is εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτό. (c)

2.447    (609D5): ἐνοῦσα ἐν αὐτῇ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κακία τῷ ἐνεῖναι … is not “do injustice and the other evils dwelling in it destroy …”.  ἐνοῦσα by its position is circumstantial, not attributive (Shorey makes the same error).

2.447    (609D9): ἐκεῖνό γε. The “remote” demonstrative refers here to the “the alternative” (to what has been said): “And yet that would be an absurd thing, if the deficiency …” points fecklessly, and “deficiency” does not create a strong enough contrast. (i)

2.449    (610A2): τὸ ἔμφυτον κακόν is not the “innate badness” but the particular badness assigned to it by nature.

2.449    (610A6): μή ποτε ἀξιῶμεν is not “we can never” but “let us never” as at B1, which tr. gets right. Perhaps this is just a matter of loose expression.

2.449    (610A10): With ἢ τοίνυν Socrates postpones telling us an alternative ( alterum, A10) is being insisted upon (τοίνυν): primum is concessive. Socrates is saying they must accept immortality until they can refute the argument. The rest of the paragraph is a triumphant announcement and asseveration of this thesis. (u)

2.449    (610B3-4): μηδὲν μᾶλλον is again the skeptical trope (cf. nn. ad 1.467 [454E1] and 2.15 [487C3], supra).  Au. translates “is no more likely” in order to give μᾶλλον something to modify but it is causation not likelihood that is the issue. (i)

2.449    (610B5): For αὐτή “soul itself” is too weak. “in itself” at least, or “for its part.” Cf.609E2. (i)

2.449    (610B7): ἐν ἄλλῳ γιγνόμενον is not “arises in another thing,” but “gets into (i.e. infects) another thing.” Likewise, ἐγγιγνόμενον below (B7) is “get in,” not “arise in.”

2.449    (610C4): διὰ τὸν θάνατον is not “on account of their death” but “because they are dying.” (u)

2.451    (610C8): “that our souls are immortal.”   “our” translating the article is excellent! (i)

2.451    (610D6-7): ἀπαλλαγὴ … κακῶν is not a release from his evil ways (these he chooses and prefers) but from the troubles of life (ἀπαλλαγή is formulaic). (c)

2.451    (610E10): μηδ’ ὑφ’ ἑνός is not “not … some single,” but μηδενός in tmesis: “if nothing makes it perish.” (i)

2.451    (610E10-611A1): ἀπόλλυται / ἀεὶ ὄν are not “die” / “remain alive” but “perish” / “exist” (i.e., be what it is). Only after these can he go on to say “deathless.”

2.451    (611A5): εἶεν ἄν is not “is” constant, but “would be” (also at A6, “nor could they be more”).

2.453    (611B5-6): In σύνθετόν τε ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ μὴ τῇ καλλίστῃ κεχρημένον συνθέσει, the collapse of the phrase done by repeating σύνθετον with συνθέσει brings to the fore that the construction is of the πολλὰ καὶ καλά (quantity/quality) type. The translation, “is made up of many parts and is not put together in the finest manner,” does not bring this across. Shorey’s “many elements not put together in the best way” at least drops the reiterated “is;” compare Quandt: “composed of parts that are many according to a formula that is less than fine.” (sy)

2.452    (611C3): Au. prints διαθεατέον, accepting with Burnet and Slings the reading of lesser authority – a scribitur in the Monacensis – (διαθετέον  ADF); and adds a critical note (“scr. recc.”) that he has borrowed from Burnet rather than Slings (for Slings in his note ad loc. refers to the Monacensis rather than simply writing scr.recc. as Burnet had). At the same time he abandons his usual habit of imitating Slings’s way of printing the lesser variant, with pointed brackets (Slings had printed διαθε⟨α⟩τέον). His own text borrows from here and there: Au. has not adopted his own rules of orthography. (t)

2.453    (611C3-4): τοιοῦτον ἱκανῶς λογισμῷ διαθετέον is “under this aspect must we give it an adequate rational scrutiny,” not “that is the sort of thing which, to be viewed adequately, must be seen by means of reason.”  The Greek lacks the connective this translation would require.

2.453    (611C6-7): On “Now we’re telling the truth … but we have looked at its condition ...” : (1) νῦν δέ means “in reality” and is not just temporal; (2) μέν is concessive; and (3) ἀληθῆ is not “the truth.” Better: “But as it is, while what we have said is true, the theoretical stance we have adopted (τεθεάμεθα) has viewed her only in her conditioned state.” (i)

2.453    (611D1): οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ῥᾳδίως is not “would not easily see,” but “could not still readily see.”

2.453    (611D4): λελωβῆσθαι, “damaged,” should be “mutilated” (i.e., something stronger) and should be the same term as used for λελωβημένον above (B10), to seal the analogy. (sm)

2.455    (611D7): ἐκεῖσε is not just “elsewhere” but “off yonder” (approbative and pregnant). (i)

2.455    (612A1): “in as much as” should probably be “inasmuch as.” (typo)

2.456    (n.36): needs a period at the end. (typo)

2.457    (612B7): ἀνεπίφθονον is “not arousing jealousy” or “scandal,” at least. Tr.’s “unobjectionable” is too vague (what would the “objection” be?) Cf. Quandt ad loc.

2.457    (612C1): ὅσους τε καὶ οἵους is a formula of praise. Therefore not just “the number and quantity” but “how great and how many they are.” Shorey: “all the various.” (i)

2.457    (612C6): τί μάλιστα is not “what in particular” but “what in the world.” Glaucon has no idea what Socrates is referring to! (i)

2.457    (612D3-9): The paragraph should be compared with the version of Shorey that it is replacing. (u)

2.457    (612D3): Comma rather than period after “judged.” (typo)

2.459    (612D5): καὶ ἡμᾶς is correlative with ὥσπερ above: “so also with us.” (sy)

2.459    (612D5): ὁμολογεῖν is not just “agree” but “grant” (after having denied or doubted). (i)

2.459    (612D6): κομίσηται is middle and its subject is δικαιοσύνη: she can “garner” the rewards.

2.459    (612D6-7): “that that” should be “that.” (typo)

2.459    (612E8): οὐχ ὁμολογήσομεν is “shall we not agree” not “did we not agree.”

2.459    (613A7): In ἢ καί the καί is not otiose. Not just “when he lives or when he dies” but “or perhaps when he dies.” (i)

2.461    (613B11): ὅπερ is again adverbial.  Not “do what runners do” (it is a simile) but “fare as” (Shorey). (i)

2.461    (613C9): ἀνέξῃ ἄρα is not “can you bear it” but “will you bear it.” English idiom allows “can” to mean “will’ when a person is asking for agreement (“can you see your way to ...”). Socrates is not cajoling Glaucon to “come halfway” with him but to own up to the full implication of the argument and resolve to abandon the attitude he confessed to in Book Two.  Thus Socrates repeats it at the end of this paragraph (where note admonitory ὅρα εἰ ἀνέξῃ, E4).

2.462    (613E2): Au. prints εἶτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται (without dashes before and after as supplied by Burnet) and appends this critical note (n.6):

                εἶτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται Jowett-Campbell, Burnet; secl. Ast, Slings

The note is peculiar for listing four editors’ opinions rather than giving the textual evidence. What he has printed is in fact the unanimous testimony of the mss. and he has chosen to read it, so no critical note is needed. He might well add a note to the translation about editors’ doubts but these doubts are not textual evidence. Slings and Burnet both record in their apparatus that Ast deleted the words so that we have the early editor Ast deleting with one modern editor accepting his deletion and the other refusing it. But then how does Jowett-Campbell come into the picture? Why not mention Adam’s deletion, or Chambry’s in the Budé? And what did Shorey do? If we look at Shorey’s Loeb, which this text is meant to replace in the Series, Shorey tells us that Ast deleted it and was followed by Hermann and Stallbaum but that Jowett-Campbell and Burnet read it. This, then, is where Au. got the reference to Jowett-Campbell! Compare Au.’s use of Shorey’s outdated report of Adam’s opinion about 556D7, noted above ad 2.254, which Shorey got from his text of 1900 and not his famous commentary as any unsuspecting reader would assume, where in fact he reversed himself! Shorey had mentioned J-C only because that was a major edition at the time of his writing (indeed he had published a fairly detailed review article of the edition when it came out: AJP 16(1895)223-436). Au.’s continual confusing of editorial opinion with historical evidence is the error of an amateur. (t)

2.465    (614B7): On ἀναβιοὺς δέ, the tr. “having done so” evinces embarrassment to bring across the simple epanalepsis, which is a characteristic trait of tale-spinning. To drop it completely is better than this. (u)

2.465    (614C1): δαιμόνιον is not “sacred,” but “strange” or “mysterious.” (i)

2.467    (614E1): καθαράς is not “purified” but “all clean” (contrasting with μεστὰς αὐχμοῦ τε καὶ κόνεως): “purified” is an interpretation not a translation.  (i)

2.467    (615A1): “how much and what kind of things” too long-winded for the formulaic auxesis (cf. ad 2.457 supra). “all the horrid things” (Quandt). (i)

2.467    (615A2-3): εἶναι δὲ τὴν πορείαν χιλιέτη is an assertion of Er, not what the souls said to each other.

2.469    (615E1): οἰομένους ἤδη ἀναβήσεσθαι is “they thought they were on the verge of ascending” not “they already thought they would be on their way up.” (i)

2.469    (615E5): καταμανθάνοντες τὸ φθέγμα is “marking” the noise (“paying attention to the noise,” though it does bring across the present tense, is too vague). Shorey: “took note of the noise;” Quandt: “hearken to the call.”

2.469    (616A3): τοῖς ἀεὶ παριοῦσι is not “those who were continuously passing by” but “to any passer-by” (ἀεί “distributive”). (i)

2.469    (616A3): ὧν ἕνεκα is not “the reasons for this” but “because of what” – what deeds they committed that warranted their punishment.

2.469    (616A3): “the reasons for this” as a tr. for ὧν ἕνεκα, if it means “why they were flaying them,” is slovenly. (u)

2.471    (616B1): Comma after “counterparts” is missing. (typo)

2.471    (616D1-5): “Its shape is … ” down to καὶ οὕτω δή (D5) is an intervention by Socrates. This needs to be shown, by closing and reopening quotes.

2.473    (616E): It is noteworthy and characteristic of this tr. that it should have rationalized Socrates’s decorative variatio in the order of the cardinal and ordinal numbers of the spheres, just as it is characteristic of Shorey’s that he let them be. (u)

2.473    (616E9): “star-studded” for ποικίλον is an interpretation not a translation.  Shorey's “spangled” is perfect.

2.477    (618A4): καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους ἅπαντας is not all sorts of human beings but all sorts of human lives.

2.477    (618A8-9): κατὰ κάλλη καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἰσχύν τε καὶ ἀγωνίαν is not “for their beauty of appearance or for other strength and powers” (=?). It is adverbial ἄλλος (“or strength besides ...”). (i)

2.477    (618B3-4): διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλον ἑλομένην βίον ἀλλοίαν γενέσθαι means “since the way a soul turns out is irrevocably determined by the choice of life she made,” not “implied a soul’s different constitution.”  On the meaning of the chiasm cf. Quandt ad loc.

2.478    (618C7): Au. prints ῥηθέντα [καὶ] συντιθέμενα without critical note, borrowing Slings’s (new) athetization of καί (against all mss.); but then translates the καί anyway: “by considering all that has been said up to now and putting it all together ... .” (t)

2.479    (618C1): μαθημάτων is studies, not lessons. It is not that we are to disregard certain content, but that we are to abandon all other pursuits. Cf. ad 2.387 (591C2), supra. (u)

2.479    (618C3): μαθεῖν καὶ ἐξευρεῖν is not “learn and discover” but “learn or discover.”  The two sources were broached above with correlative καί ’s (C2) and are now presented in a characteristically streamlined chiasm. (i)

2.479    (618C5): “to be able to choose” should be only “to choose:” the question of ability was already covered above.  ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν is more “as the situation allows, to the extent possible” than “out of those that are possible.” Shorey: “always and everywhere to choose the best that conditions allow.” (u)

2.479    (618C6): τὰ νυνδὴ ῥηθέντα is not “all that has been said up to now” but “all the factors that have been adduced.” Shorey: “all the things of which we have spoken.” Cf. Quandt ad loc. (u)

2.479    (618D1): “the possession of what kind of state of what kind of soul,” for μετὰ ποίας τινὸς ψυχῆς ἕξεως, besides its unwieldiness, translates ἕξις twice. Shorey: “with what habit of soul.” (u)

2.479    (618D2): ἰδιωτεῖαι καὶ ἀρχαί is a pair, like the pairs before it and after it. The tr. loses the antithesis needlessly, to-wit: “high or low birth, one’s personal life, political offices, and physical strengths and weaknesses ... .” (u)

2.479    (618D2-5): τί ἐργάζεται is “what effect these things have,” not “what can be achieved” by them.

2.479    (618D4): “soul, naturally or are acquired” should probably be “soul naturally, or are acquired.” (typo)

2.479    (618D6): “taking thought” for συλλογισάμενον fails to recall semantically the verb that it points back to (ἀναλογιζόμενον, C6), which had been translated “considering.” (sm)

2.479    (618E4): “supreme” choice is too vague and unclear for κρατίστη αἵρεσις. Instead, “crucial” or “most influential” choice – the choice with the longest effect, a common use of this adjective in both its degrees. (u)

2.481    (619D1): In ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν, καί is “in very fact.” (i)

2.481    (619D1-3): ὡς δε καὶ εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάττους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἁλισκομένους τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἥκοντας is not “generally speaking a number not less than the others, caught in such circumstances were those who came down from the sky” (unclear and run-on) but (Shorey): “and one may perhaps say that a majority of those who were thus caught were of the company that had come down from heaven;” or (Quandt): “and indeed it seemed that virtually as many of those that made this mistake had come from heaven as had come from the other place.” The sense is not “caught in such circumstances” but “entrapped in this way.” (u)

2.481    (619D5-7): In διὸ δὴ καὶ μεταβολὴν τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πολλαῖς τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεσθαι, the first καί means a “virtual” reversal came about. It is not just an “exchange between good and evil lives.” (i)

2.483    (619E3): εὐδαιμονεῖν ἄν is not “may be happy” but “would be happy” and in the next line “will not be a rough road” should be “would not be” (οὐκ ἄν, E4). (u)

2.483    (620A2): For κατὰ συνήθειαν, “through familiarity” is unclear. Even Shorey’s “by the habits” is not quite right. They are acting out of a reaction to what they got used to before. “in accordance with the perspective of their former lives” (Quandt). (c)

2.483    (620A6): Being “born in” a woman is not quite what appalls him, but having to come into existence through the path of a woman’s uterus. (c)

2.483    (620B5-6): “in the middle of them” for ἐν μέσοις δέ is too vague. Rather, “drawing her lot somewhere in between them in the order.” Cf. B1, “the soul that was allotted to choose twentieth” (εἰκοστήν goes with λαχοῦσαν though the tr. made it into “the twentieth soul to choose”). (u)

2.485    (620C1-2): τεχνικῆς γυναικός is not a female craftworker but a worker in a woman’s craft (rather than the “arts of war”). (c)

2.485    (620C7): μόγις means “almost at his wit’s end” (not just the colorless “with difficulty”). (i)

2.485    (620D2): “and was glad to choose it” for ἁσμένην ἑλέσθαι has (1) again forgotten the leading construction is acc./inf. in oratio obliqua (cf. ad 2.405, supra), whence ἑλέσθαι is the main verb and not a complementary infinitive with ἁσμένην; and (2) has lost the drama of Odysseus’s behavior. “eagerly grabbed it” is the idea; even Shorey’s “and chose it gladly,” though syntactically correct, is too weak. (u)

2.485    (620D7): “according to the draw they approached Lachesis in order” is slovenly. He means their turn to see Lachesis was in the same order as their turn to choose their lot.  Shorey finesses it; Quandt: “once they had chosen they approached Lachesis in the same order.” (u)

2.487    (620E6): “without turning around” is too weak for ἀμεταστρεπτί. It means they were not allowed to, continuing the idea of ἀμετάστροφα (E5). (u)

2.487    (621A8): τοῦ μέτρου is not “their measure” as if each had his personal allotment. The article is “generic” not “possessive.” (c)

2.487    (621A8): τὸν δέ effects a transition to continue the narrative. “He went on to say that ... .” (i)

2.487    (621B3): φέρεσθαι is not “taken up” but “were being borne off” (representing an imperfect). (i)

2.487    (621B4): The tr. loses the “he said” construction at its paradoxical end. How did he know this? he could not say! (i)

2.487    (621C3): νομίζοντες is not “consider that the soul is immortal” (=?) but “incorporate the fact of the soul’s immortality into our outlook on life and way of living.”




Deficiencies in the production of these volumes are also fundamental for being avoidable, such as cybernetically-produced typographic errors (cf. ad 2.43, supra) and faulty smart-quotes (cf. ad 2.114, supra); the absence of the Stephanus page number in the upper left corner (renewing the Loeb’s erstwhile distinction of being the only standard edition of Plato that forces the reader to thumb back and forth to find out what Stephanus page he is on); the presence of a useless vertical stroke in the Greek text about halfway through each Stephanus page; the confusion of exegetical and critical notes since both are now being designated by concurrent sequences of arabic numerals; and the unnecessarily ugly page layout (e.g., 1.52-3 and 2.104-5). I have not set out to list all the errors in the work, nor do I mean to be presenting herewith a review. The merits and faults of the supplementary notes and introductory matter, though they will influence the unwary, are at this point for me side issues. The Author’s very shallow bibliography (almost nothing outside of English or earlier than 1980) has already been noted in N.Bloessner’s review of Emlyn-Jones’s ed. of Republic 1 (Gnomon 85[2013]19-25).  


I have assembled this review (1) for the sake of scholars to dissuade them from relying upon these volumes in their courses, (2) for students as a prophylaxis in case they can no longer get their hands on the Shorey Loeb, and not the least (3) in hopes that those in charge might not let this go on in future modernizations of the Loeb Plato.


© Kenneth Quandt / San Francisco / 2 September 2015


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